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The Fall of Lin Piao

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Extract

By 1964 Mao Tse-tung had lost effective control over much of the Party hierarchy set up by his “successor,” and also over the state administrative apparatus… Liu Shao-ch'i and his like-minded comrades utilized the Mao cult in theory and slighted Maoism in practice… Mao was convinced that the people and Party rank and file were with him but were misled by his disloyal opposition. … Edgar Snow, “Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution,” in The New Republic, 10 April 1971.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1973

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References

* A further view of the disgrace of Piao, Lin, its causes and effects, is given in another article in this issue, Ellis Joffe, “The Chinese Army after the Cultural revolution: the effects of intervention,” especially pp. 468–77. EditorGoogle Scholar.

1. “Text of Chinese statement on Lin Piao,” issued by the Chinese Embassy in Algeria and published in the New York Times, 29 July 1972.

2. See, for example, the article by the Writing Group of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, “Strengthen the Party spirit of the proletariat,Hung ch'i (Red Flag) 12 (1971), in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), 71:11, p. 12Google Scholar.

3. Wu ch'i yi kung-ch'eng chi-yao” (“Outline of the ‘571 Project'”), in “Chung-fa” (Central Committee Document) No. 4, 13 01 1972Google Scholar. This key document, entitled “The struggle to smash the counter-revolutionary coup of the Lin-Ch'en anti-Party clique – second set of materials,” appears, in translation, in Issues and Studies (Taipei), 05 1972, pp. 7783Google ScholarPubMed.

4. For excerpts from this transcript which was approved by Chinese officials, see theNew York Times, 12 October 1972.

5. a, “The Lin Piao ‘mystery,'” in Le Monde, 30 12 1971Google Scholar.

6. Mao subsequently told Edgar Snow, in December 1970, that he had been “most unhappy about… the maltreatment of … Party members and others removed from power” during the Cultural Revolution. Snow, Edgar, “A conversation with Mao Tse-tung,” in Life, 30 04 1971Google Scholar.

7. Piao's, Lin political report to the Ninth Congress of the CCP, in Current Background (CS) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), 880, pp. 34ffGoogle Scholar.

8. Mao's speech, dated 28 April 1969, appears in Issues and Studies, March 1970, pp. 94–98.

9. New China News Agency (NCNA), 16 February 1969.

10 Red Flag Editorial, “On summing up experience,” 14 March 1969, in Peking Review, 21 March 1969, p. 4.

11. CB 892, p. 15.

12. It is interesting to note that Iin's personal “errors” are attributed, in the official Chinese statement, to “arrogance.” See note 1 above.

13. People's Daily editorial, “Pay attention to methods of work,” 5 November 1969, in Peking Review, 14 November 1969, pp. 5–6.

14. Hui, Chu, “Forever uphold the revolutionary tradition of hard struggle,” Red Flag, 11 (1969), in SCMM 667, pp. 1–5Google Scholar.

15. See “Vice-Chairman Lin Piao's instructions on the question of cadres,” 10 August 1966, in Issues and Studies, February 1972, pp. 107–109.

16. For the last reference to the Cultural Revolution Group, see NCNA, 22 December 1969.

17. On the May 16 Group, see Burton, Barry, “The Cultural Revolution's ultraleft.conspiracy: The ‘May 16 Group’,” in Asian Survey, XI:11 (1971), pp. 10291053CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18. “OCP Central Committee circular on distribution of the ‘Revised Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China,’” in Issues and Studies, February 1972, p. 100.

19. It is interesting to note that following the fall of Piao, Lin, Tung Pi-wu has once again appeared regularly in the position of “Acting Chief of State,” a position in which he was identified briefly in October 1969 and then not again till 02 1972Google Scholar. This suggests that Lin's interpretation of Mao's March 1970 decision was correct – that it was directed not at the office but at the man who was supposed to inherit the office.

20. See, for example, “PLA studies constitution, aids Party organisation,” NCNA, 17 April 1970.

21. For a discussion of this important speech, see Bridgham, Philip, “Mao's ‘Cultural Revolution’: origin and development,” CQ 29 (1967), p. 25Google Scholar.

22. Joint People's Daily, Red Flag and Chieh-fang-ch'un pao (Liberation Army Daily) editorial, “Communists should be the advanced elements of the proletariat,” in Peking Review, 3 July 1970, pp. 10–11.

23 Terrill, Ross, “The 800,000,000: Report from China,” in The Atlantic Monthly, 11 1971, p. 107Google Scholar.

24. This key document, entitled “Summary of Chairman Mao's talks with leading comrades during inspection trip to outlying areas (Mid-August to September, 1971),” appears in Chung-kung yen-chiu (Studies in Chinese Communism) (Taipei), 10 09 1972, pp. 1824 (in English) and pp. 83–97 (in Chinese)Google Scholar.

25. Including PLA chief of staff Huang Yung-sheng, Air Force commander Wu Fa-hsien, Navy leader Li Tso-p'eng, Logistics chief Ch'iu Hui-tso, and Lin's wife and staff office chief Yeh Ch'un.

