1 On the disintegration of the bourgeois party system during the Weimar Republic, see Jones, Larry Eugene, “‘The Dying Middle’: Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Politics,” Central European History 5 (1972): 23–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Sammlung oder Zersplitterung? Die Bestrebungen zur Bildung einer neuen Mittelpartei in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik 1930–1933,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25 (1977): 265–304, as well as the forthcoming articles “The Dissolution of the Bourgeois Party System in the Weimar Republic,” in Social Change and Political Development in the Weimar Republic, ed. Richard, Bessel and Edgar, Feuchtwanger (London and New York, 1980).Google Scholar

2 For a general survey of the German inflation, see Stolper, Gustav, Häuser, Karl, and Borchardt, Knut, The German Economy 1870 to the Present (New York, 1967), pp. 74–89.Google Scholar For the most recent and exhaustive study of the German inflation, see Feldman, Gerald D., Iron and Steel in the German Inflation, 1916–1923 (Princeton, 1977)Google Scholar, as well as the collection of documents published by Feldman, and Homburg, Heidrun in Industrie und Inflation: Studien und Dokumcnte zur Politik der deutschen Unterneluner 1916–1923 (Hamburg, 1977).Google Scholar Of further value, though misleading in its treatment of the impact of the inflation upon the German middle strata, is the recent comparative study of postwar European society by Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1977).Google Scholar

3 In this connection, see the recollections of Schoenbemer, Franz, Confessions of a European Intellectual (New York, 1946), pp. 153–55Google Scholar, as well as the highly impressionistic treatment of the inflation by Friedrich, Otto, Before the Deluge: A Portrait of Berlin in the 1920's (New York, 1972), pp. 120–31.Google Scholar

4 The term middle class as it has been used in this article does not refer to the narrow concept of Mittelstand employed by Winkler, Heinrich August in his monographic study, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus: Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk find Kleinhandel in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 1972Google Scholar), but rather to the more catholic definition used by Theodor Geiger in his classic analysis of German social structure in the 1920s, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart, 1932). Even Geiger's categories are much too vague for a precise analysis of the various socioeconomic groups which comprised the German middle strata during the Weimar Republic, a problem due in part to Geiger's own methodological shortcomings, but also to the fact that during the Weimar Republic the social fabric of the German middle class underwent such a profound transformation that precise categorization becomes extremely difficult.

5 Born, Karl Erich, “Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel Deutschlands am Ende dcs 19. Jahrhunderts,” Vierteljahrshefte für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 50 (1963): 361–76.Google Scholar

6 On the social and economic impact of World War I upon the German middle class, see Kocka, Jürgen, “The First World War and the ‘Mittelstand’: German Artisans and White-Collar Workers,” Journal of Contemporary History 8 (1973): 101–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as well as his lengthier monographic study, Klassengesellschaft im Kriege: Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1918 (Göttingen, 1973), pp. 65–95.

7 On the social and economic repercussions of the German inflation, see the classic study by Eulenberg, Franz, “Die sozialen Wirkungen der Währungsverhältnisse,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 122 (1924): 748–94Google Scholar, as well as the more recent contributions by Laursen, Karsten and Pedersen, Jorgen, the German Inflation 1918–1923 (Amsterdam, 1969), pp. 108–22Google Scholar, and Witt, Peter-Christian, “Finanzpolitik und sozialer Wandel in Krieg und Inflation 1918–1924,” in Industriellcs System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik: Verhandlungen des Internationalist Symposiums in Bochum vom 12.–17. Juni 1973, ed. Hans, Mommsen, Dietmar, Petzina, and Bernd, Weisbrod (Düsseldorf, 1974), PP. 395–426.Google Scholar See also the forthcoming essay by Peter-Christian Witt, “The Social and Political Consequences of the Inflation and Stabilization,” in Social Change and Political Development in the Weimar Republic.

8 Winkler, Mittelstand, pp. 76–83.

9 Schräder, Bemhard Heinrich, Die Entwicklungstendenzen der deutschen Warenhauskonzerne (Wurzburg, 1930), pp. 3–20.Google Scholar

10 On the economic problems of the small business sector in the late 1920s, see Dethloff, J., “Das Handwerk in der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft,” in Strukturwandlungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft, ed. Bemhard, Harms, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1929), 2:3–41Google Scholar, and Wolfgang Reichardt, “Probleme der Handwerkspolitik,” Ibid., 2:63–80. On the credit difficulties of the German farmer, see Meyer, Lothar, Die deutsche Landwirtschaft während der Inflation und zu Beginn der Deflation (Täbingen, 1924), pp. 23–32Google Scholar, and Fritz Beckmann, “Landwirtschaftliche Kreditfragen,” in Strukturwandlungen, 1:160–71.

