1 Sun Yat-sen in 1921 explicitly acknowledged this parallel and drew consequences for practical policy: We should take advantage of German brains and German abilities to make China rich and powerful soon. Upon attaining that purpose, China should be prepared with all its power to free Germany from the fetters of the Versailles Treaty. Quoted in Shen-chang Hwang, Das Deutschlandbild der Chinesen (The Chinese image of Germany), in Rüdiger, Machetzki (ed.), Deutsch-Chinesische Beziehungen, Ein Handbuch (German-Chinese Relations, A Handbook)(Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1982), pp. 1324 (author's translation).Google Scholar

2 By 1993 a Beijing foreign policy think-tank described Germany as the dominant power in Europe and thus a big power sharing world leadership with the United States. Su Huimin, ‘Ouzhoude Deguo’ haishi ‘Deguode Ouzhou’ (‘European Germany’ or ‘German Europe’), Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies), Beijing, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 20–22.Google Scholar

3 Rongyuan Lin, Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland (Relations between China and Germany) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), pp. 117–19.Google Scholar Replying to a question addressed to her in the Bundestag in 1989 Minister of State in the Federal Foreign Office Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer said that Beijing's competence to represent Taiwan had been implicitly recognized by Bonn in 1972 and that Taiwan was no subject of international law. Mechthild Leutner (ed.), Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China, 1949 bis 1995: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur (Federal Republic of Germany and China, 1949 to 1995 Politics, Economics, Culture) (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), p. 336.Google Scholar

4 Zhou Enlai was the first Chinese politician to pronounce himself in support of German reunification during his visit to East Berlin in July 1954. This support, however, clearly referred to a socialist Germany under the leadership of a communist party. Riidiger Machetzki, China und das andere Deutschland (China and the other Germany), in Machetzki, Deutsch-Chinesische Beziehungen, pp. 145–158 (author's translation).Google Scholar

5 Embassies were not opened prior to October 1953.

6 In 1950 the FRG imported goods worth DM 61.7 million from the PRC, which represented 0.54% of its overall imports. The PRC imported goods worth DM 47.8 million from the FRG, corresponding to 1.93% of its world-wide imports. By 1972 the respective volumes had reached DM 342.4 million or 0.27% for FRG imports from the PRC and DM 532.4 million or 5.83% for PRC imports from the FRG. Erhard Louven, Deutsch-Chinesischer Wirtschaftsverkehr seit 1945 Der lange Weg zur bestandigen Zusammenarbeit (German-Chinese economic exchange since 1945 the long way towards lasting cooperation), in Ibid. pp. 177–203.

7 Neues Deutschland, 3 July 1957 as quoted in Machetzki, China und das andere Deutschland (author's translation).Google Scholar

8 Machetzki, China und das andere Deutschland.

9 Oskar, Weggel, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Volksrepublik China: der lange Weg zur ‘Normalisierung’ (The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of China: the long road towards ‘normalization’, in Machetzki, Deutsch Chinesische Beziehungen, pp. 121–144.Google Scholar

10 When Mao's successor Hua Guofeng visited Bonn in October 1979 the press reported diverging views of the Soviet Union. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt cautioned not to present the visit as an epochal event. Wirtschaftswoche, 5 November 1979 and Der Spiegel, No. 43 (1979) as quoted in Rongyuan, Lin, Die Berziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland,pp. 171–72.Google Scholar

11 Rongyuan, Lin, Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland, p. 139. Negotiations continued for almost four years.Google Scholar

12 Lun, Wen, Xide zongli Heermute Keer (West Germany's Prime Minister Helmut Kohl), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), Beijing, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1983), pp. 59–63.Google Scholar

13 Rongyuan Lin, Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland, p. 160.

14 German arms exports agreed upon during 1978–79 included tanks, tactical aviation and weapons systems manufactured by a French-German consortium, anti-tank missiles and helicopters. Jing-dong, Yuan, The politics of the strategic triangle: the U.S., COCOM, and export controls on China, 1979–1989 Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 47–79;Google ScholarHarish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe (London & New York: Pinter, 1990), p. 149.Google Scholar

15 In the early 1980s, the FRG's foreign intelligence service co-operated with Chinese partners in monitoring Soviet missile tests from Xinjiang. Das chinesische Minenfeld (The Chinese minefield), Rheinischer Merkur, 5 February 1993 p. 3.

