¹ See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, 1 January 1948, 55 UNTS 194, recital 3 (GATT), which states: “Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.”

² Ibid, art I.1 states: “With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, … any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.” Despite this article, the GATT contains exceptions in the form of art XXIV, which allows customs unions and free trade areas.

³ Ibid, art XXXVI.8, which states that developed countries will reduce or remove obstacles to the trade of developing countries without expectation of reciprocity. The note to art XXXVI.8 in Annex I entitled Notes and Supplementary Provisions states: “[T]he phrase do not expect reciprocity means, in accordance with the objectives set forth in this Article, that the less-developed contracting parties should not be expected, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past trade developments.”

⁴ Anthony N Cole, “Labor Standards and the Generalized System of Preferences: The European Labor Incentives” (2003) 25 Michigan J Intl L 186.

⁵ Ibid at 187–88.

⁶ Norma Breda dos Santos et al, “Generalized System of Preferences in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization: History and Current Issues” (2005) 39:4 J World Trade 638.

⁷ Cole, supra note 4 at 190.

⁸ Resolution 21(II) on Preferential or Free Entry of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Developing Countries to the Developed Countries in Annex I A of the Proceedings of the UNCTAD Second Session, New Delhi, 1 February–-29 March 1968, Report and Annexes TD/97, vol 1 (1968) at 38, n 25 [Resolution 21(II)].

⁹ Ibid at 38, recital 4.

¹⁰ Ibid at 38, para 1.

¹¹ In this article, condition and conditionality in the singular and the plural have been used interchangeably.

¹² Cole, supra note 4 at 192; James Harrison, “Incentives for Development: The EC’s Generalized System of Preferences, India’s WTO Challenge and Reform” (2005) 42 Common Market L Rev 1664.

¹³ Gene M Grossman & Alan O Sykes, “A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP” (2005) 4:1 World Trade Rev 41 at 60–63 [Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development”].

¹⁴ See Waiver to the Generalized System of Preferences, Decision BISD18S/24, Doc L/3545 (25 June 1971), para a [GSP Waiver].

¹⁵ Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Doc L/4903 (28 November 1979) [Enabling Clause].

¹⁶ See also GSP Waiver, supra note 14, recital 5, which states: “Noting the statement of developed contracting parties that the grant of tariff preferences does not constitute a binding commitment.”

¹⁷ James Harrison, “GSP Conditionality and Non-Discrimination” (2003) 9(6) Intl Trade Law & Regulation 160.

¹⁸ European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc WT/DS246/R (Panel Report, 1 December 2003) and Doc WT/DS246/AB/R (Appellate Body, 7 April 2004) [EC – Tariff Preferences]. Harrison, supra note 12 at 1665.

¹⁹ Enabling Clause, supra note 15, para 5.

²⁰ Ibid, para 7.

²¹ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 [GATT 1994]. Lorand Bartels, “The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program” (2003) 6:2 J Intl Econ L 516 [Bartels, “WTO Enabling Clause”]. See also EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, n 192, which states that “the Enabling Clause is one of the ‘other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES’ within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement.”

²² Robert Howse, “India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for ‘Political’ Conditionality in US Trade Policy” (2003) 4:2 Chicago J Intl L 388.

²³ The European Union (EU) was known as European Communities (EC) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) until 30 November 2009. See Member Information: The European Union and the WTO, online: <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm>. The EC – Tariff Preferences case arose before 30 November 2009. In this article, the abbreviation EC will be used while referring to the aforementioned case and the abbreviation EU will be used in the remaining situations.

²⁴ Matsushita, Mitsuo et al, The World Trade Organization Law, Practice and Policy, 2nd ed, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 775 Google Scholar; Pratap, Ravindra, “WTO and Tariff Preferences India Wins Case, EC the Law,” Economic and Political Weekly 39:18 (1–7 May 2004) at 1788.Google Scholar The EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) had been challenged in the past in the following cases in the WTO, but they did not result in the adjudication of the Enabling Clause: European Communities – Measures Affecting Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WTO Doc WT/DS154; European Communities – Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WTO Doc WT/DS209; European Communities – Generalized System of Preferences, WTO Doc WT/DS242.