11 In this respect, see Nothaas, Josef, “Die Stellenlosigkeit der Angestellten,” Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv 16 (1927): 271–322.Google Scholar On the development of the German whitecollar class during the Weimar Republic, see Jürgen Kocka, “Zur Problematik der deutschen Angestellten 1914–1933,” in Industrielles System, pp. 792–811.

12 Eulenburg, “Wirkungen der Währungsverhältnisse,” p. 756.

13 Ibid., pp. 756–57. See also Dietrich, Hermann, Was wird aus den Sparguthaben? (KarIsruhe, 1924).Google Scholar

14 Weber, Alfred, Die Not der geistigen Arbeiter (Munich and Leipzig, 1926), pp. 41–45.Google Scholar For further information on the impact of the inflation upon the German academic community, see Schreiber, Georg, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter: Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Retches (Leipzig, 1923)Google Scholar, as well as the recent monographic study by Ringer, Fritz K., The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 62–66.Google Scholar

15 For a contemporary impression, see Ross, F. A., “The Passing of the German Middle Class,” American Journal of Sociology 29 (1924): 529–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Extensive documentation on the hardship which the inflation inflicted upon individual members of the German middle class can be found in the private papers of Hermann Dietrich in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (herafter cited as BA: NL Dietrich), vols. 294–96, and Kuno Graf von Westarp (hereafter cited as NL Westarp) in the private possession of Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen.

16 The best source of information on the revaluation campaign is the speech delivered by Adolf Bauser, “Die Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” at a convention held by the Reich Party for People's Right and Revaluation (Reichspartei für Volksrecht und Aufwertung) in Stuttgart, Mar. 5–6, 1927, in Für Wahrheit und Recht: Der Endkampf um eine gerechte Aufwertung: Reden und Aufsätze, ed. Adolf, Bauser (Stuttgart, 1927), pp. 5–11.Google Scholar For further information, see the article by Fritzsch, Werner, “Sparerbund für das Deutsche Reich (Spb) 1922–1939,” in Die bürgerlichai Parteien in Deutschland: Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderer bürgerlichen Interessenorganisationen vom Vonnärz bis zum jahre 1945, 2 vols. (East Berlin, 1968–1970), 2:648–53.Google Scholar

17 An occupational breakdown of the membership of five south German chapters of the Savers' Association (Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Heidelberg, and Worms) from Dec. 1925 to Jan. 1926 reveals the following social configuration: pensioners, 29.4%; civil servants, 20.0%; without profession (principally unemployed women and widows), 14.8%; liberal professions including academics, 10.2% white-collar employees, 8.5%; private gentlemen (Privatier), 5.0%; small businessmen, 2.7%; workers, 2.7%; and farmers, 1.4%. Similar figures for the rest of the country are unfortunately not available. On the social composition of the revaluation movement, see the statistical table in Georg Winnewisser, Die Aufwertung der Industrie-Obligationen: Eine wirtschaftliche Untersuchung (Karlsruhe, 1927), p. 30. The author would like to express his gratitude to Michael Hughes of the University of California-Berkeley for having brought this reference to his attention.

18 Pirlet, Otto, Der politische Kampf um die Aufivertungsgesetzgebung nach dem l. Weltkrieg (Ph.D. diss., Cologne, 1970), p. 36.Google Scholar

19 Ibid., pp. 36–44. See also Düringer, , “Schutz der Hypotheken,” Juristische Wochenschrift 53 (1923): 433–34.Google Scholar

20 Heymann, Ernst, “Reichsgericht, Hypothekenaufwertung und Lebensversichcrung,” Deutsche Junsteti-Zeitung 29 (1924): 18–23.Google Scholar

21 On the government's response to the Supreme Court decision of Nov. 28, 1923, see Luther, Hans, Politiker ohne Partei: Erinnerungen (Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 229–33.Google Scholar Further details are to be found in the manuscript by Southern, “The Revaluation Question in the Weimar Republic.”

