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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Despite a rash of proposals for structural change in the government of Canada, the constitutional changes of 1982 did not bring it about. There continues to be pressure for change, especially on the part of those desiring regional representation in a strengthened second chamber. The argument of the article is that only some changes, at the limit a Bundesrat-type chamber, are compatible with the majority principle on which parliamentary government is based. An elective Senate creates problems for parliamentary government in Australia and is basically incompatible with majority rule; the introduction of such a chamber may well require the adoption of something like the United States or Swiss model. A constitutional mini-convention is proposed to negotiate such a chamber, if desired, with the first ministers prior to the employment of the new amending process.
Malgré l'avalanche de projets appelant des changements structurels dans le gouvernement du Canada, les changements constitutionnels de 1982 n'en ont pas amené. II continue d'y avoir une demande de changement, en particulier de la part de ceux qui désirent une représentation régionale à l'intérieur d'une seconde chambre renforcée. Ce texte vise à montrer que seuls quelques changements, à la limite une chambre du type Bundesrat, sont compatibles avec le principe majoritaire sur lequel le parlementarisme est basé. Un sénat électif crée des problèmes pour le parlementarisme en Australie et est fondamentalement incompatible avec la règle de la majorité; l'introduction d'une telle chambre pourrait bien rendre nécessaire l'adoption de quelque chose ressemblant au modèle américain ou suisse. Une mini-rencontre constitutionnelle des premiers ministres, prélable à l'emploi du nouveau processus d'amendement, est proposée pour négocier l'adoption d'une telle chambre, si celà est désiré.
1 This is not the place to present a complete bibliography of these reports. The central document of the Trudeau government is A Time for Action (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1978).Google Scholar Possibly the most balanced proposal is A Future Together, the report of the (Pépin-Robarts) Task Force on Canadian Unity (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1979). Prominent secondary sources are McWhinney, Edward, Canada and the Constitution, 1979–1982 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)Google Scholar, Milne, David, The New Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Lorimer, 1982)Google Scholar and Banting, Keith and Simeon, Richard (eds.), And No One Cheered (Toronto: Methuen, 1983).Google Scholar
2 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Senate Reform (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1984).Google Scholar
3 Strengthening Canada: Reform of Canada's Senate. Report of the Alberta Select Special Committee on Senate Reform (Edmonton: The Clerk's Office, Legislature, 1985).Google Scholar
4 McCormick, Peter, Manning, Ernest C. and Gibson, Gordon, Regional Representation: The Canadian Partnership (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 1981).Google Scholar
5 Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), vol. 3, 89.Google Scholar
6 While Douglas V. Vemey was one of the scholars who for some time pointed to the difficulty of combining the federal and parliamentary systems, I had not, when delivering this address, read his Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).Google Scholar I have since done so, and found the book replete with statements of the problematic posed here, especially in chaps. 1, 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11.
7 The clearest statement of Locke's majority principle is Kendall, Willmoore, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1941).Google Scholar
8 For a thorough Canadian analysis of the Australian crisis, see Smiley, D. V., An Elected Senate for Canada? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1985).Google Scholar
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11 Smiley, D. V. and Watts, R. L., Intrastate Federalism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985)Google Scholar, chap. 3.
12 Ibid., 32.
13 Irvine, W. P., Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1979).Google Scholar
14 While interviewing members of the Bundestag on the Great Coalition of 1966–1969 in 1969, I was greatly impressed by the volume and intensity of work done by PR-elected members in this area.
15 For a discussion of recent British developments along this line, see Norton, Philip (ed.), Parliament in the 1980s (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).Google Scholar
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20 Since then, Parliament had to be recalled in the summer of 1986 because the Senate had amended a bill after the Commons adjourned—hardly a way for the Senate to gain points.
