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The International Law Commission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

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Extract

One of the principal achievements of the United Nations is its work in codifying and developing international law. The International Law Commission, created in 1949, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, is the chief agency of the United Nations for achieving these tasks. The Chairman of the Commission at its sixteenth session, Professor Roberto Ago of Italy, stated in the Commission on July 16, 1964, that if the codification work which was now taking place in that body could be completed and accepted by states, progress would have been made without precedent since the time of Grotius.

So well-established has the International Law Commission become on the international scene that it is almost surprising to recall that the existence of this body rests, not on any specific wording of the United Nations Charter calling for the creation of such a body of experts, but on the general phraseology of Article 13 of the Charter which provides that “the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) promoting … and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” In the space of seventeen years the International Law Commission has achieved widespread recognition for the high quality of its work; it would be no exaggeration to say that it has come to be regarded as rivaling in importance the work of the International Court of Justice. As “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” as successor to the Permanent Court of Justice — a new feature of international institutions in the modern era — and as the highest international judicial tribunal, the International Court of Justice is regarded, in the general scheme of the Charter, as an exceptionally prestigious body.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1966

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References

1 Made at the 19th meeting of the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, at its session in Mexico City on Sept. 10, 1964. See A/AC.119/SR. 19, at 14 (Oct. 21, 1964).

2 For full text of this resolution, see A/5746 of Nov. 16, 1964, para. 137. According to the summary record of the intervention of the Ghanaian representative at the twenty-second meeting of the Special Committee in Mexico City (Sept. 14, 1964), he was of the view that “allegations that the Court was a Western court of justice were not entirely unfounded” (A/AC.119/SR 22 of Oct. 22, 1964, at 6). In his view, this was one of the reasons “why the Charter of the Organization of African Unity had omitted judicial settlement as a means of settling international disputes” (Ibid., 7). For further comments in the debate at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1965 on the composition of the Court as a factor in the attitude of states towards its use, see A/C.6/SR.881 of Nov. 25, 1965, at 3 (statement of Nepalese representative) ; A/C.6/SR.882, of Nov. 26, at 6 (Tan-zanjan statement); A/C.6/SR.884 of Dec. 1, at 11 (Central African Republic); A/C.6/SR.891 of Dec. 9, at 3 (Burmese statement) ; and A/C.6/SR.891, at 18 (Ceylonese statement). See also, for example, statements of Syrian representative at the subsequent session of the Special Committee in New York (A/AC.125/SR.29 of April 1, 1966, at 11) and of the UAR representative (A/AC.125/SR.29, at 13).

3 Ibid., para. 136.

4 See, for a highly interesting discussion, Shihata, I.F.I., “The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice,” 19 International Organization 203 (1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See A/5746 of Nov. 16, 1964, para. 175.

6 For a comment on this point, see statement of representative of Afghanistan in the debates at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1965 (A/C.6/SR.898 of Dec. 22, 1965, at 5).

7 A/5746, para, 75.

8 As recorded in the Summary Record of the 22nd meeting of the Committee on Sept. 14, 1964 (see A/AC.119/SR.22 of Oct. 22, 1964, at 12). See also the comment of the Yugoslav representative at the 18th meeting of the Special Committee (first session) on Sept. 10, 1964, (as summarized in A/AC.119/SR.18 of Oct. 21, 1964): “There were obviously important reasons why so many States had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or had done so with reservations, and one of them, it might be suggested, was that international law had not yet reached a sufficiently high level of development, and still lacked clearly formulated and generally accepted principles on many important issues.” See also his intervention at the 23rd meeting (A/AC./119/SR.23 of Oct. 22, 1964, at 11–13). For similar views expressed in the debates during the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1965, see, for example, A/C.6/SR.879 of Nov. 24, 1965, at 2–3 (statement of Finnish representative).

9 A/5746 of Nov. 16, 1964, para. 137, subpara. 3(b).

10 A/AC.125/L.25 and Add.1, para. 3(c) of March 30 and 31, 1966.

11 See A/AC.125/6 of April 20 for text and A/AC.125/L.38 Add.2 for a discussion of the various proposals.

12 See intervention of Soviet representative at 20th meeting in Mexico City on Sept. 11, A/AC.119/SR.20 of Oct. 21, 1964, at 6.

13 See Shihata, supra note 4, at 221–22. Some recent writers (e.g., Carlston, K.S., “Development and Limits of International Adjudication,” 59 Am. Soc. Int’l L., Proceedings, 182 (1965),Google Scholar envisage the possibility of the Court playing a less significant role in the future, partly as a result of “… conflicting perceptions and values of the East-West division of the world into Communist and non-Communist nations … and the North-South division of the world between developed and under-developed nations…” (Carlston, op. cit. 186). But it is precisely these factors which give special significance to U.N. codification activities as a part of the process of producing agreed statements of the law in various specific fields which Eastern, Western and developing states regard as constituting an acceptable basis for regulating their inter-state relations. The success of these U.N. efforts would seem of particular importance in assessing the prospects for the future of international adjudication.

14 Address at Princeton University, March 23, 1964, published in Cordier, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder (ed.), The Quest for Peace: The Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lectures at 57 (N.Y. Columbia Univ. Press, 1965).Google Scholar

15 See A/AC. 125/6 of April 20, 1966.

16 A/5694, May 1, 1964, at 150.

17 Gotlieb, , Disarmament and International Law 6061 (1965).Google Scholar

l8 See Stone, J., Aggression and World Order (London, 1958).Google Scholar

19 See Whitton, J. B. and Larson, A., Propaganda: Toward Disarmament in the War of Words (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

20 Article I of the Statute of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/4/-Rev.1).

21 Cornell University Press (Ithaca, N.Y., 1965).

22 Ibid., vi (preface).

23 Ibid., 3–4.

24 Resolution of Sept. 22, 1924; Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 21, 1924, at 10.

25 See resolution of Sept. 27, 1927, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 53 at 9.

26 See statement of Mr. Dean at 1267th meeting of the General Assembly Nov. 6, 1962 (A/C.1/SR.1267, at 122).

27 Hudson, Manley, Progress in International Organization 86 (Oxford, 1932).Google Scholar