22 In this respect, see Luther, Hans, Feste Mark—solide Wirtschaft: Rückblick auf die Arbeit der Reichsregierung während der Wintermonate 1923/24 (Berlin, 1924), pp. 37–48.Google Scholar

23 Pirlet, Kampf um die Aufwertungsgesetzgebung, p. 51. For the BVP's position on the revaluation issue, see Emminger, Erich, Der Kampf um die Aufwertung: Rechenschaftsbericht der Bayerischen Volkspartei (Munich, n.d. [1928]).Google Scholar

24 Krohn, Claus-Dieter, Stabilisierung und ökonomische Interessen: Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1923–1927 (Düsseldorf, 1974). PP. 22–53.Google Scholar

25 Luther, Politiker ohne Partei, pp. 233–40. For the details of the Third Emergency Tax Decree, see Netzband, Karl-Bernhard and Widmaier, Hans Peter, Währungs- und Finanzpolitik der ära Luther 1923–1925 (Basel and Tübingen, 1964), pp. 168–223.Google Scholar

26 For example, see Wüst, Reinhard, Das Aufwertungsproblem und die 3. Steuemotverordnung: Eine gemeinverständliche Betrachtung (Halle, 1924).Google Scholar

27 On the DDP's financial difficulties in the May 1924 elections, see “Rechenschaftsbericht der Reichsgeschäftsstelle für die Reichstagswahlen 1924,” n.d. [June 1924], in the unpublished Nachlass of Heinrich Gerland, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, vol. 8. For further details, see Larry Eugene Jones, “Die Rückwirkungen der Inflation auf die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems in der Weimarer Republik,” Historische Prozesse der deutschen Inflation, pp. 288–95, as well as the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Bowers, Peter M., “The Failure of the German Democratic Party, 1918–1930” (Pittsburgh, 1973), pp. 91–111.Google Scholar

28 On the impact of the inflation upon the DVP's electoral base, see the letter from Eugen Leidig of the Prussian DVP to Gustav Stresemann, Aug. 25, 1921, in Stresemann's unpublished Nachlass, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn, vol. 231, pp. 141378–86, as well as Stresemann's remarks of Aug. 22, 1923, in Stresemann, Gustav, Vermächtnis: Der Nachlass in drei Bänden, ed. Henry, Bernhard, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1932–1933), 1:95–98Google Scholar, quoted in Southern, “Revaluation Question,” p. 7.

29 “Aufwertungsfrage und Deutschnationale Volkspartei,” DNVP-Werbeblatt, no. 287, NL Westarp.

30 Recent quantitative research by Professor Thomas Childers of the University of Pennsylvania has indicated that the losses of the two liberal parties in the 1924 Reichstag elections were heaviest among those segments of the population which had suffered most as a result of the inflation, namely, pensioners, small investors, widows, disabled veterans, and others living on fixed incomes. According to Childers' evidence, these elements defected primarily to the DNVP and to a lesser degree to the National Socialist German Freedom Movement. The support which the DNVP received from this segment of society reached a high point in the December 1924 elections and declined from that point on. The National Socialists began to score substantial gains within this segment of the population only after the onset of the depression in the late 1920s. For a preliminary sum-mary of Childers' conclusions, see his article, “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote,” Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976): 17–42.

31 Bauser, “Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” p. 7.

32 For the SPD's position, see Hertz, Paul, Sozialdemokratie und Aufwertung (Berlin, n.d. [1924])Google Scholar, as well as the vivid recollection of the revaluation conflict in Keil, Wilhelm, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1947–1948), 2:305–16.Google Scholar

33 In particular, see Emminger, Erich, Die Aufwertungsfrage im aufgelösten Reichstag (Munich, 1924)Google Scholar, as well as Heimann, Hugo, Der Kampf um die Aufwertung: Von Helfferich bis Hindenburg (Berlin, 1925), pp. 13–18.Google Scholar

34 See the letter from Werner Stephan, secretary of the DDP, to the Savers' Association, Oct. 29, 1924, in Die Demokratie und die Aufwertung (Berlin, 1924), p. 10, as well as “Wilhelm Külz, “Die Demokratische Partei und die Aufwertung der öffentlichen Anleihen,” Nov. 24, 1924, BA: NL Dietrich, 294/86–89.

35 For the DVP's position in the negotiations which led to the dissolution of the Reichstag in the fall of 1924, see Curtius, Julius, “Der Kampf um eine Mehrheitsregierung,” Deutsche Stimmen 36 (1924): 339–46Google Scholar, as well as the treatment in Thimme, Roland, Stresemann und die deutsche Volkspartei 1923–1925 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1961), pp. 90–99.Google Scholar

36 Wunderlich, Hans, “Aufwertung und Fürstenauseinandersetzung,” Deutscher Aufbau: Nationalliberale Arbeit der Deutschen Volkspartei, ed. Adolf, Kempkes (Berlin, 1927), pp. 192–202.Google Scholar See also Stresemann, Gustav, Nationale Realpolitik: Rede auf dem 6. Parteitag der Deutschen Volkspartei in Dortmundam 14. November 1924 (Berlin, 1924), pp. 39–42.Google Scholar

37 For example, see Ohne Deutschnationale keine Aufwertung! Was jeder von der Aufwertung wissen muss (Berlin, 1925).

38 See the “Aufruf der ‘Aufwertungs- und Aufbaupartei’ ” and the official announcement of the party's founding, both dated Nov. 1, 1924, and appended to an official party circular from Nov. 9, 1924, in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Zeitgeschichtliche Sammlung, Hauptabteilung XII, IV, no. 220 (herafter cited as GStA Berlin-Dahlem, ZSg XII/IV no. 220). For the party's basic orientation, see Wüst, Reinhard, Im Aufwertungskampf fü Wahrheit und Recht gegen “Luthertum” und “Marxismus”: Eine gemeinverständliche Auseinandersetzung mit den Trugschlüssen und Schlagworten der Aufwertungsgegner (Halle, 1924).Google Scholar

39 See “Wahlaufruf u. Programm der Aufwertungs- und Wiederaufbau-Partei,” n.d. GStA Berlin-Dahlem, ZSg XII/IV no. 220.

40 “Richtlinien zur Wahl,” Die Aufwertung: Offizielles Organ des Hypotheken- Gläbiger- und Sparer-Schutzverbandes für das Deutsche Reich, Nov. 7, 1924, no. 7. See also the report of the meeting of the central executive committee of the Mortgagees and Savers' Protective Association, Oct. 26, 1924, Ibid.

41 For this correspondence, see Die Aufwertung, Nov. 28, 1924, no. 27.

42 Paul Meissner, “Zur Lage,” Die Aufwertung, Nov. 28, 1924, no. 27. See also Bauser, “Die Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” p. 7.

43 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 46 (1927): 498–99.

44 See the report on the meeting of the DNVP Reichstag delegation, Feb. 10, 1925, in the letter from Reichert to Meyer, Reusch, and Blohm, Feb. 12, 1925, along with the enclosure, “Zur Aufwertungsfrage: Drei Ministerreden in der deutschnationalen Fraktion am 10.II.25, in the Nachlass of Paul Reusch, Historisches Archiv der Gutehoffhungshütte, Oberhausen, no. 400101295/16. For further information, see “Stellungnahme des Arbeitsausschusses der deutschnationalen Industriellen zur Aufwertungsfrage,” June 4, 1925, NL Westarp, as well as Dörr, Manfred, Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei 1925 bis 1928 (Marburg, 1964), pp. 325–33.Google Scholar

45 Aufwertungs- und Aufbau-Partei to Westarp, Mar. 4, 1925, NL Westarp. See also Bauser, “Die Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” pp. 7–8.

46 For the DDP's position, see Dietrich, Hermann, Gegen die Ausbeutung des Mittel standes zugunsten des Grosskapitals: Für eine gercchte Entsch¯digtmg aller Kriegs- und Inflationsgeschādigten: Rede im Reicfatag am 20. Februar 1925 (Berlin, n.d. [1925]).Google Scholar In contrast to Dietrich's position, the DDP's appeal for a revaluation of those financial assets destroyed by the inflation over and above the terms of the Third Emergency Tax Decree met with a cool response from the commercial and industrial interests which stood on the party's right wing. See the letter from Ernst Mosich of the DDP National Committee for Trade, Industry, and Commerce (Reichsausschuss für Handel, Industrie und Gewerbe beim Hauptvorstand der DDP) to Dietrich, Jan. 23, 1925, BA: NL Dietrich, 295/258–61. See also Schneider, Werner, Die Deutsche Denwhratische Partei in der Weimarer Republik 1924–1930 (Munich, 1978), pp. 102, 176–78.Google Scholar

47 See the memorandum by the Minister of Economics Neuhaus on his meeting with representatives from the leading bourgeois interest organizations, Jan. 28, 1925, in-the records of the Reich Chancery, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bcstand R 43 I, vol. 2455, pp. 71–72 (hereafter cited as BA: R 43 I/2455/71–72).

