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Searching for Accountability: The Draft UNInternational Convention on the Regulation,Oversight, and Monitoring of Private Military andSecurity Companies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Benjamin Perrin
Benjamin Perrin*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
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Summary

The proliferation of private military and securitycompanies has attracted significant public andscholarly attention during the last decade. Thiscomment examines the United Nations DraftInternational Convention on the Regulation,Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military andSecurity Companies (Draft Convention). It discussesthe significance of the Draft Convention and thendescribes the approach taken to the regulation ofthis controversial topic. Several problematicelements of the Draft Convention are identifiedincluding the definition of prohibited activities,State responsibility for the conduct of privatemilitary and security companies and the proposedInternational Criminal Court referral mechanism.Finally, specific policy recommendations are madefor the government of Canada as a home state andcontracting state of private military and securityservices, irrespective of the progress ofnegotiations on the Draft Convention.

Sommaire

Sommaire

La prolifération des sociétés militaires et de sécuritéprivées a attiré l’attention publique etscientifique au cours de la dernière décennie. Cecommentaire passe en revue le projet de l’ONU de laConvention internationale relative à laréglementation, à la supervision et au contrôle dessociétés militaires et de sécurité privées (en datedu 13 juillet 2009). Il traite de l’importance duprojet de convention, puis décrit l’approche adoptéepour la réglementation de ce sujet controversé.Plusieurs éléments problématiques du projet deconvention sont identifiés, y compris la définitiondes activités interdites, la responsabilité desÉtats pour la conduite des sociétés militaires et desécurité privées, et la proposition d’un mécanismede saisie de la Cour pénale internationale. Enfin,indépendamment du progrès dans les négociations surle projet de convention, quelques recommandations depolitiques spécifiques sont proposées pour legouvernement du Canada, le Canada étant paysd’origine et État contractant de services militaireset de sécurité privés.

Type
Notes and Comments / Notes etcommentaires
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 47 , 2009 , pp. 299 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2009 

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References

1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination (UN Working Group), Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies (final draft for distribution, 13 July aoog) [Draft Convention].

2 For a brief history of the UN Working Group’s efforts leading to the Draft Convention, see Haile, J. Chris, “New U.N. Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies” (2009) 6(9) Int’l Government Contractor 70.Google Scholar

3 These terms are defined in the Draft Convention, supra note 1, Article 2 (n)-(p).

4 See Perrin, Benjamin, “Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military Companies with International Humanitarian Law” (2006) 88Google Scholar Int’l Rev. Red Cross 6l3, n. 5.

5 See Draft Convention, supra note 1, Articles 22–23 (jurisdiction), 24 (extradition), and 25 (mutual legal assistance).

6 Ibid., Article 2 (k) (definitional provision); see also Article 31 (5). The term “intrinsically governmental” is alternatively used in Article 8 of the Draft Convention, supra note 1 : “States parties shall define and limit the scope of activities of private military and/ or security companies and specifically prohibit functions which are intrinsically governmental, including waging war and/ or combat operations, taking prisoners, espionage, intelligence and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention, including the interrogation of detainees.” This inconsistent use of language should be remedied.

7 Ibid., Article 4(6).

8 Ibid., Article 1(2).

9 Ibid., Article 10.

10 Ibid., Article 11(1)-(2).

11 Ibid., Article 11 (3).

12 Ibid., Article 12(1).

13 Ibid., Article 18(4).

14 Ibid., Articles 22 and 28.

15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1g December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 4, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

16 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 26 (entered into force 26 June 1987).

17 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN GAOR, 61 st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 68, UN Doc. A/ Res/61/177 (2007).

18 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force 7 December 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force 7 December 1978).

19 See Draft Convention, supra note 1, Articles 2 (h) and 2 (p).

20 See ibid., Articles 2(i) and 2(o).

21 Ibid., Article 17(1),(3).

22 Ibid., Article 18(3).

23 Ibid., Article 19(1).

24 Ibid., Article 18(4).

25 Ibid., Article 18(5).

26 Ibid., Article 21 (2).

27 Ibid., Article 20(2).

28 Ibid., Articles 2(q) and 13.

29 Ibid., Articles 26( 2).

30 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1517 (entered into force 14 March 2003).

31 Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, and the United States. See Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, UN General Assembly Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636 (6 October 2008) [Montreux Document].

32 Ibid. at 6-7.

33 See Protocol I, supra note 18, Articles 51 (3).

34 Draft Convention, supra note 1, Article 10.

35 “Reports and Documents: Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law Adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 2009” (2008) 90(872) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 991.

36 Draft Convention, supra note 1, Article 2(k) (definitional provision); see also Article 31 (5). The term “intrinsically governmental” is alternatively used in Article 8 of the Draft Convention: “States parties shall define and limit the scope of activities of private military and/ or security companies and specifically prohibit functions which are intrinsically governmental, including waging war and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, espionage, intelligence and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention, including the interrogation of detainees.” This inconsistent use of language should be remedied.

37 See ibid., at 18, note 4. UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 7 September 1990, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/firearms.htm>.

38 Ibid., Articles 19(4)(d).

39 See Benjamin Perrin, “Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Organizations: Implications for International Humanitarian Law,” in Benjamin Perrin, ed., Edges of Conflict: Non-State Actors, Contemporary Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law [forthcoming].

40 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 12 December 2001, International Law Commission, <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf>.

41 Draft Convention, supra note 1, Article 4(2) [emphasis added].

42 Montreux Document, supra note 31 at 7.

43 Draft Convention, supra note 1, Article 26( 2).

44 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998) [Rome Statute].

45 See Rastan, Rod, “The Power of the Prosecutor in Initiating Prosecutions,” a paper prepared for the Symposium on the International Criminal Court (3–4 February 2007, Beijing, China) at 4, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/ICC/PoweroftheProsecutor.pdf>..>Google Scholar

46 See Rome Statute, supra note 44, Articles 12( 3).

47 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 34-43.

48 Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39.

49 See, for example, Security Services Act, S.B.C. 2007, c. 30.

50 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2005, c. 24.