16 Radio Beijing in German, 23 April 1985 as quoted in Bundespresseamt/Ostinformatiorten,24 April 1985; Die Welt, 15 August 1988; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 22 September 1990.

17 Jing-dong, Yuan, The politics of the Strategic Triangle, quoting from Technology and East-West Trade (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 173–184.Google Scholar

18 Millionenkredit fur China (Million DM credit for China), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 October 1984 p. 4.

19 Co-operation was mostly in the development of Vietnam's light industries and vocational training. See e.g. Handelsprotokoll für 1982 mit der SR Vietnam vereinbart (1982 trade protocol agreed upon with the SR Vietnam), Neues Deutschland, 7/8 November 1981 p. 3; Briicke der Verbundenheit mit dem Volk von Vietnam (Bridge of solidarity with the Vietnamese people),3 December 1982 p. 1; Zielstrebiger Ausbau der Zusammenarbeit mit der SRV (Consequent extension of co-operation with the SRV), Ibid.28 February 1986 p. 2. In October 1984 the GDR launched an economic aid package for Cambodia. AbschluB der offiziellen Gesprache DDR-Kampuchea (‘Termination of official talks between the GDR and Kampuchea), Neues Deutschland 12 October 1984 p. 1/2.

20 Xinhua in English, 12 September 1970 as quoted in Leutner, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China, pp. 134–37.

21 Rongyuan, Lin, Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland, pp. 222–23.Google Scholar

21 Rongyuan, Lin, Die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland, pp. 222–23.Google Scholar

22 In 1989 China imported GDR goods worth US $339.28 million and exported goods worth US$331.41 million to the GDR. Asien-Pazifik Winschaftshandbuch 1991 (Asia-Pacific Economic Handbook, 1991) (Hamburg: Ostasiatischer Verein e. V. 1991), pp. 106–107.

23 Conversely, it inspired a temporary interest in West Germany's Social Democrats and their policies of East-West détente, Kapur, Distant Neighbours, pp. 185–86.

24 Volkskammer (People's Assembly) resolution of 8 June 1989 as quoted in China Aktuell, Vol. 18, No. 9 (1989), p. 665.Google Scholar

25 Xinhua News Agency in English, 25 September 1989 quoted in Wolfgang Bartke (ed.), The Relations between the People's Republic of China and I. Federal Republic of Germany, II. German Democratic Republic in 1989 as Seen by Xinhua News Agency(Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1990), pp. 348–49.

26 Oskar, Weggel, Kein Himmlischer Friede in der DDR (No heavenly peace in the GDR), China Aktuell, Vol. 18, No. 11 (1989), pp. 863–69. Preparations included the earmarking of detention camps for large numbers of demonstrators.Google Scholar

27 Xinhua in English, 4 November and 6 December 1989 quoted in Bartke, The Relations between the PRC, p. 465.

28 Youguan Deguo tongyide huati (On the subject of German unification), Renmin ribao (People's Daily) 14 December 1989 p. 4; Xinhua in English, 10 November 1989 and other Xinhua reports, quoted in Bartke, The Relations between the PRC, pp. 117–128. The trend towards reunification was initially explained with the GDR's vuhierability to FRG broadcasts rather than popular demand. Zhu Weige, Dangqiande Deguo tongyi wenti (The present problem of German unification), Guoji wenti yanjiu, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1990), pp. 41–44.

29 Xinhua, 1 October 1990 as quoted in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)FE/0884 Al/1 of 2 October 1990. 30. Leitlinien zur deutschen Asienpolitik (Guidelines on German policy vis-a-vis Asia), Bulletin {Federal Government Bulletin), No. 9,28 January 1994 pp. 69–71 (author's translation).

31 Weifibuch 1994 (White Book 1994) (Bonn, Federal Ministry of Defence) April 1994 p. 38 (author's translation).

32 In 1993 43% of the EC's exports to China and 40.1 % of imports from China originated in Sino-German trade. Runners-up were Italy with 18.3% and 12.5% and France with 11.9% and 17.7% respectively. Direction of Trade 1994 Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1994).

