¹ For some historical accounts of the development of national party conventions, see Lederle, John, “National Party Conventions: Canada Shows the Way,” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, xv (Sept. 1944), 118–33Google Scholar, and the same author's “The Liberal Convention of 1919 and the Selection of Mackenzie King,” Dalhousie Review, XXVII (Sept. 1947), 85–102. See also Quinn, Herbert F., “The Third National Convention of the Liberal Party,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVII, no. 2 (May 1951)Google Scholar, and Williams, J. R., The Conservative Party of Canada, 1920–1949 (Durham, NC, 1956), 79–109Google Scholar. Biographic and autobiographic works are still among the prime sources of information on past conventions of both major parties. See, for example, Dawson, R. MacGregor, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874–1923 (Toronto, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Ward, Norman, ed., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto, 1966)Google Scholar. The 1967 and 1968 conventions did evoke some new interest. See especially Smiley, D. V., “The National Party Leadership Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis,” this Journal, I, no. 4 (Dec. 1968), 373–97Google Scholar, and Wearing, J., “The Liberal Choice,” Journal of Canadian Studies, II (May 1968), 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² “The National Party Leadership Convention,” 377.

³ “Politics Is the Name of This Political Game,” Globe and Mail, March 30, 1968.

⁴ Was the man for whom you voted on the first ballot the man you most wanted to see as leader of the party? _____ yes _____ no. If no, how would you explain your first ballot vote? ______________

⁵ Conceptually, the six strategies are not mutually exclusive, but they may be treated as such here for purposes of analysis. Coding decisions reflect the respondent's own emphasis or rank ordering of reasons for his first ballot vote. It should be clear, however, that several of the strategies could be complementary; for example, supporting a “favourite son” candidate was, for some delegates, a convenient way of “staying uncommitted.”

⁶ An interesting account of the impact of Greene's convention speech on a single delegate is Lowman, Ron, “Mrs Hagey Makes Her Choice,” Toronto Daily Star, April 6, 1968Google Scholar. Mrs Hagey later turned up as a respondent in our survey.

⁷ As might be expected, 73 per cent of MacEachen's first ballot support came from the Maritime provinces, 59 per cent of it from Nova Scotia alone. See Table VII for data on regional voting trends, and Appendix c for regional distribution of the sample.

⁸ An overwhelming 91 per cent of the respondents indicated that they considered themselves “free agents” in the voting. Among the other 9 per cent who indicated varying levels and types of binding commitments there were only two MacEachen voters (both from Ontario). The single Nova Scotia delegate who reported a binding first ballot commitment was a first ballot supporter of Mr Winters!

⁹ “Hellyer-Martin-Winters Axis Forming?” Ottawa Journal, April 4, 1998.

¹⁰ While one should not infer that it was because of Sharp's endorsement that this shift in voting occured, it is clear that the trend fully justified the view that Sharp's endorsement was highly valuable to the Trudeau campaign. It might be noted, however, that his support was useful in several ways more subtle (and perhaps ultimately more important) than any transfer of votes. As a member of the Liberal “establishment” Sharp brought to the Trudeau condidacy an aura of respectability that it had previously lacked. Considerably more important, however, and less clearly measurable, is the “bandwagon effect” created by any major shift of this type which occurs in the heat of the campaign. The fact that Sharp appears to have been able to bring along a number of his delegates as well may only have added to the advantages that Trudeau had already gained from his endorsement.

¹¹ Newman, Peter, “Sharp's Support Makes Trudeau Unstoppable,” Ottawa Journal, April 4, 1968.Google Scholar

¹² Our findings indicate that Turner enjoyed the support of a large number of younger delegates, particularly those representing the various university Liberal clubs. The mean age of Turner supporters was 32.2 years, by far the lowest of any such grouping. The “youth” delegates gave little fourth ballot support to Winters (see Table XII). Further, there is evidence to suggest that in terms of ideology as well the Turner supporters were generally closer to those of Trudeau than to the followers of Winters.

¹³ By increasing the difficulty of effectively organizing against him, the convention procedures tend to favour the front runner. An interesting discussion of this point may be found in Baar, Carl, “Party Organization, Convention Organization, and Leadership Selection in Canada and the United States,” a paper presented at the sixty-sixth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at Los Angeles, California, Sept. 11, 1970, pp. 12–18.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Regenstreif, Peter holds the same reservations regarding causality and the responses to his question, “What are the qualities that you are looking for in a leader of your party, both as a man and as a politician?” See “Change in Leadership: The Succession to Diefenbaker and Pearson,” paper presented at the fortieth annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, 1968, pp. 7–9.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., 16–21. See also the same author's “Note on the ‘Alternation’ of French and English Leaders in the Liberal Party of Canada,” this Journal, II, no. 1 (March 1969) 118–22.

¹⁶ Premier Smallwood's influence may have played a role in the Newfoundland case. Of the Newfoundland delegates in the sample 44.5 per cent (as compared with only 7.4 per cent from all other provinces) reported binding first ballot commitments. All of these voted for Trudeau. There is no real evidence in the survey, however, that the premier was able to “control” the Newfoundland delegation as was often alleged by politicians and journalists. The Newfoundland delegates in our sample did not face a genuine conflict situation since they reported an overwhelming “true preference” for Trudeau. How they might have behaved had Mr Smallwood chosen to support another candidate is an intriguing but moot question. The survey evidence in the other provinces generally indicates that provincial leaders were not a significant force in delegate decision-making, and it is also clear that the convention structure generally does not produce the mechanisms which would be required to forge and control regional voting blocs.

¹⁷ French language and ethnicity appeared to be an important source of reference group identification outside Quebec as well. An association of +.57 (Yule's Q) was obtained between language and first ballot vote for the entire sample. Of those delegates who indicated French as their primary language 61 per cent (N = 63) voted for Trudeau on the first ballot. Even delegates who reported an ability to speak French as a second language proved more likely to support Trudeau than those who spoke only English.

¹⁸ “The National Party Leadership Convention,” 396.

¹⁹ See Duncan, Otiset al., Occupations and Social Status (New York, 1961). Allan Kornberg employed the Duncan measure as a device for summarizing the occupational status of MPs; see Canadian Legislative Behavior (New York, 1967), 38–46. A similar scale was also developed byGoogle ScholarBlishen, Bernard for constructing “class profiles” from occupational data; see “The Construction and Use of an Occupational Class Scale,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV, no. 4 (Nov. 1958), 519–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar