¹ En-lai, Chou, “Report on the Work of the Government to the 1st Session of the 3rd National People's Congress” (Summary), New China News Agency (NCNA), 12 30, 1964Google Scholar.

² Ibid. Unlike the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama had been educated in China.

³ The CCP credits Mao with having developed this thesis in 1963, at a reception for a group of African visitors. See Jen-mtn Jih-pao (People's Daily), August 9, 1963. But Mao had already raised the issue in September 1962 at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee.

⁴ Feng, Wang, “To Better Understand the Party's Nationalities Policy,” Min-tsu T'uan-chieh (National Unity), 1961, No. 10–11, p. 3Google Scholar. Mao initiated the new line in August 1963; it was fully developed by another Vice-Chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission, Ch'un, Liu, in an article in Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), 1964, No. 12, “Class Struggle and the National Question in Our Country at the Present Time,” especially p. 25Google Scholar.

⁵ See F. Hudson, G, “The Nationalities of China,” St. Antony's Papers, VII (London, 1960), pp. 51–61Google Scholar; and MacFarquhar, Roderick, “The Minorities,” in “Communist China's First Decade,” The New Leader, Vol. 42, No. 23 (1959), pp. 17–21Google Scholar. For a, superb discussion of the background of the problem, see DeFrancis, John, “National and Minority Policies” in “Report on China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.277 (1951), pp. 146–155CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ In an unpublished master's dissertation (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1959) entitled “Communist Policy in Inner Mongolia, 1947–1957“ (p. 153)Google Scholar, Thomas A. Metzger has traced the beginnings of this new policy to a nationalities work Conference held in Tsingtao during July and August 1957.

⁷ The shift in nationalities policy was part of a general policy review undertaken at the time, especially in the economic field. For a perceptive discussion of the period, see Halpern, A. M., “Between Plenums: A Second Look at the 1962 National People's Congress in China,” Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 9 (11 1962), pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Shao-ch'i, Liu, “Political Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP,” Eighth National Congress of the CCP (Peking, 1956), p. 79Google Scholar. There is nothing of consequence in the Communiqué of the 10th Plenum (NCNA, September 28, 1962); the substance of the CCP's deliberations on nationalities policy at the meeting may be gleaned from an editorial in Min-tsu T'uan-chieh, No. 11, 1962: “In National Minority Areas Positively Implement the Spirit of the Party's 10th Plenum…“Google Scholar.

⁹ Lu, Chang, “The Situation with Regard to the Use and Translation of the Term ‘Min-tsu’,” Min-tsu T'uan-chieh, No. 7, 1962, pp. 34–39Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Some of the Soviet Union's “national minorities,” notably in Siberia and Central Asia, were in a pre-capitalist stage of development at the time of the Revolution. As a result, Lenin had been obliged to distinguish between “nations“ and “nationalities,” as observed earlier. Apparently, however, the CCP was not satisfied with Lenin's theoretical formulation of the problem. On Stalin's muddled attempt to deal with this very murky problem, see Shaheen, Samad, The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self Determination (Bandung: Utrecht University Thesis, 1956) p. 51Google Scholar.

¹¹ In terms of Communist revolutionary practice, nations may form Communist Parties, but nationalities do not. Thus, the somewhat esoteric distinction here between nation and nationality is of considerable moment. The Russian and Chinese Communists shared the problem of how to preserve a multi-national state under the leadership of a single Communist Party; both denied the national minorities the right to form their own parties.

¹² This point is brought out in an article by Feng, Ku in Min-tsu T'uan-chieh, No. 10, 1962, pp. 7–11Google Scholar, entitled “The Thorough Resolution of the National Question Is a Long Historical Process.”

¹³ Ibid. Ulanfu, the leading non-Han personality in the CCP, was perhaps the point when he observed in the October 1, 1959, issue of Red Flag that thethat the influence of bourgeois ideology “will be stronger in its expression in the nationalities question, than anywhere else, because the nationalities question provides it with a very good disguise.”

¹⁴ People's Daily, June 3, 1962.

¹⁵ Liu, op. cit.

¹⁶ Min-tsu T'uan-chieh editorial, No. 11, 1962Google Scholar, op. cit.

¹⁷ “See, for instance, Chih-i, Chang (Vice-Chairman of the United Front Work Department), “Several Questions Concerning the People's Democratic United Front,” Hsin Hua Pan-yueh K'an (New China Semi-monthly) No. 11, 1957, pp. 67–71Google Scholar. As in all discussions of the problem, Chang speaks only of the upper strata of the national minorities as an object of “unity-struggle-unity.”

¹⁸ Snow, Edgar, “Interview with Mao,” The New Republic, 02 27, 1965Google Scholar. As Mr. Snow explains, Chairman Mao's answers as published are not direct quotations.

¹⁹ The idea of a revolutionary united nations was advanced by Premier Chou En-lai in a statement made January 25 on the occasion of a visit to Peking of Dr. Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia. See Le Monde, January 26, 1965.

²⁰ This is the clear implication of Liu Ch'un's Red Flag article (see note 4, above) in which a summary of the requirements for an international united front introduces a detailed discussion of the success of China's united front of nationalities in overcoming feudalism, etc. For a thorough discussion of the Chinese revolution as a model for the “third world,” see Richer, Philippe, “Doctrine chinoise pour le Tiers Monde,” Polilique étrangère, 1965, No. 1, pp. 75–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Lattimore, Owen, From China, Looking Outward (inaugural lecture), (Leeds: Leeds Un. Press, 1964)Google Scholar.