33 Germany was replaced as China's no. 4 trading partner by Taiwan in 1992.

34 Direct bilateral trade totalled US$1,774 billion in 1980 US$4,519 billion in 1990 and US$11.89 billion in 1994. Aufienhandel (Foreign Trade) (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1989), 1993 International Trade Statistics Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1995), China Trade Report (Hong Kong), Vol. 33, No. 6 (June 1995).

35 Kapur, Distant Neighbours, p. 185. At that time, West Germany became China's most important overseas creditor.

36 Die deutsche Wirtschaft hat ihre Position in China verbessert (German business improves its ranking in China), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 July 1995 p. 9.Google Scholar

37 1993 International Trade Statistics Yearbook and China Trade Report. This includes re-exports via Hong Kong. During the first half of 1995. Germany's share of China's imports dropped below 5%. Kanzler Kohls Besuch in Peking (Chancellor Kohl's visit to Beijing), Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 13 November 1995 p. 4.

38 Between 1979 and 1993 the FRG launched 569 projects in China, with contracted investment totalling US$1.5 billion. This compares with 616 projects and US$3 billion for Britain and 242 projects and US$6.84 billion for France (leading investor was Hong Kong with 114,147 projects and US$150.9 billion total contracted investment). Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation as quoted in The Financial Times, 31 August 1994 p. 4. Among earlier German projects were a cold rolling mill in Wuhan (1974), manufacture of vacuum systems and compressor engines in Shanghai (1979), manufacture of oosmetic products in Shanghai (1981), container ship building in Shanghai (1981), passenger car construction in Shanghai (1984), a joint steel pipeline plant in Tianjin (1986), joint development of a passenger aircraft (1987), a joint aircraft maintenance centre (1987), and construction of a 100 MW high temperature nuclear reactor (1988).

39 China ordert zwolf Airbus-Flugzeuge in Deutschland (China orders 12 airbus aircraft in Germany), Suddeutsche Zeitung,3l March 1993 p. 2. In practice, the advantage has been relative with the Chinese side ritually complaining about the high price of German products (Japan had been courted with similar promises in 1985). Today, Germany ranks sixth among foreign investors in China behind Hong Kong, Taiwan, the U.S., Japan and South Korea. The FRG has stakes in about 600 companies, but only a 1.5% share of overall direct investment. The Financial Times, 10 November 1995.

40 Radio China International in Chinese, 16 November 1993 as quoted by Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 18 November 1993.

41 Bilanz des Kohl-Besuches in China (The balance of Kohl's visit to China), Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 21 November 1993 p. 13. Other contracts included delivery of six passenger aircraft, six special cargo ships, train cars and machinery parts.

42 Ibid. ODA had previously been used to facilitate German business participation in the construction of the Shanghai underground.

43 Radio China International in Chinese, 4 July 1994 as quoted by Bundespresseamt Femseh-ZHorfunkspiegel Ausland, 5 July 1994. Signed contracts cover construction of an electrical power station in Hangfeng, a cold rolling mill in Baoshan, chemical and pharmaceutical plants. Li Peng in Deutschland: 40 Vertrage und Geschafte mit China in Milliardenhohe (Li Peng in Germany: 40 contracts worth billions of dollars signed with China). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 1994 p. 1/2; Li Peng vereinbart in Bonn nicht nur neue Investitionsprojekte (Li Peng does not only agree on new investment projects in Bonn), Ibid. 6 July 1994 p. 13.

44 A business consortium led by car-maker BMW will draw up a national concept for transport and telecommunications together with Chinese counterparts. This includes construction of roads, ports, airports, railways (Kohl has been lobbying for a Chinese decision in favour of Germany's ICE high-speed train) and telecommunication installations along the Eastern seaboard between Beijing and Shanghai. Co-operation in vocational training and other development projects are to be financed from ODA. Ibid.

45 Radio China International, 4 July 1994. According to Li Peng, Kohl had pledged to lobby actively for Chinese WTO-membership. People's Central Broadcasting Service in Chinese, 10 July 1994 as quoted in Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 12 July 1994.

