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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 March 2008
The issues raised in Professor Becker's paper bear directly on the claims that the Franco-Prussian War can make for its place as the most critical war of the mid-nineteenth century. These points must be debated, if not resolved, if this subject is to continue to exercise its hold on international historians—as well as, one may add, on non-historians, interested in the past, concerned to know whether the past can help the present, and bewildered by disputes among the experts. Yet there is only so much an expert—or someone vain enough to fancy himself as such—can do. Simply put, to treat this whole subject in a graceful and coherent form within the limits of a single article in a journal of this nature would surpass the capacity of this writer. He can only attempt, as a starter, to sketch out what he takes to be the main thrust and balance of Franco-Prussian relations in the weeks preceding the outbreak of the war of 1870, and to give at least a partial elucidation of the problem by commenting on several aspects of it, without attempting to bring all of these individual comments into one, comprehensive statement.
1 Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke, 15 vols., 1st ed. (Berlin: O. Stolberg, 1924–35) (hereafter cited as GW), vol. 15, 282. As A. J. P. Taylor once remarked, this is evidence of what he thought in 1892, not in 1870; The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 202, note 2.
2 See Agénor, Antoine, de Gramont, duc, La France et la Prusse avant la guerre (Paris: E. Dentu, 1874), 14Google Scholar; Émile Ollivier, L'Empire libéral, 18 vols. (Paris: E. Dentu, 1895–1918), vol. 14, 20; Case, Lynn M., French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954), 241Google Scholar. The French had known about the candidacy at least as early as March 1869. Wetzel, David, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 53Google Scholar.
3 See Paul W. Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European International System,” in Systems, Stability, and Statecraft, ed. Schroeder, with an introduction by David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 93.
4 Bismarck did not pursue the candidacy consistently and unwaveringly. When Marshall Prim, head of the Spanish regency, offered the throne to Leopold in September 1869 and the latter turned him down, Bismarck professed himself satisfied with the result. Kolb, Eberhard, Der Kriegsausbruch 1870. Politische Entscheidungsprozesse und Verantwortlichkeiten in der Julikrise 1870 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1970), 23Google Scholar; Kleinmann, Hans-Otto, “Die spanische Thronfrage in der internationalen Politik vor Ausbruch des deutsch-französischen Kriegs,” in Europa vor dem Krieg von 1870, ed. Kolb, Eberhard (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), 142–43Google Scholar. Craig, Gordon A., Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 22Google Scholar.
5 Bismarck to William I, March 9, 1870. Bismarck, GW, vol. 6b, 268–71. See also Josef Becker, ed., Bismarcks spanische “Diversion” 1870 und der preußisch-deutsche Reichsgründungskrieg, 2 vols., vol. 1, Der Weg zum spanischen Thronangebot. Spätjahr 1866–4. April 1870 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), vol. 1, 343–52.
6 See, for example, Ildefenso Antonio Bermejo, Historia de la interinidad y guerra civil de España desde 1868, 3 vols. (Madrid: R. Labajos, 1875–77); Lauser, Wilhelm, Geschichte Spaniens von dem Sturz Isabellas bis zur Thronbesteignung Alfonsos, 3 vols. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1877)Google Scholar; Antonio Pirala, Historia contemporánea, 6 vols. (Madrid: F. Gonzalez Rojes, 1875–80), vol. 2, Guerra civil (1876). An excellent modern treatment is to be found in Javier Rubio, España y la Guerra de 1870, 3 vols. (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Secretaría General, 1989). All the diplomats of Europe were aware of the anarchy. See, for instance, Dubsky (Madrid) to Beust, February 9, 16, and 22, 1869, vol. XXVI, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. Politsches Archiv, Vienna.
7 Diószegi, István, Österreich-Ungarn und der französisch-preußische Krieg 1870–1871 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974), 13–22Google Scholar; also valuable: Émile Bourgeois, Rome et Napoleon III, 1849–70, Études sur les origines et la chute du Second Empire (Paris: A. Colia, 1907).
8 Zeldin, Theodore, Émile Ollivier and the Liberal Empire of Napoleon III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 172Google Scholar.
9 Wandruszka, Adam, “Zwischen Nickolsberg und Bad Ems,” in Reichsgründung 1870/71. Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen, ed. Schieder, Theodor and Deuerlein, Ernst (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1970), 51–52Google Scholar.
