¹ These states are variously referred to as the Third World, the Group of 77, G-77, the South, developing countries, Group A, and the non-aligned nations. Some terms have technical meanings and are not necessarily synonymous. For example, there are important historical differences between the G-77, which was created primarily for economic reasons at UNCTAD I in 1964, and the non-aligned movement, which dates to the 1950’s and is political in origin. Nevertheless, most of the literature on the NIEO employs the terms interchangeably, as will be done here. According to Edward McWhinney, the “key to the concerted action in the United Nations in 1974 … is the fusion” of the two groups. “The International Law-Making Process and the New International Economic Order” (1976) 14 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 57, 61.

² G.A. Res. 3281, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31 ) 50, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).

³ Abi-Saab, Georges, “The Third World and the Future of the International Legal Order” (1973) 29 Rev. égyptienne de dr. int’l 27, 38Google Scholar. See also Suy, E., “Innovations in the Law-Making Process” in MacDonald, , Johnston, , and Morris, , eds., The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare 188 (1978)Google Scholar; Castañeda, Jorge, “The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law” (1961) 15 Int’l Org. 38 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Mohammed Bed-jaoui, who claims “the newly independent States refuse to consider themselves bound by various customary principles when these principles still express relationships of domination, inequality or privilege,” Towards a New International Economic Order 132 (1979).

⁴ Correau, Dominique, “Le nouvel ordre économique international” (1977) 104 J. du droit int’l 595, 602.Google Scholar

⁵ Geiser, Hans-Joerg, “A New International Economic Order: Its Impact on the Evolution of International Law” (1978) 9 Annales d’Etudes Int’l 89, 97.Google Scholar

⁶ Brown, Seyom, “The New Legitimacy” (1975–76) 31 Int’l J. 14.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Petersmann, Ernst-U., “The New International Economic Order: Principles, Politics and International Law” in MacDonald, et al., op. cit. supra note 3, at 450.Google Scholar

⁸ Bedjaoui, op. cit. supra note 3, at 59.

⁹ As a reaction, the developing states place greater reliance upon the General Assembly and UNCTAD, where their majority can be felt. Neither, however, can impose new patterns of conduct upon unwilling recipients, but both do serve as an effective sounding board for LDC demands and as a forum for the construction of alternative economic strategies. For a similar view, see McWhinney where he states that the LDC’s have developed a “keen awareness of using the General Assembly as a positive instrument for rewriting the ‘Old’ or classical international law and substituting a ‘new,’ postulated, more progressive, third-world oriented law in its place.” Supra note 1, at 60.

¹⁰ The birth of the NIEO is generally considered to be the final communiqué of the first Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Bang Dun, Indonesia, in 1955. Cf. Clyde Ferguson, “The New International Economic Order” [1980] U. Ill. Forum 693, 695 and Guy Feuer, “Réflexions sur la Charte des Droits et Devoirs Economiques des Etats” (1975) 79 Rev. gén. de dr. int’l pub. 273, 275•

¹¹ Cf. “International Trade as the Primary Instrument for Economie Development” G.A. Res. 1707, 16 UN GAOR, Supp. (N0. 17), UN Doc. A/5100 ( 1961 ); “International Development Strategy for the First UN Development Decade” G.A. Res. 1710, 16 UN GAOR, Supp. (N0. 17), UN Doc. A/5100 (1961); “Declaration on Social Progress and Development” G.A. Res. 2542, 24 UN GAOR Supp. (N0. 30), UN Doc. A/7630 (1969).

¹² International Development Agency, UN Res. 1706, 16 UN GAOR, Supp. (N0. 17), UN Doc. A/5roo (1961); UNCTAD, G.A. Res. 1785, 17 UN GAOR, Supp. (N0. 17), UN Doc. A/5217 (1962) made permanent G.A. Res. 1995, 19 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 15), UN Doc. A/5815 (1964); UNIDO, G.A. Res. 2152, 21 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).

¹³ G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI) UN GAOR Supp. (No. 1) 3, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974).

¹⁴ G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI) UN GAOR (Supp. 1) 5, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974).

¹⁵ Against: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the United States. Abstentions: Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain.

¹⁶ According to Christopher Joyner, a declaration “is a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human Rights [sic].” It possesses no greater legal effect than any other UN resolution: “U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm Creation” (1981) Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 445 at 456, citing a Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs, 34 UN E.S. COR Supp. (No. 8) 15, UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.610.

¹⁷ See also McWhinney, supra note 1, at 64.