²⁵ Council Regulation (EC) 2501/2001 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 [2001] OJ L346, art 1.2 [Regulation 2501/2001].

²⁶ Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, “Institutional Choice in the Generalized System of Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of Rights” (2005) 39(6) J World Trade 982.

²⁷ These countries were Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

²⁸ See EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Panel, paras 2.7–2.8. The drug arrangements were laid down in art 10 of Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 25, which stated: “1. Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on products which, according to Annex IV, are included in the special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking referred to in Title IV and which originate in a country that according to Column I of Annex I benefits from those arrangements, shall be entirely suspended. For products of CN code 0306 13, the duty shall be reduced to a rate of 3,6 %; 2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be entirely suspended, except for products for which Common Customs Tariff duties also include ad valorem duties. For products of CN codes 1704 10 91 and 1704 10 99, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.”

²⁹ Request for a WTO Waiver, New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking, Doc G/C/W/328 (24 October 2001) para 3 [Request for a WTO Waiver].

³⁰ EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission Action, Brussels, Doc MEMO/02/53 (12 March 2002), online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-02-53_en.htm>; EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission Action, Brussels, Doc MEMO/02/122 (3 June 2002), online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-02-122_en.htm>.

³¹ Biswajit Dhar & Abhik Majumdar, The India-EC GSP Dispute: The Issues and the Process (25–26 January 2006) at 3–7, online: <http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/dhar.pdf>.

³² Pratap, supra note 24 at 1788.

³³ Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 31 at 19.

³⁴ Enabling Clause, supra note 15, n 3, states: “As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries’ (BISD 18S/24).”

³⁵ Ibid para 2(a) states: “The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following: … (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences.”

³⁶ Ibid para 3(c) states: “Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: … (c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.”

³⁷ Shaffer, Gregory & Apea, Yvonne, “GSP Programmes and Their Historical-Political-Institutional Context” in Cottier, Thomas et al (eds), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 488 at 501, n 51.Google ScholarPubMed

³⁸ The issue of conditionalities is also important in view of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, wherein least-developed and developing countries’ implementation of certain provisions is conditional on the receipt of assistance and support for capacity building. See the entire section II and, in particular, arts 16(1)(c), 16(2)(d), 17(1)(b), 17(4), 19(1), 19(2)(b) and (c), and 21 of the Annex to the Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Decision of 27 November 2014, Doc WT/L/940 (28 November 2014).

³⁹ Morrissey, Oliver, “Alternatives to Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending” in Koeberle, Stefan et al. (eds), Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005) at 237.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Stefan G Koeberle, “Should Policy-Based Lending Still Involve Conditionality?” (2003) 18:2 World Bank Observer 251 [Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending”].

⁴¹ Patrick Watt, “Partnerships in Policy-Based Learning” in Koeberle et al, supra note 39, 249.

⁴² Lorand Bartels, The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, Doc EXPO-B-INTA-2008-57 PE 406.991 (2008) at 1 [Bartels, Application of Human Rights].

⁴³ Ibid at 3.

⁴⁴ Gene M Grossman & Alan O Sykes, “European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)” in Henrik Horn & Petros C Mavroidis, eds, The WTO Case Law of 2003, American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 221 [Grossman & Sykes, “European Communities”].

⁴⁵ Lorand Bartels, “The Appellate Body Report in European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programmes” in Cottier et al, supra note 37, 465 [Bartels, “Appellate Body Report”].

⁴⁶ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Panel, para 7.116.

⁴⁷ Ibid, Appellate Body, para 78.

⁴⁸ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Panel, para 7.103.

⁴⁹ Ibid, Appellate Body, para 148.

⁵⁰ Ibid, para 156.

⁵¹ Ibid paras 175–76.

⁵² Ibid para 160.

⁵³ Ibid para 161.

⁵⁴ Ibid. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154.

⁵⁵ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, para 130.

⁵⁶ Ibid para 162.

⁵⁷ Ibid para 173.

⁵⁸ Ibid paras 180–83.

⁵⁹ Request for a WTO Waiver, supra note 29, para 2.

⁶⁰ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, paras 186–90.

⁶¹ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 52–53.