10 Bismarck to Fleeming (Karlsruhe), February 28, 1870, Bismarck, GW, vol. 6b, 261–62.
11 Achard, Amédée, Souvenirs personnels d'émeutes et de révolutions (Paris: M. Lévy Frères, 1872), 266Google Scholar.
12 Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des relations internationales, vol. 5, Le XIXe Siècle, vol. 1, De 1815 à 1871 (Paris: Hachette, 1954), 378–79. And, one might add, Bismarck had good reason to suppose that Napoleon III would never go to war. His record over the previous fourteen years supports this conclusion. He had disappointed his allies by pulling out of the Crimean War prematurely after making what his allies considered an unsatisfactory peace. He had done the same thing in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859. He had come close to war in 1866, but had shrunk from it. See Norman Rich, “Bismarck and the War of 1870” (unpublished paper, Brown University, 1963); Wetzel, Duel, 94.
13 Paul Schroeder makes the compelling case that Bismarck “was gambling less to gain a prize, the unification of Germany, than to avert a loss, the possible defection of Bavaria to Austria.” See Schroeder, P. W., “International Politics, Peace, and War, 1815–1914,” in Europe, 1789–1914: The Nineteenth Century, The Short Oxford History of Europe, ed. Blanning, T. C. W. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 180Google Scholar.
14 Ibid., 180.
15 What dominated the meeting was Alexander's desire for a plebiscite in North Schleswig, where the Danes were a majority. Bismarck, GW, vol. 6b, 315–17.
16 The British did this all the time—e.g., in Portugal (1833); Greece (1850).
17 There are many sources for Gramont's declaration. The present writer follows the one in Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, 6 vols. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1894–1905), vol. 6, 227. Note that Gramont makes the invidious distinction between the friendship of the Spanish people and the wisdom of the Germans. My italics here and above.
18 La Vallette to Gramont, July 17, 1870, Les Origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–1871, 29 vols. (Paris: Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1895–1918), (hereafter cited as OD), 28: 102.
19 Fleury to Gramont, July 11, 1870, ibid., 221.
20 See the devastating justice to the declaration by Albert Sorel, Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande, 2 vols. (Paris: E. Plon et cie., 1875), vol. 1, 77–78. Master historian that he was, he was only too aware of the seeds of danger this so obviously misguided and self-destructive chauvinism carried within itself.
21 Ibid., 172–23.
22 Gramont to Benedetti, July 7, 1870, OD, 28: 89.
23 Benedetti to Gramont, July 7, 1870, ibid., 91.
24 Benedetti to Gramont, July 9, 1870, ibid., 151–52.
25 Ibid.
26 Gramont to Ollivier, July 9, 1870. Gramont Papers. Forty-five Archives privées. Archives nationales, Paris.
27 Vincent Benedetti, Ma mission en Prusse (Paris: H. Plon, 1871), 322.
28 Gramont to Benedetti, July 10, 1870, OD, 28: 184.
29 Gramont to Benedetti, July 11, 1870, ibid., 222.
30 Gramont to Benedetti, July 10, 1870, ibid., 307.
31 Ollivier, brown notebook, n.d. (probably from 1872), Ollivier Papers, privately held, La Moutte and Paris.
32 Gramont to Ollivier, July 13, 1870, OD, 28: 309.
33 Psalm 44:7 and Hosea 1:7.
34 William L. Langer, “Bismarck as a Dramatist,” in Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honour of G. P. Gooch, C.H., ed. A. O. Sarkissian (London: Longmans, 1961), 209.
35 William L. Langer, “Red Flag on the Gallic Bull: The French Decision for War in 1870,” in Europa und Übersee. Festschrift für Egmont Zechlin, ed. Otto Brunner and Dietrich Gerhard (Hamburg: Verlag Hans Bredov-Institut, 1961), 135–54. The article argues that the French, not the Prussians, caused the war of 1870.
36 Max Spindler, Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte, vol. 4 (Munich: Beck, 1967), 268–69; Dieter Langewiesche, Liberalismus und Demokratie in Württemberg zwischen Revolution und Reichsgründung (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974), 420–23; Heinz W. Schlaich, “Bayern und Deutschland nach dem Prager Frieden,” in Gesellschaft und Herrschaft. Forschungen zu sozial- und landesgeschichtlichen Problemen vornehmlich in Bayern. Eine Festgabe für Karl Bosl zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Richard van Dülmen (Munich: Beck, 1969), 301–308; Wolf D. Gruner, “Bayern, Preussen und die süddeutschen Staaten 1866–1870,” Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 38 (1974): 799–927.
37 Schroeder, “Lost Intermediaries,” 91.
38 Benedetti was convinced to the end that Bismarck and William would not provoke a crisis by crossing the Main. They would let the states of South Germany come to them. Benedetti to Daru, February 25, 1870. OD, 26: 318.
39 Schroeder, “Lost Intermediaries,” 91.
40 Schroeder, Paul W., “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Inevitable War,” in Schroeder, Systems, Stability, and Statecraft, 158–60Google Scholar.