48 Memorandum of a conversation between the government and the leadership of the government parties, Jan. 23, 1925, BA: R 43 I/1020/139–40. See also Stürmer, Michael, Koalition und Opposition in der Weimarer Republik 1924–1928 (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 91–98.Google Scholar

49 Minutes of a meeting between representatives of the government and the leadership of the government parties, Mar. 18, 1925, BA: R 43 I/1020/163–81.

50 Krohn, Stabilisiemng und Interessen, pp. 164–73.

51 Minutes of a ministerial conference in the Reich Chancery, Mar. 22, 1925, BA: R 43 I/1020/189–97.

52 See Dietrich, Hermann, Aufwertung und Deutsche Demokratische Partei: Der Wahlschwindel der Deutschnationalen: Rede gehalten im Deutschen Reichstag am 8. Mai 1925 (Berlin, n.d. [1925])Google Scholar, and Heimann, Hugo, Worte und Taten in der Anfwertungsfrage: Was reden Deutschnationale? Was tun Sozialdemokraten?, ed. Vorstand Der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Berlin, 1925).Google Scholar

53 Die Aufwertung, May 8, 1925, no. 18.

54 Hergt, Oskar, Zur Aufwetungsfrage: Reichstagsrede vom 7. März 1925 (Berlin, 1925).Google Scholar

55 For a comparison of Best's proposal with the 1925 revaluation legislation, see his speech, “Dritte Steuemotverordnung, Aufwertungsgesetz und Gesetzentwurf des Sparerbundes,” in Für Wahrheit und Recht, pp. 12–22. By “schematic” approach is meant one that establishes revalorization percentages for each category of indebtedness without taking into consideration the respective merits of each individual claim.

56 See the correspondence between Best and the DNVP leadership in Der Kampf um die Aufwertung (Berlin, 1925), pp. 27–32, as well as Best, “Das Kompromiss in dcr Aufwertungsfrage und seine Väter,” Die Aufwertung, June 12, 1925, no. 23.

57 Keil, Erlebnisse eincs Sozialdemokraten, 2:314–15.

58 Hergt, Oskar, Der Endkampf um die Aufwertung: Reichstagsrede am 10.Juni 1925 (Berlin, 1925).Google Scholar

59 For the details of the 1925 revaluation settlement, see Southern, “The Revaluation Question,” as well as Moldenhauer, Paul, Die Regelung der Aufwertungsfrage (Cologne, 1925)Google Scholar, and Schetter, Rudolf, “Aufwertung,” Politisches Jahrbuch 1925, ed. Georg, Schreiber (Mönchen-Gladbach, 1925), pp. 141–76.Google Scholar

60 Die Aufwertung, July 26, 1925, no. 25.

61 Bauser, “Die Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” p. 8. See also Bauser, , Vortrag (Cannstatt, 1925)Google Scholar, as well as “Aufwertung und Volksbegehren,” Schwäbischer Merkur, Apr. 8, 1926, no. 160.

62 Bauser, “Die Geschichte des Aufwertungskampfes,” pp. 8–9.

63 Hepp and Kalckreuth from the presidium of the National League, Rural (ReichsLandbund) to Westarp, May 8, 1926Google Scholar, NL Westarp. See also Landbund und Aufwertungsgesetz, Vortrags-Matcrial für Landbundführcr und -Redner, no. 4 (Berlin, 1926).

64 Posadowsky-Wehner to Westarp, Jan. 5, 1926, NL Westarp.

65 Posadowsky-Wehner to Westarp, June 2, 1926, NL Westarp. See also Posadowsky-Wehner, “Zweierlei Recht,” in Posadowsky-Wehner, Adolf Von, Die Enteignung des Glāaubiger-Vermögens: Eine Sammlung von Aufsätzen (Berlin, n.d. [1928]), pp. 34–36.Google Scholar

66 See the letter from the Mortgagees and Savers' Protective Association in Osnabräck to the DNVP executive committee, June 8, 1926, in the unpublished records of the DNVP, Landesverband Osnabrück, Nicdcrsächsisches Staatsarchiv Osnabrück, Bestand C1, vol. 90, pp. 74–75 (hereafter cited as NSSA Osnabrück, C1/90/74–75), as well as the letter from the Savers' Association to the DNVP party leadership, June 12, 1926, NL Westarp.

67 Westarp to the Savers' Association, June 11, 1926, NSSA Osnabrück, C1/90/71–73, and June 17, 1926, NL Westarp.

68 Bauser, “Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Zicle der Volksrechtspartei,” in Für Wahrheit und Recht, pp. 90–91. For further information on the founding and history of the, see Werner Fritzsch, “Reichspartei für Volksrecht und Aufwertung (Volksrechtspartei) 1926–1933,” in Die bürgalichen Parteien in Deutschland, 2:555–60.