26. Joint People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily editorial, “Unite to win still greater victories,” in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), 72:2, p. 80.

27. “Summary of Chairman Mao's talks,” pp. 20–21.

28. Ibid. p. 21.

29. Ibid. pp. 21–22.

30. See the joint People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily editorial, “Long live the great unity of the people of the world,” in Peking Review, 7 May 1971, pp. 10–12.

31. See, for example, the joint People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily editorial, “Commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China,” in Peking Review, 2 July 1971, pp. 17–19.

32. “Outline of the ‘571 Project,”” Issues and Studies, May 1972, p. 79.

33. Bridgham, , “Mao's ‘Cultural Revolution,’” p. 19Google Scholar.

34. See, for example, a, 16 November 1971, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: People's Republic of China (FBIS), 24 11 1971, pp. D3–D4Google Scholar.

35. “Commemorate the 50th anniversary,” pp. 17–20.

36. Bridgham, , “Mao's ‘Cultural Revolution,’” p. 19Google Scholar.

37. See, for example, the subsequent self-criticism by PLA Nanking units (for having made such “mistakes” as following the wrong “line” and being “arrogant and complacent” during this rectification campaign) in Hofei, Radio, 23 02 1972, in FBIS, 24 February 1972, pp. C1–C5Google Scholar.

38. Foochow, Radio, 8 04 1971, in FBIS, 14 April 1971, pp. C1–C3Google Scholar.

39. “Summary of Chairman Mao's talks,” pp. 22–23.

40. Issues and Studies, May 1972, p. 81.

41. “Text of Chinese statement on Iin Piao.”

42. “Summary of Chairman Mao's talks,” p. 21.

43. “Outline of the ‘571 Project,’” p. 81.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. pp. 79–80.

46. Ibid. p. 79.

47. “Summary of Chairman Mao's talks,” p. 22.

48. Ibid.

49. “Outline of the ‘571 Project,’” p. 80.

50. Ibid.

51. As noted above, the official Chinese statement (in the New York Times, 29 July 1972) does allege that Iin attempted to assassinate Chairman Mao.

52. For excerpts from the official transcript of Chou En-lai's account, see the New York Times, 12 October 1972.

53.Chung-fa” (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document) No. 24, entitled “The struggle to smash the counter-revolutionary coup of the Lin Piao Anti-Party clique – third set of materials,” in Issues and Studies, December 1972, p. 95.

54. Ibid. p. 96.

55. New York Times, 12 October 1972.

56. Burns, John, “Mao is quoted as saying Lin was killed in crash,” New York Times, 28 07 1972Google Scholar.

57. Harbin, Radio, 8 07 1972, in FBIS, 10 July 1972, p. G2Google Scholar.

58. Lanchow, Radio, 17 09 1972, in FBIS, 19 September 1972, p. H1Google Scholar.

59. Tsinan, Radio, 17 12 1971, in FBIS, 20 December 1971, p. B5Google Scholar.

60. See above, note 37.

61. NCNA, 15 January 1972, in FBIS, 17 January 1972, pp. B1–B2.

62. Snow, Edgar, “A conversation with Mao Tse-tung,” in Life, 30 04 1971Google Scholar.

63. Snow, Edgar, “The Army and the Party,” in The New Republic, 22 05 1971, p. 11Google Scholar.

64. See, for example, the article by the Writing Group of the Iiaoning Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, “Strengthen the Party spirit of the proletariat,Red Flag 12 (1971), in SCMM, 71:11, pp. 915Google Scholar.

65. Shihchiachuang, Radio, 12 12 1971, in FBIS, 17 December 1971, p. F2Google Scholar.

66. NCNA, 24 January 1972, in FBIS, 2 February 1972, p. G2.

67. Changsha, Radio, 18 12 1971, in FBIS, 21 December 1971, p. DlGoogle Scholar.

68. Harbin, Radio, 30 10 1971, in FBIS, 2 November 1971, pp. G1–G4Google Scholar.

69. See, for example, the 1972 New Year's Day editorial, “Unite to win still greater victories,” in SCMP, 72:2, p. 78.

70. Peking Review, 2 July 1971, p. 21.

71. Article by the Writing Group of the CCP Hupeh Provincial Committee, “A powerful weapon to unite the people and defeat the enemy,Red Flag 9 (1971), in SCMM, 71:08, pp. 78Google Scholar.

72. Lanchow, Radio, 10 10 1972, in FB1S, 16 October 1972, p. H2Google Scholar.

73. Taiyuan, Radio, 25 09 1972, in FBIS, 26 September 1972Google Scholar.

74. Lanchow, Radio, 10 10 1972, in FBIS, 16 October 1972, p. H3Google Scholar.

75. “Mao Tse-tung's private letter to Chiang Ch'ing,” 8 July 1966, in Issues and Studies, January 1973, pp. 94–96.

76. For a transcript of this conversation, see Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 3: 3–4 (1971), pp. 3159Google Scholar.

77. See, for example, Shenyang, Radio, 9 01 1973, in FBIS, 16 January 1973, pp. G2–G3Google Scholar.