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War Planning 1914.
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German-Italian Military Relations on the Eve of World War I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
Extract
There can be little doubt that the German military leadership played an important role in the events leading up to the outbreak of World War I. Although there may be some disagreement as to the extent of the general staff's influence, its assessment of the European situation is known to have carried great weight in the decision-making councils in Berlin. Much significant research has been done on the activities of the German military hierarchy in the prewar period, but certain subjects remain to be explored. One of these is the relationship of the Berlin general staff with its counterpart in Rome. A great deal of evidence exists which indicates that in the period from December 1912 until August 1914 the chief of the general staff, Helmuth Graf von Moltke, and other military leaders in Berlin were greatly concerned about their southern ally. The German generals, probably influenced by the theories of Clausewitz with his great emphasis on the value of numerical superiority, saw Italy, with her large mass-conscripted army of over thirty divisions, as the balance of power in any conflict between the Central Powers and the Franco-Russian Alliance.
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