⁶² Rolland, Sonia E, Development at the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶³ Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 31 at 22–23.

⁶⁴ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 1004.

⁶⁵ Pratap, supra note 24 at 1788.

⁶⁶ Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), Minutes of Meeting Held on 20 July 2005, Doc WT/DSB/M/194 (26 August 2005) para 32.

⁶⁷ Inde / OMC – SPG: l’OMC confirme qu’il est possible d’opérer une différenciation entre les pays en développement, Brussels, Doc IP/04/476 (7 April 2004), online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-476_fr.pdf >.

⁶⁸ Howse, supra note 22 at 397.

⁶⁹ Bartels, “WTO Enabling Clause,” supra note 21 at 524.

⁷⁰ Harrison, supra note 17 at 164.

⁷¹ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, n 318. L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1905).

⁷² GATT 1994, supra note 21, art XX states: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.”

⁷³ WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 493, art 2.3, which states: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.”

⁷⁴ Enabling Clause, supra note 15, para 2(d) states: “The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following: … (d) Special treatment on the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.”

⁷⁵ Bartels, “Appellate Body Report,” supra note 45 at 483–84.

⁷⁶ Harrison, supra note 12 at 1674.

⁷⁷ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, para 163.

⁷⁸ Rolland, supra note 62 at 162.

⁷⁹ Ibid at 161.

⁸⁰ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 53–54.

⁸¹ Stéphane de la Rosa, “Observations après le rapport du groupe spécial ‘Communautés européennes – conditions d’octroi de préférence tarifaires aux pays en développement’: Vers une remise en cause du SPG communautaire ‘à la carte’?” (2003) 15 L’Observateur des Nations Unies 23.

⁸² Howse, supra note 22 at 400.

⁸³ Lorand Bartels, “The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement” (2007) 10:4 J Intl Econ L 878 [Bartels, “WTO Legality”].

⁸⁴ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 55–56.

⁸⁵ See EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Panel, para 7.175.

⁸⁶ Rolland, supra note 62 at 160.

⁸⁷ Ibid at 161–63.

⁸⁸ Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns adopted on 14 November 2001, Doc WT/MIN(01)/17 (20 November 2001) para 12.2.

⁸⁹ Howse, supra note 22 at 392, n 28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

⁹⁰ Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 31 at 19.

⁹¹ Steve Charnovitz et al, “Internet Roundtable The Appellate Body’s GSP Decision” (2004) 3:2 World Trade Rev 264.

⁹² Ibid at 247.

⁹³ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, para 164.

⁹⁴ Bartels, “Appellate Body Report,” supra note 45 at 484.

⁹⁵ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 43.

⁹⁶ Ibid at 45.

⁹⁷ Ibid at 54.

⁹⁸ Howse, supra note 22 at 395.

⁹⁹ De la Rosa, supra note 81 at 4.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid at 16.

¹⁰¹ Ibid at 23.

¹⁰² Grossman & Sykes, “European Communities,” supra note 44 at 227.

¹⁰³ Robert Howse, “Back to Court after Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not Quite Yet: India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences” (2003) 18:6 Am U Intl L Rev 1380. Outside of the GSP, the EU continued to make payments to coup-ridden Mauritania in exchange for fishing opportunities. This shows the EU’s lack of faith in human rights issues. See Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 4.

¹⁰⁴ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 42, 57, 63, 65.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid at 66.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid at 55.

¹⁰⁷ Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 401 (DSU).

¹⁰⁸ The Appellate Body used the Oxford English Dictionary even in the EC – Tariff Preferences case. See generally EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body. See also Joost Pauwelyn, “Reply to Joshua Meltzer” (2003–04) 25 Michigan J Intl L 925.

¹⁰⁹ EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Appellate Body, para 161.

¹¹⁰ See Ibid, Panel, paras 7.86–7.87. See also Jane Bradley, “The Enabling Clause and the Applied Rules of Interpretation” in Cottier et al, supra note 37, 505.

¹¹¹ European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WTO Doc WT/DS269/AB/R (Appellate Body, 12 September 2005) para 195 [EC – Chicken Cuts].

¹¹² Ibid para 199.

¹¹³ GATT 1994, supra note 21, art II.7 states: “The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement.”