¹⁸ A. O. Adede confesses that the Charter is not “in itself legally binding” in “The New International Economic Order: Progressive Development of International Law and the United Nations,” address to the McGill International Law Society, March 30, 1981, at 11. For similar statements see Agrawala, S. K., “The Emerging International Economic Order” (1977) 17 Indian J. Int’l L. 261, 273, and Abi-Saab referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 3 at 48.Google Scholar

¹⁹ G.A. Res. 217 A (III), 3 UN GAOR 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). Those claiming the Universal Declaration may have become binding include: Humphrey, John P., “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Judicial Character” in Ramcharan, , ed., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Thirty Years After (1979)Google Scholar; Saarie, V. and Higgins-Cass, R., “The United Nations and the International Protection of Human Rights” (1977) 7 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 591 Google Scholar; Petrenko, Stephen, “The Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter” (1978) 9 Manitoba L.J. 53 Google Scholar; Schwelb, Egon, “The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter” (1972) 66 Am. J. Int’l L. 337 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sharma, V. and Wooldridge, T., “Some Legal Questions Arising from the Expulsion of Ugandan Asians” (1979) 23 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ Joyner, supra note 16, at 463. Further, at 478, he states: “Moreover, formal recommendations by the General Assembly embody persuasive authority as indicators of the world community’s legal desires at a particular time. The overriding difficulties earmarking the nature of General Assembly resolutions reside in determining first how to minimize politics from intruding into the legal process, and second, how to subsume national interests when they conflict with policies of international justice.” As support, the author cites several resolutions which have subsequently influenced international law.

²¹ Among the voluminous documentation on this point, see the Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Report), North-South: A Program for Survival (1980); Tinbergen, Jan, RIO: Reshaping the International Order (1976), Government of Canada, Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations (1980) (Task Force).Google Scholar

²² John O’Manique puts it more vividly: “Hewer of wood and drawer of water, exporter of raw materials, importer of manufactured goods, underdeveloped in manufacturing and economically controlled by foreigners — to the extent that these phrases characterize Canada, it is appropriate to call her the world’s wealthiest developing country. Consequently, developing countries not blessed with her wealth, sometimes look to Canada as a possible ally — a friend who, though rich and strong, shares some of their problems and will occasionally speak out for their interests in the international fora. She is seen by some to be an enlightened middle power with an awareness and concern for the problems of development.” In “The Response of the Principal Sectors of Canadian Society to the NIEO” in Laszlo, E. and Kurtzman, J., eds., The United States, Canada and the New International Economic Order 73 (1979).Google Scholar

²³ Dept of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches: “The Compelling Need for Progress in North/South Relations,” Rt. Hon. Trudeau, P. E. to the House of Commons, June 15, 1981, at 7.Google Scholar

²⁴ Dept of External Affairs, Statement by Dr. Mark MacGuigan at the nth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, “The Global Negotiations and the International Development Strategy,” September 15, 1980.

²⁵ Dept of External Affairs, Explanation of Vote, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN General Assembly, December 12, 1974, at 1.

²⁶ Canada, Prime Minister’s office, Notes for “Remarks by the Prime Minister at the Mansion House, London, England,” March 13, 1975.

²⁷ CIDA, September 1975.

²⁸ North-South Institute, North-South Encounter (1977).

²⁹ CIDA, op. cit. note 27.

³⁰ Ibid., 6.

³¹ 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

0.42 0.47 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.42

Figures compiled from North-South Institute, op. cit. supra note 28, at 109 and In the Canadian Interest? 9 (1980); CIDA, Annual Aid Review 2 (1979).

³² The North-South Institute, Interest?, op. cit. supra note 31, at 36, predicted it would drop to 0.37 per cent. Although External Affairs officials do not necessarily agree with that figure, they generally acknowledge that it will drop below 0.4 per cent. They insist, however, the 0.5 per cent will be achieved by 19B5, that the requisite mechanisms are now in place, and that the current drop is no cause for alarm because the system is designed to “hiccup” to 0.5 per cent between 1983 and 1985. Unlike the 1970’s, when there was an allegedly equal commitment to 0.7 per cent, “This time we’re serious.”

³³ CIDA, ibid., 2.

³⁴ Ibid., 1. See also Dept of External Affairs, Annual Review 1979 25 (1980), where further impetus was given to the belief that publicly, at least, Canada was still committed to the Strategy: “Bilateral disbursements continued to be concentrated on the poorest countries, in accordance with one of the principal objectives set out in the Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975–80.”

³⁵ Op. cit. supra note 21.

³⁸ Ibid., 37.

³⁷ Dept of External Affairs, Government Response to the Report of the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations 3 (1981).

