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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
It is often assumed, especially in the Anglo-American literature, that Frederick William I (1713–40), by establishing the “canton System” in 1733, lessened his need to rely on foreign mercenaries for military manpower and moved in the direction of a national, conscript army. As put by Robert Ergang: “The establishment of this so-called ‘canton system’ not only assured… a large permanent supply of recruits; it was also a long step toward making the Prussian army a national one. Recruiting abroad was still continued, but it was only supplementary. Native recruits now formed the backbone of the Prussian army.” This persistent assumption, stated in different ways by different authors, has even penetrated the textbook literature. A closely related assumption holds that Frederick the Great after 1740, by increasing the proportion of foreign manpower to as much as two-thirds of the total, “reversed” the trend toward making the army more national in character. The purpose of this essay will be to demonstrate that both of the above-mentioned assumptions are false; they depend on a misunderstanding of the real trends in Prussian recruiting bolstered, in the latter case, by faulty statistics.
1. Ergang, R., The Potsdam Führer (New York, 1941), 77.Google Scholar
2. E.g., Rosinski, H., The German Army, 2d ed. (London, 1940), 18;Google ScholarShanahan, W., Prussian Military Reforms, 1786–1813 (New York, 1945), 39;Google ScholarCraig, G., The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (New York, 1956), 10, 12, 23;Google ScholarBruford, W., “The Organization and Rise of Prussia,” in The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1957), 7:295;Google ScholarHubatsch, W., Frederick the Great of Prussia (London, 1975), 32;Google ScholarJohnson, H., Frederick the Great and His Officials (New Haven, 1975), 27;Google ScholarKoch, H., A History of Prussia (London, 1978), 87–88;Google ScholarRoss, S., From Flintlock to Rifle:Infantry Tactics, 1740–1866 (London, 1979), 20;Google ScholarSchwieger, K., “Militär und Bürgertum,” in Blasius, D., ed., Preussen in der deutschen Geschichte (Königstein/Ts, 1980), 184;Google ScholarChilds, J., Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648–1789 (New York, 1982), 52;Google Scholar a textbook example is Chambers, M. et al. The Western Experience (New York, 1974), 2:632.Google Scholar
3. Rosinski, 26–27; Craig, 22; Redlich, F., The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force (Wiesbaden, 1964), 2:201;Google ScholarLuvaas, J., Frederick the Great on the Art of War(New York, 1966), 31;Google Scholarcf. Strachan, H., European Armies and the Conduct of War (Winchester, Mass., 1983), 9.Google Scholar
4. The point is not always understood; e.g., see Craig, 12, 23; Hubatsch, 32.
5. No formal distinction between “natives” and “foreigners” was made before 1740. Estimates of the number of foreigners before that date have to be based on interpretation of recruiting patterns and a few fragments of statistical evidence, such as the muster roll of the Leibkompagnie of the Dohna regiment for May 1715, which shows 21 percent foreigners among the enlisted men. Kopka von Lossow, R., Geschichte des Grenadier-Regiments König Friedrich 1.(4. ostpreussischen) Nr. 5 (Berlin, 1889–1901), 2:73*–76*.Google Scholar One company, of course, does not necessarily typify the whole army. Some regiments did little or no foreign recruiting until the 1720s; the artillery, as a matter of policy, had no foreigners. W. Venohr's estimates for 1720 (ca. 27 percent) and 1730 (ca. 33 percent) seem too high; his figure for the number of foreign recruits between 1713 and 1738 (18,000) is impossibly low. Der Soldatenkönig: Revolutionär auf dem Thron (Frankfurt/Main and Berlin, 1988), 143, 153.Google Scholar
6. On recruiting before 1713, see Schrötter, R., “Die Ergänzung des preussischen Heeres unter dem ersten Könige,” Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte 23 (1910):403–67;Google ScholarJany, C., Geschichte der preussischen Armee, 2d ed. (Osnabrück, 1967), 1:546–79.Google Scholar For recruiting after 1713, see Jany, I: 679–718. To some extent, Jany corrected the pioneering work of Lehmann, M., “Werbung, Wehrpflicht, und Beurlaubung unter Friedrich Wilhelm I.,” Historische Zeitschrift 67 (1891): 254–89.Google ScholarJähns, M., Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften (Munich and Leipzig, 1889–1891), 2:1547–73, gives a good survey of the documentary evidence, but should not be read without reference to Jany.Google Scholar
7. Reglement vor die königl. preussische Infanterie (Potsdam, 1726 [Repr.; Osnabrück, 1968]), 552.Google Scholar
8. All measurements have been converted to English feet and inches. The Prussian standard of measurement was the Rhenish foot, equivalent to 1.03 English feet. The figures given above have been extrapolated from the specifications in the so—called Werbereglement of 1732 for the Infantry and Dragoons, : “Disposition und Ordres, womach die Königl. Preuss. Infanterie Regimenter von dato d. 1. 8br. 1732 wegen der Werbung sich zu verhalten haben sollen,” MilitairWochenblatt 26 (1841): 82–83;Google ScholarTyszka, K., Geschichte des königl. preussischen Isten Dragoner-Regiments (Rastenburg, 1837), 438.Google Scholar
9. Data are taken from Bagensky, B. v., Regimentsbuch des Grenadier-Regiments König Friedrich Wilhelm IV. (1. pommerschen) Nr. 2, von 1679–1891 (Berlin, 1892), 52–53, 56–57;Google Scholar and Kopka von Lossow, 2:139*, 144*. The figures for Hacke include cantonists between 15 and 40, for Diericke between 18 and 40. The canton of the Diericke regiment was located in Masuria and New East Prussia where the average stature (column A) of the population was less than that of the core provinces. The apparent differences in manpower utilization (column B) are due to different sized cantons. Columns B and C do not take into account the “Third Battalion,” consisting of shorter men and semi-invalids, of the Diericke regiment. At the time of Frederick William I or Frederick the Great such personnel would have been grouped in separate garrison battalions.
