Article contents
Signaling and Tariff Policy: The Strategic Multistage Rent Reduction Game
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2003
Extract
This study uses a game-theoretic analysis to suggest that governments can minimize the political risks associated with significant liberalization of trade by employing a multistep process in the reduction of state-supplied rents. The model argues that when governments precede significant reductions in state-supplied rents with a smaller reduction, or with a reduction that can be portrayed credibly as externally imposed, they may be in a position to evaluate, and hence mitigate, costs associated with significant trade liberalization. Substantive implications are explored in the context of United States trade policy and the still-curious ability of the Franklin Roosevelt administration to engage in strategic rent reductions without suffering meaningful political backlash.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , September 2003 , pp. 765 - 789
- Copyright
- © The Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique
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