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Swatek-Evenstein, Mark
2020.
A History of Humanitarian Intervention.
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The Syrian Crisis, 1860-61: A Case Study in Classic Humanitarian Intervention
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
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- Notes and Comments / Notes et commentaires
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- Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 23 , 1986 , pp. 246 - 260
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- Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1986
References
1 For a sophisticated recent discussion, see D’Amato, , “The Concept of Human Rights in International Law,” 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1110 (1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 See, e.g., Lillich, R., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973)Google Scholar; Hassan, , “Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ Reexamined,” 17 Willamette L. Rev. 859 (1980–81)Google Scholar; Jeffery, , “The American Hostages in Teheran: The I.C.J, and the Legality of Rescue Missions,” 30 Int’l and Comp. L.Q. 717 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fonteyne, , “The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter,” 4 Cal. W. Int. L.J. 203 (1974)Google Scholar; Brownlie, , “Humanitarian Intervention” in Moore, J., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World 217 (1974)Google Scholar; Lillich, , “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives” in Moore, J., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World 229 (1974)Google Scholar; Franck, T. and Rodley, N., “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force,” 67 Am. J. Int’l L. 275 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moore, , “The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,” 9 Va. J. Int’l L. 205 (1969)Google Scholar; Lillich, , “Intervention to Protect Human Rights,” 15 McGill L.J. 205 (1969)Google Scholar; and Lillich, , “Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights,” 53 Iowa L.R. 325 (1967).Google Scholar
3 See Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States 338–42 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brownlie, , “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen” in Lillich, R., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 139 (1973).Google Scholar
4 Brownlie, , “Humanitarian Intervention” in Moore, J., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modem World 221 (1974).Google Scholar
5 The nature of the Maronite and Druze religious sects was expressed by Lord Stratford de Radcliffe, when the Syrian crisis was first debated in the British Parliament on July 10, 1860:
The principal tribes are the Druses, of Pagan origin, who generally profess the Mahomedan creed, and add to the prejudices of religion a character marked with no small degree of ferocity; and the Maronites, who, as your Lordships know, are Christians, but, in spite of their Christianity, act from time to time with little regard for humanity in their disputes among themselves and with their neighbours.
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (3rd series, 1860), Vol. 159, at 1648–49.
6 Encyclopedia Britannica (15th ed., 1974), Vol. 17, at 954.
7 The capitulation of 1535 may be considered the foundation of French claims to a protectorate over the Christians in the Levant. The actual relations between them, more in particular the Maronites, and the French date however from three centuries earlier. When St. Louis landed at Limisso in September, 1248, he found in the island of Cyprus a Maronite colony notable for its loyalty to the kings of the house of Lusignan.
Scheltema, J., The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860 17 (1920).Google Scholar
8 Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 6.
9 See Ziadeh, N., Syria and Lebanon 35 (1957).Google Scholar
10 Petran, T., Syria 48–49 (1972).Google Scholar
11 A comprehensive account is provided in Ma’oz, M., Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840–1861 (1968).Google Scholar
12 Ibid.
13 Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 6, at 954–55.
14 Ibid., 955. Ma’oz, op. cit. supra note 11, at 232, comments on the economic tension between Christians and Muslims in Damascus as follows: “The economic motive behind the Muslims’ animosity was equally powerful: while the Damascus Christians were, as already described, growing richer through foreign trade and in government employment, large sections of the local Muslim population were suffering acute economic distress or did not find their prosperity increasing proportionately.”
15 Tibawi, A., A Modern History of Syria 123–24 (1969).Google Scholar
16 For different perspectives on this conflict, see Scheltema, op. cit. supra note 7, and the review by Bliss in 26 Am. Hist. Rev. 326 (1921); Jessup, H., Fifty-Three Years in Syria Vol. 1, at 157–214 (1910)Google Scholar; and Churchill, C., The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860 132–254 (1862).Google Scholar
17 Tibawi, op. cit. supra note 15, at 125.
18 Ibid.
19 Spagnolo, J., France and Ottoman Lebanon: 1861–1914 30 (1977).Google Scholar
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 31. See also Ma’oz, op. cit. supra note 11, at 231.