³⁸ See Dept of External Affairs; address by Allan J. MacEachen, Minister of Finance to the North-South Roundtable Conference, Society for International Development, November 16, 1980; Annual Review 1980 (Draft); Communiqué No. 89, September 10, 1981, Notes for a Speech by the Hon. Raymond Perrault, Leader of the Government in the Senate and Head of the Canadian Delegation at the UN Conference on Least-Developed Countries, Paris, September 3, 1981; Notes for an Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, to the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 21, 1981.

³⁹ Lavoie, Gilbert, “Trudeau ampute le budget de l’ACDI de $175 millions,” La Presse, July 17, 1983, A-9.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ North-South Institute, op. cit. supra note 20, at 93.

⁴¹ The top four countries took close to 60 per cent of the GPT: Hong Kong (20 per cent), South Korea (20 per cent), Malaysia (9.8 per cent), Singapore (9.8 per cent). In fact, due to agreements signed in the 1930’s, duties on sugar actually discriminated in favour of Australia and South Africa, which supplied 80 per cent of Canadian imports in 1976. For all figures, ibid., at 94 et seq.

⁴² Ibid., 73 et seq.

⁴³ Perrault, supra note 38.

⁴⁴ Wills, T., “Removal of Import Quotas Jolts Footwear Industry,” The Gazette, Montreal, December 15, 1981, at 1.Google Scholar Apparently, the lifting of the leather quota was not spurred by altruism alone, as it appears the quota was contrary to the GATT and the E.C. had already successfully demanded $25 million compensation (ibid., 13).

⁴⁵ “To the extent possible, Canada has sought to limit qualitative restrictions on imports of products of interest to developing countries. Nevertheless, some restrictions continue to be necessary on imports of certain textiles, clothing, and footwear products because of the importance of these sectors to the Canadian economy.” Annual Review, op. cit. supra note 38.

⁴⁶ CIDA, op. cit. supra note 27, at 24.

⁴⁷ North-South Institute, Commodity Trade: Test Case for a New Economic Order 63 (1978).

⁴⁸ “For commodities which have important linkages to Canadian industry … or which are processed by Canadian firms … both industry and national interests may be advanced by price-stabilizing commodity agreement. But in the case of those commodities produced in significant quantities in Canada, and dominated by transnational firms based in consumer countries, industry and national interests may often diverge. Because of the close consultation between Canadian negotiators and firms, and the high degree of foreign control in many raw material producing industries, foreign corporate priorities seem to have been injected into Canadian national decision making.” North-South Institute, Interest?, op. cit. supra note 31, at 63.

⁴⁹ According to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 2nd Session, 30th Parliament, Issue #15, May 17, 1977, at Г2, LDC’s owed Canadian creditors approximately $9.8 billion, of which $1.965 billion was owed to CIDA, $1.192 billion to the Export Development Corporation, and $6.6 billion to Canadian private banks.

⁵⁰ North-South Institute, Third World Deficits and the “Debt Crisis” 27 (1977).

⁵¹ MacEachen, supra note 38.

⁵² Dept of External Affairs, transcript of a speech given by the Prime Minister at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, Nairobi, Kenya, August 11, 1981.

⁵³ For a complete list see Castel, J.-G., “Canada and International Arbitration” (1981) 36 Arbitration J. 5, 12.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Investment Insurance, Exchange of Notes between Canada and Jamaica, Treaty Series, 1971, No. 42, Para. 6.

⁵⁵ Overseas Institute of Canada, Canada’s Participation in International Development (1965).

⁵⁶ The 1 per cent goal was established in the First UN Development Decade resolution, supra note 11.

⁵⁷ Overseas Institute, op. cit. supra note 55, at 37.

⁵⁸ Task Force Report, op. cit. supra note 21, at 18.

⁵⁹ Art. 38(1)(c), Statute of the International Court of Justice.

⁶⁰ See generally the collection of essays reprinted in Lillich, R., ed., Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order (1976)Google Scholar. In particular, see the following essays: Bowett, D. W., “Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States” (1972) 13 Va. J. Int’l L. 1,Google Scholar “International Law and Economic Coercion” (1976) 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 245; Lillich, R., “Economic Coercion and ‘the New International Economic Order’: A Second Look at Some First Impressions” (1976) 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 233;Google Scholar Paust, J. and Blaustein, A., “The Arab Oil Weapon: A Threat to International Peace” (1974) 68 Am. J. Int’l L. 410,CrossRefGoogle Scholar “The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality” (1976) 15 Col. J. Trans. L. 57; Shihata, I., “Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order” (1976) 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 261,Google Scholar “Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International Law” (1974) 68 Am. J. Int’l L. 591.