¹¹⁴ EC – Chicken Cuts, supra note 111, paras 194–99.

¹¹⁵ See EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 18, Panel, para 7.88. See also Jane Bradley, “The Enabling Clause and the Applied Rules of Interpretation” in Cottier et al, supra note 37, 505.

¹¹⁶ EC – Chicken Cuts, supra note 111, para 283.

¹¹⁷ Grossman & Sykes, “A Preference for Development,” supra note 13 at 55.

¹¹⁸ Joost Pauwelyn, “How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits” (2003) 37:6 J World Trade 1001.

¹¹⁹ United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R (Appellate Body, 29 April 1996) para 17.

¹²⁰ Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc WT/DS163/R (Panel, 1 May 2000) para 7.96.

¹²¹ Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Need for a New Philosophy of International Economic Law and Adjudication” (2014) 17:3 J Intl Econ L 639 at 640, 659.

¹²² Ibid at 641.

¹²³ Ibid at 659.

¹²⁴ Asif Qureshi, “Interpreting WTO Agreements for the Development Objective” in Victor Mosoti, ed, Towards a Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, Sustainable Development and Trade Issues, ICTSD Resource Paper no 5 (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, March 2003) at 103.

¹²⁵ Petersmann, supra note 121 at 654, 667–68.

¹²⁶ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 1001–04.

¹²⁷ Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences [2005] OJ L169 [Regulation 980/2005].

¹²⁸ Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) 552/97, (EC) 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 [2008] OJ L211 [Regulation 732/2008].

¹²⁹ Regulation (EU) 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences and Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 [2012] OJ L303 [Regulation 978/2012].

¹³⁰ Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)”, Doc 2004/C 110/10 (30 April 2004) paras 3.3, 3.3.3, 6.6.2, 7.4 [Opinion on GSP].

¹³¹ Ibid, paras 6.6.2.3, 6.6.5.1.

¹³² Revised EU Trade Scheme to Help Developing Countries Applies on 1 January 2014, European Commission Memo, Brussels (19 December 2013) at 3, online: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/december/tradoc_152015.pdf>.

¹³³ Regulation 978/2012, supra note 129, art 9.1(a); Annex VII, para 1.

¹³⁴ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 16.

¹³⁵ Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 4.9.

¹³⁶ The only differences are the following: (1) Regulations 980/2005 and 732/2008 refer to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid whereas Regulation 978/2012 does not refer to it; (2) Regulation 978/2012 refers to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, whereas Regulations 980/2005 and 732/2008 do not refer to it. See Annex VIII of Regulation 978/2012, supra note 129; Annex III of Regulation 980/2005, supra note 127; Regulation 732/2008, supra note 128.

¹³⁷ Opinion on GSP, supra note 130 at 1.

¹³⁸ Regulation 978/2012, supra note 129, art 9(1).

¹³⁹ Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 25, arts 14.2, 21.2.

¹⁴⁰ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 19.

¹⁴¹ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 1006.

¹⁴² Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 3.3.2.

¹⁴³ DSB, supra note 66, para 33.

¹⁴⁴ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee Developing Countries, International Trade and Sustainable Development: The Function of the Community’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for the Ten-Year Period from 2006 to 2015, Doc COM(2004) 461 final (7 July 2004) para 5 [Communication from the Commission to the Council].

¹⁴⁵ See Generalized System of Preferences European Parliament Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee “Developing Countries, International Trade and Sustainable Development: The Function of the Community’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for the Ten-Year Period from 2006 to 2015” (Doc COM(2004)0461), P6_TA(2004)0024 (14 October 2004) para 12 [European Parliament Resolution].

¹⁴⁶ Harrison, supra note 12 at 1678.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid at 1681.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid at 1682.

¹⁴⁹ United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body, 12 October 1998) para 165.

¹⁵⁰ General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183.

¹⁵¹ Regulation 978/2012, supra note 129, recital 13.

¹⁵² Bartels, “WTO Legality,” supra note 83 at 881–82.

¹⁵³ Regulation 978/2012, supra note 129, arts 9.1(b), 9.1(e), 9.1(f), 13, 14.3, 15.6. The previous regulations laying down the GSP + also depended on the review and monitoring mechanisms of the relevant conventions.