22 A. Tibawi, op. cit. supra note 15, at 127.
23 See generally Jessup, op. cit. supra note 16, at 195 et seq.
24 Spagnolo, op. cit. supra note 19, at 32–33.
25 Ibid., 33.
26 Ibid.
27 As W. B. Lawrence stated in his annotated edition of Wheaton, “the active interposition of the great Powers was required by considerations of humanity on account of the inability of the Porte to prevent the massacre of the Maronites by the Druses in Syria.” Wheaton, H., Elements of International Law 23 (2nd ann. ed., Lawrence, W., 1863).Google Scholar
28 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (3rd series, 1860), Vol. 159, at 1653–54.
29 The relevant provisions of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, are reproduced in Sohn, L. and Buergenthal, T., Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights 235 (1973).Google Scholar
30 Reproduced in Parry, C., ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1969), Vol. 122, at 490–91.Google Scholar
31 Stowell, E., Intervention in International Law 64 (1921).Google Scholar
32 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (3rd series, 1861), Vol. 161, at 1119.
33 Stowell, op. cit. supra note 31, at 64–65. The official diplomatic language of the two protocols of August 3, 1860 is reproduced in Parry, op. cit. supra note 30, at 487–91. The London Times, August 10, 1860, called these developments “a gratifying sign of the accord which prevails among all civilised powers that, although the state of Europe is far from reassuring and the strength of France is so displayed as to be a menace for its neighbours, the European nations are yet capable of uniting in a great cause.”
34 Spagnolo, op. cit. supra note 19, at 35.
35 Ibid. The translation is that of the British Foreign Office.
36 For eyewitness accounts of this ferocity, see Churchill, op. cit. supra note 16; and Jessup, op. cit. supra note 16.
37 But by the end of June line-of-battle ships, frigates and corvettes, from all nations, came successively dropping in, and war steamers cruised about to all points of the coast. The English and French squadrons under Admirals Martin and Jehennes took up their stations off the port of Beyrout in July. Finally, the French military expedition under General Beaufort D’Hautpol, landed on the 16th of August. With the British flag floating on the waters, and the French standards waving on the soil of Syria, the Christians again breathed. Confidence was restored. Those who had fled to foreign shores returned. The future might at last be in a measure guaranteed — but the past!
11,000 Christians massacred.
100,000 sufferers by the civil war.
20,000 desolate widows and orphans.
3,000 Christians habitations burnt to the ground.
4,000 Christians perished of destitution.
2,000,000 1. property destroyed.
Churchill, op. cit. supra note 16, at 219.
38 For a concise and balanced account of the work of the International Commission, see Spagnolo, op. cit. supra note 19, at 36–47.
39 Ibid., 36.
40 Ibid., 36–37.
41 Ibid., 37.
42 Ibid., 38.
43 Reproduced in Parry, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. 124, at 35–37. A biographer of Lord Palmerston comments, in relation to these events:
The Control Commission were still arguing about the future government of the Lebanon and the steps to be taken to safeguard the security of the Christians when the six months’ period stipulated in the Convention expired at the beginning of February, 1861, and the French were required to withdraw from Syria; but Russell had already demanded a month before that the French leave Syria immediately. All the other powers objected, and said that this would mean more massacres of Christians. Once again, Palmerston and Russell gave way, and agreed that the French troops could prolong their stay till June.
Ridley, J., Lord Palmerston 536 (1970).Google Scholar
44 See the account by Bell, H., Lord Palmerston, Vol. 2, at 269–70 (1936).Google Scholar
45 51 British and Foreign State Papers 288–92 (1860-61).
46 Spagnolo, op. cit. supra note 19, at 45.
47 Ibid.
48 “The Syrian case has been almost unanimously considered a case of lawful humanitarian intervention”: Reisman, M. and McDougal, M., “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” in Lillich, R., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 167, at 181 (1973).Google Scholar But cf. T. Franck and N. Rodley, supra note a, at 282.