69 On the goals and basic orientation of the VRP, see Bauser, “Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ziele der Volksrechtspartei,” pp. 92–95, and Posadowsky-Weliner. “Ansprache, gehalten auf der Reichsdelegiertentagung des Sparerbundes zu Erfurt am 28. August 1926,” in Die Enteignung des Cläubiger-Vermögens, pp. 42–46.

70 In this connection, see the study by Ranulf, Svend, Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology: A Sociological Study (Copenhagen, 1938).Google Scholar

71 For an indication of the anticapitalist sentiment articulated by the founders of the VRP, see the speeches by Brink, “Wirtschaft und Aufwertung,” and Oelenheinz, , “Währung und Währungsbetrug,” at the Mar. 1927Google Scholar convention of the Stuttgart VRP, in Für Wahrheit und Recht, pp. 63–87.

72 The VRP's official party program, which was presented at the party's delegate congress in Nov. 1926 and formally adopted at Naumburg in Sept. 1927, can be found in Spiegel der deutschen Inflation: Dokumente, Berichte, Urteile, ed. Oehlenheinz, H. (Mannheim, 1928), pp. 91–93.Google Scholar

73 On the founding and early history of the WP, see Drewitz, Hermann, “Die politische Standesbewegung des deutschen Mittelstandes vor und nach dem Kriege,” Jahrbuch der Reichpartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1929 (n.p. [Berlin], n.d. [1929]), pp. 13–32Google Scholar, as well as the standard monographic study of the WP by Schumacher, Martin, Mittelstands front und Republik: Die Wirtschaftspartei-Reidtspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919–1933 (Düsseldorf, 1972).Google Scholar

74 In particular, see the speech by the Jörissen, Wp's Franz, Hausbesitz und Mittelstand: Nach einem Vortrag gehalten auf dem Verbandstage des Zentralverbandes deutscher Haus- und Grundbesitzer-Vereine Köln a. Rhein 1921 (Spandau, 1921).Google Scholar

75 On the WP's appeal in the May 1924 election campaign, see the speeches by Drewitz, Johann Victor Bredt, and Carl Ladendorffat the WP's Berlin party congress, Mar. 22–24, 1924, in Handbuch der Wirtschaftspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes für die Reichstags- und Gemeindewahlen 1924, ed. Parteivorstand, (Berlin, 1924), pp. 10–29.Google Scholar

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77 For the WP's position on the 1925 revaluation law, see Jörissen's remarks in the meeting between government officials and the leaders of the government parties, Mar. 18, 1925, BA: R 43I/1020/166–67.

78 On the outcome of the Saxon Landtag elections, see Kölnische Zeitung, Nov. 2, 1926, no. 815.

79 Memorandum by Rademacher on the revaluation question, Nov. 19, 1926, NL Westarp.

80 On the significance of Saxony as a paradigm for the collapse of the German party system, see Fenske, Hans, Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Parteienge sehichte (Frankfurt a.M., 1972), pp. 285–304.Google Scholar

81 In this respect, see the correspondence between Wüst and Bauser published in Wüst, Reinhard, Graf Posadowsky und die Aufwatung (Halle, 1927), pp. 7–11Google Scholar, 17–24, as well as the polemic against the Savers' Association in Sparerbund und Aufwertungspartei (Halle, 1926).

82 Fritsch, “Reichspartei für Volksrecht und Aufwertung,” pp. 556–58.

83 Bauser, , “Nach der Wahl,” Deutsches Volksrecht: Offizielles Zentralorgan der Volksrechtspartei und des Sparerbundes, June 6, 1928, no. 45.Google Scholar Of the established bourgeois parties, the DNVP seems to have been most severely affected by the VRP's performance at the polls. According to a confidential DNVP source whose figures cannot be corroborated, no less than 450,000 of the VRP's 480,000 votes in the 1928 Reichstag elections were estimated to have come form the ranks of those who had voted for the DNVP in 1924, while another 300,000 former Nationalist voters were estimated to have defected directly to the SPD as a result of the DNVP's duplicity in the revaluation question. See the memorandum from the central headquarters of the German National Workers' League, (Deutschnationaler Arbeiterbund), June 12, 1928Google Scholar, NL Westarp.

84 Winkler, Heinrich August, “Extremismus der Mitte?” Vierteljahnhefte für Zeitgeschichte 20 (1972): 175–91.Google Scholar