⁶¹ Memorandum of the Legal Bureau, Dept of External Affairs, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,” February 13, 1975, reprinted in (1976) 14 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 323–24.

⁶² Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1. For an extensive compilation of the documentation on the international law of the environment, see Castel, J.-G., International Law 723 et seq. (3rd ed.) (1976)Google Scholar, and Williams, S. A. and de Mestral, A. L. C., Introduction to International Law 251 et seq. (1979).Google Scholar

⁶³ 1931–41 (3. UNRIAA 1905) United States-Canada.

⁶⁴ Supra, note 25, at 2–4.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, supra note 61.

⁶⁶ Cf. Joyner, supra note 16.

⁶⁷ G.A. Res. 1962, 18 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 15–16), UN Doc. A/5515 (1965).

⁶⁸ “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” Annex to UN Doc. A/Res. 2222 (xxi) January 25, 1967, 610 UNTS reprinted in (1967) 6 ILM 386.

⁶⁹ “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.113/Add. 4 (1979).

⁷⁰ “Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction” G.A. Res. 2749, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 27) 24, UN Doc. A/8027 (1970).

⁷¹ Juda, L., “UNGLOS III and the New International Legal Order,” (1979) 7 Ocean Dev. Int’l L.J. 221, 248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷² T.D. PR/914.

⁷³ Cf. UN Assoc. of the USA, Issues before the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations (1981).

⁷⁴ Ibid., 78.

⁷⁵ MacDonald, Johnston, and Morris, eds., supra note 4, at 60.

⁷⁶ Graham, Thomas R., “The Results of the Tokyo Round” (1979) 9 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 153.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Ibid., 170.

⁷⁸ GATT, Art. 36, para. 8.

⁷⁹ Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law 5 (2nd ed.) (1973).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Ibid., 6–8.

⁸¹ Feuer, supra note 10 at 302.

⁸² [1927] P.G.L.J., Series A, No. 16.

⁸³ [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3.

⁸⁴ Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 79, at 8.

⁸⁵ Op. cit. supra note 62, at 19.

⁸⁶ [1905] 2 K.B. 391, 407.

⁸⁷ Cf. Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 79, at 253.

⁸⁸ Supra note 11, Second Development Decade G.A. Res. 2626, 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

⁸⁹ “Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

⁹⁰ Supra note 11.

⁹¹ Supra note 12.

⁹² Schacter, Oscar, “The Evolving International Law of Development,” (1976) 15 Col. J. Trans. L. 1, 10.Google Scholar

⁹³ In the words of the North-South Institute: “In summary, while Canadians in general and Canadian policymakers in particular like to view Canada as being in (or close to) the vanguard of the industrial countries, this self-image is more flattering than accurate. Canada, on occasion, has taken positions that have put this country among the leaders of the North. However, as far as proceeding with in depth and innovative analyses or offering proposals that could facilitate substantive agreement between the North and the South, Canada has neither called upon enough of its resources, nor come close to realizing its potential.” Op. cit. supra note 28, at 41. As well, see D. R. Morrison, who points out: “Most of the authors surveyed do not think that Canada’s foreign policy in matters of international development has reflected as yet a serious, comprehensive and integrated response to the Third World case for a new international order” in “Canada and International Development” (1979-80) 14 J. Cdn Studies 133, 141.

⁹⁴ Task Force Report, op. cit. supra note 21, at 19.

⁹⁵ The Gazette, Montreal, April 8, 1982, at 3–19. See also Gray, John. “How Road to Global Aid was Never Paved,” The Globe and Mail, Toronto, September 28, 1983, at 1.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Op. cit. supra note 49, at 9, para. 13.

⁹⁷ Cf. Lyon, P. V. and Ismael, T. Y., eds., Canada and Third World Trade xviii (1976).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ North-South Institute, Interest?, op. cit. supra note 31, at 65.

⁹⁹ Task Force Report, op. cit. supra note 21, at 15.

¹⁰⁰ Annual Review, op. cit. supra note 38, at 2.

¹⁰¹ North-South Institute, Encounter, op. cit. supra note 28, at 39.

¹⁰² Hamlet, III: 1, Il. 57–58.

¹⁰³ Helleiner, G. K., “Canada and the New International Order” (1976) Cdn Public Policy 451, 454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Dept of External Affairs, “Declaration of the Ottawa Summit,” July 21, 1981.

¹⁰⁵ O’Manique, op. cit. supra note 22, at 134.