49 Lawrence, T., The Principles of International Law 116 (1895).Google Scholar
50 Stowell, op. cit. supra note 31, at 66.
51 See text accompanying notes 57–65, infra.
52 Wheaton, op cit. supra note 27, at 132. Winfield stated the rule in broadly similar terms: “It may be laid down at the outset that, as state-independence is the foundation of modern international law, non-intervention is the rule, intervention the exception.” Winfield, , “The History of Intervention in International Law,” 3 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 130, at 139 (1922–23).Google Scholar
53 See, e.g., Wheaton, op. cit. supra note 27, at 115 et seq.; and Woolsey, T., Introduction to the Study of International Law 90 et seq. (1860).Google Scholar
54 Woolsey, ibid., 91; Creasy, E., First Platform of International Law 303–4 (1876)Google Scholar; Wheaton, H., Elements of International Law 91 (1836).Google Scholar
55 The extreme case of extraordinary crimes, committed by a government against its subjects, is still less capable of exact definition. Here, however, the danger of erring is less than in the other instance, because interference here is more disinterested; and the evil results of a mistake are less, because such cases are comparatively rare.
Woolsey, T., Introduction to the Study of International Law 58 (2nd ed., rev. 1867).Google Scholar
56 Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 49, at 115.
57 The statement by SirHarcourt, W. Vernon, Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of International Law 14 (1863)Google Scholar, is illustrative: “Intervention is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably handled by those who have the power to give effect to it, may be the highest policy of justice and humanity.”
58 Quoted in Baker, S., Halleck’s International Law, Vol. 1, at 511 (3rd ed., 1893)Google Scholar. For a similar view, see Pradier-Fodéré, P., Traité de Droit International Européen et Américain 663 (1885).Google Scholar
59 Woolsey, op. cit. supra note 53, at 111.
60 See, e.g., Bernard, M., On the Principle of Non-Intervention 33–34 (1860)Google Scholar:
The law upholds as a principle the sovereignty and equality of States from the greatest to the least, and, as a corollary, prohibits intervention. Here, again, in a hundred particular cases, there may be the most powerful inducements to shake off the restraints of the rule. Nay, there may even be cases in which it becomes a positive duty to transgress it — in which respect it does but resemble every other merely human law.
61 Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 49, at 132–33.
62 See also the emphatic statement in Wheaton, op. cit. supra note 27, at 613:
Without discussing whether civil war superadds belligerent to municipal rights, or substitutes the former for the latter, or whether a recognition by third parties of the belligerent rights of rebels, or even the formal acknowledgment by them of their independence can affect their status as respects the legitimate government, it is very certain, that, should a case of servile war arise, it would not be necessary for the governments of Christendom to base their intervention on any such considerations. They might well found it on those instincts of a common humanity, which international law is far from repudiating, though they may neither concern questions of political power nor of national independence.
63 Arntz, E., Revue du Droit International 675 (1876)Google Scholar, quoted in Stowell, op. cit. supra note 31, at 53.
64 “[T]he appearance of European warships stopped Christian bloodshed at Sidon in the first week of June, 1860, and prevented similar outbreaks in other coastal towns such as Beirut, Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa.” Ma’oz. op. cit. supra note 11, at 230. An eyewitness to the events gave similar testimony:
That the presence of the French expeditionary force in Syria exercised a most beneficial moral influence cannot be denied. It induced a general feeling of security amongst the Christian population, while it overawed the spirit of Mohammedan fanaticism.. . . When … the Druzes discovered that the French were not coming to exterminate them, but, on the contrary, treated them with the greatest forbearance, and even gave them assurances of freedom from molestation, they gradually regained confidence and returned to their homes.
Churchill, op. cit. supra note 16, at 250–51.
65 Various standards for evaluating the legitimacy of a claimed humanitarian intervention in contemporary international law have been proposed by Nanda, , “The United States’ Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order — Part I,” 43 Denver L.J. 439 (1966)Google Scholar; Lillich, “Intervention to Protect Human Rights,” supra note 2; Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives,” supra note 2; Lillich, “Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights,” supra note 2; and Moore, “The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,” supra note 2.
Professor Falk has argued persuasively that “it is highly doubtful whether it is desirable to commit international law to a maximum principle of nonintervention. The history of international relations exhibits many instances in which intervention was prompted by humanitarian considerations that one can condemn only by a too vigorous waving of the banners of sovereignty.” Falk, , “The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the International Affairs of Independent States,” 5 How. L.J. 163, at 166–67 (1959).Google Scholar
On the arguable dictates of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter in the current controversy over humanitarian intervention, see especially Reisman and McDougal, supra note 48, at 178.
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