10. For contemporary views, see Beneckendorff, K., Karakterzüge aus dem Leben König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (Berlin, 1787–1789), 3:76–77, 88–89;Google ScholarFassmann, D., Leben und Thaten des… Königs von Preussen Friederici Wilhelmi (Hamburg, 1735–1741), 1:722–23, 781.Google Scholar
11. Friedlaender, E., ed., Berliner geschriebene Zeitungen aus den Jahren 1713 his 1717 (Berlin, 1902), 537, 613–14.Google Scholar
12. Presumably, if the canton system gave the army “a national basis which it had not had before” (Craig) or if native recruits “now formed the backbone of the Prussian army” (Ergang), one has to conclude that foreigners were the numerical backbone of the army before 1733. It would seem logical, also, to assume that the canton system was a response to the failure of foreign recruiting to keep up the strength of the army. See Craig, 8–10, 12; Ergang, 72–77; Rosinski, 17–18; Childs, 52; Koch, 87–89; Redlich, 2:180–82.
13. Frederick the Great did just that after 1740. He, too, preferred tall soldiers, but he was willing to compromise in order to get more recruits at a cheaper price per head. See Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen, ed. Volz, G. (Berlin, 1920), 146–47;Google ScholarMittheilungen aus dem Archiv des königlichen Kriegsministeriums (Berlin, 1891–1895), I: 21;Beneckendorff, 3:90.Google Scholar
14. Acta Borussica: Ergänzungsband, “Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau, 1704–1740,” ed. Krauske, O. (Berlin, 1905), 496; cf. 247.Google Scholar
15. The obsession with tall men, of course, had practical roots in a striving for tactical perfection. Infantrymen had to be reasonably tall in order to handle the long musket effectively. See Bleckwenn, H., Unter dem Preussen-Adler: Das brandenburgisch-preussische Heer, 1640–1807 (Munich, 1978), 63–65.Google Scholar
16. Data arc taken from “Mittheilungen aus dem Archive des königlichen Kriegsministeriums, III; Statistische Nachrichten über die Armee Friedrich Wilhelms I,” Militär-Wochenblatt 76 (1891): 1031–36.Google Scholar The large number of men who merely changed status through promotion or transfer from one unit to another were countcd as being both “discharged” and “recruited” in the monthly lists. Thus the true number of men recruited or discharged was less than these figures indicate. The frequent assertion that 20 percent of the soldiers had to be discharged annually because of old age or invalidity has been shown to be false. See Fann, W., “Peacetime Attrition in the Army of Frederick William I, 1713–1740,” Central European History II (1978):323–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
17. Friedlaender, 56, 240, 646; “Wie es unter König Friedrich Wilhelm I. gewesen,” Der Soldaten-Freund 40(1872–1873): 353.Google Scholar
18. See above, n. 12.
19. On the development of the canton system and on furloughing, see Jany, 1: 679–700,707–9.
20. “Scarcely believable”: Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand (Berlin, 1846–1857), 1:193 (hereinafter:Oeuvres).Google Scholar
21. According to Frederick, out of a total strength of 76,000, 26,000 (34.2 percent) were foreigners, hence the frequent statement that foreigners constituted one-third of the army in 1740. It should be understood, however, that Frederick was referring only to the number of foreign privates, whereas part of the N. C. O.'s and musicians were also foreigners. Oeuvres, 2:1Google Scholar. Frederick's figures do not include the nearly 5,000 men of the militia (“New Garrisons”). See Jany, I: 660.
22. Oeuvres, 8: 216–17.
23. Friedrich der Grosse: Militärische Schriften, ed. Taysen, A. v. (Berlin, 1883), 493, 494;Google ScholarReglement vor die königl. preussische Infanterie (Berlin, 1743 [Repr.; Osnabrück, 1976]), 573.Google Scholar
24. See above, n. 13; Oeuvres, 8: 216–17Google Scholar; Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen, 138–40.
25. Droysen, J., Geschichte der preussischen Politik (Leipzig, 1868–1886), 5/3: 18.Google ScholarCf. Dette, E., Friedrich der Grosse und Sein Heer (Göttingen, 1914), 16;Google Scholar Rosinski, 27; Luvaas, 31; Duffy, C., The Army of Frederick the Great (New York, 1974), Ross, 19–20; Childs, 47.Google Scholar
26. Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen, 83.
27. Jany, 2:240–41.