¹⁵⁴ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 8.

¹⁵⁵ Bartels, “WTO Legality,” supra note 83 at 879.

¹⁵⁶ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 16.

¹⁵⁷ Bartels, “WTO Legality,” supra note 83 at 881.

¹⁵⁸ Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 144, para 6.5.

¹⁵⁹ Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 6.6.2.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, para 6.5.

¹⁶¹ DSB, supra note 66, para 35; Dhar & Majumdar, supra note 31 at 21.

¹⁶² Bartels, “WTO Legality,” supra note 83 at 877.

¹⁶³ Harrison, supra note 12 at 1680–81.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid at 1687, n 88.

¹⁶⁵ Philip Alston, “‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime” (2004) 15:3 EJIL 457 at 471–472.

¹⁶⁶ Drusilla K Brown et al, Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labour Standards, Discussion Paper no 477, Research Seminar in International Economics, School of Public Policy, University of Michigan (6 May 2002) at 20.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid at 21.

¹⁶⁸ Harrison, supra note 12 at 1683.

¹⁶⁹ Jagdish N Bhagwati, Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement against Linkage (TWIN-SAL) (1999) at 1–2, online: Columbia University Academic Commons <https://doi.org/10.7916/D8KD24KG>; Brown et al, supra note 166 at 22–23; Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 4.4; Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 990–91.

¹⁷⁰ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 17.

¹⁷¹ This section of the article draws on Koeberle et al, supra note 39; Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 249–73.

¹⁷² Harold Bedoya, “Conditionality and Country Performance” in Koeberle et al, supra note 39 at 192. See also Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 252.

¹⁷³ Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 252, 255.

¹⁷⁴ Morrissey, supra note 39 at 238.

¹⁷⁵ Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 249, 256.

¹⁷⁶ “Part 4 Discussion Summary” in Koeberle et al, supra note 39, 225 at 225–26.

¹⁷⁷ Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 266.

¹⁷⁸ Duong Duc Ung, “Policy-Based Lending and Conditionality: The Experience of Vietnam” in Koeberle et al, supra note 39, 233 at 235.

¹⁷⁹ Morrissey, supra note 39 at 237.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid at 238.

¹⁸¹ Ibid at 239.

¹⁸² Ibid at 241–42.

¹⁸³ These countries are: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mongolia, and Pakistan. See Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EU-Funded ILO Project on Labour Rights in GSP + Countries, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/>. It may be noted that the EESC is helping developing countries build their capacity to respond to questionnaires. See Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 5.1. It is these very countries that are expected to fulfil the conditionalities in the EU’s GSP +.

¹⁸⁴ Morrissey, supra note 39 at 242.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid at 244.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid at 244–46.

¹⁸⁷ Watt, supra note 41 at 249–50.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid at 250.

¹⁸⁹ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 998.

¹⁹⁰ Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 7.10.

¹⁹¹ Watt, supra note 41 at 251.

¹⁹² Ibid at 251–52.

¹⁹³ “Part 5 Discussion Summary” in Koeberle et al, supra note 39, 253 at 255.

¹⁹⁴ Opinion on GSP, supra note 130, para 4.2.

¹⁹⁵ “Part 5 Discussion Summary,” supra note 193 at 254.

¹⁹⁶ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 995.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Sutherland et al, The Future of the WTO Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (Geneva: WTO, 2004) at 24–25, para 94; Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 993.

¹⁹⁸ See Koeberle, “Policy-Based Lending,” supra note 40 at 252, making the same point in the case of the World Bank.

¹⁹⁹ Harrison, supra note 12 at 1688.

²⁰⁰ Bartels, Application of Human Rights, supra note 42 at 20.

²⁰¹ See GSP Waiver, supra note 14, recital 1.

²⁰² Charnovitz et al, supra note 91 at 256.

²⁰³ Shaffer & Apea, supra note 26 at 1001.

²⁰⁴ European Parliament Resolution, supra note 145, para E.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, para 6(a).

²⁰⁶ See Decision on Waiver Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries adopted on 15 June 1999, Doc WT/L/304 (17 June 1999); Decision on Extension of Waiver Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries adopted on 27 May 2009, Doc WT/L/759 (29 May 2009).