46 Goldene Biicher und goldene Briicken furs Geschaft (Golden books and golden bridges for business), Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 July 1994 p. 3. The German side decided to leave issues such as intellectual property rights to the attention of the World Trade Organization. Germany's new diplomacy may lead to payoff in China, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 11 July 1995 p. 2.

47 German bank waves its club at China over debts, International Herald Tribune, 29 January 1995 p. 1/4.Google Scholar

48 Radio China International in Chinese, 5 July 1994 as quoted in Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 7 July 1994.

49 Trade and Industry Minister Glinter Rexrodt expressed his dissatisfaction with EU import quotas and announced a German initiative to liberalize them under the German EU presidency. Li Peng in Deutschland: 40 Vertrage und Geschafte mit China in Milliardenhohe, Frankfurter Allgetneine Zeitung, 5 July 1994 p. 1/2.

50 Hugh, Williamson, Making their marks, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 July 1995 p. 22.Google Scholar

51 Ibid. U.S. officials privately complained to their FRG counterparts for taking advantage of their bilateral row with China.

52 ‘Teltschik dementiert Riistungsgeschafte in China (Teltschik denies Chinese arms deals), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 1995 p. 2. German industry had been lobbying for years for a relaxation of restrictions on arms and dual use exports, and Daimler Benz had actually entered into a joint venture on the production of trucks with the People's Liberation Army's Norinco. Kanzler Kohls Besuch in Peking, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 13 November 1995 p. 4.

53 That yearihe PRC received German ODA (including loans and subsidies) worth DM 300.7 million (US$153.4 million). Egypt received DM 1,114.9 million and India DM 428.0 million Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1994 Statistical Yearbook for the FRG) (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994). Germany pledged DM 233.7 million (US$163.8 million) in 1995 DM 151 million as loans and the rest as a non-repayable grant. Mehr als 200 Millionen Mark Entwicklungshilfe an China (More than DM 200 million development aid for China), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 June 1995 p. 4.

54 Steuergelder und Geschafte mit China (Taxpayer's money and business with China), Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 May 1995 p. 3. 55. Sanctions were a result of parliamentary pressure rather than government initiative. In October 1990 soft loans totalling approximately US$540 million (including $275 million for the construction of an underground railway in Shanghai) were retroactively sanctioned for 1980–90. N-TV interview with Kohl's former advisor on foreign policy, Horst Teltschik, 4 July 1994 as quoted by Bundespresseamt Fernseh-/Hörfunkspiegel Ausland, 5 July 1994; Wieder Bonner Hilfe für China (New Bonn assistance for China), Siiddeutsche Zeitung15 December 1990 p. 7.

55 Emporung iiber zuviel Freundschaft (Indignation about excessive friendship), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 July 1994 p. 4.

57 German business did complain, however, that the FRG's share in China's foreign trade was diminishing. Deutsche Wirtschaft sieht weniger Chancen im Chinageschaft (German business registers less opportunities in China), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 7 April 1990 p. 4. Germany's trade deficit had built up before sanctions were imposed and was at least partly due to Chinese austerity policies.

58 Volkswagen expandiert in Shanghai (Volkswagen expands in Shanghai), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1989 p.3.

59 Jiang, Jianqing, Xi Ou fangwu lianhede tuijin he Ou Meide guanxi (Prospects of the West European Union and Euro-American Relations), Guoji wenti yanjiu. Vol. 49, No. 3 (1993), pp. 1–7. An earlier Chinese analysis had ranked the preservation of the Atlantic alliance only fourth among Germany's foreign policy priorities (behind promotion of European unity, strengthening of relations with Eastern Europe and development of relations with the Soviet Union).Google ScholarPan Qiehang, Deguo dongbu diqu fazhan qianjing he Deguo waijiao zoushi (Prospects for the development of Eastern Germany and trends in Germany's foreign relations), Xi Ou yanjiu (West European Studies), Beijing, Vol. 9, No. 6 (1991), pp. 17–23.Google Scholar

60 During a press conference on the occasion of his 1993 visit to China, Kohl mentioned both issues conjointly, but tried to play down the UN question. Deutschlandfunk in German, 17 November 1993 as quoted in SWB, FE/1850/G/3 of 19 November 1993. There have been no indications of Bonn lobbying the Commission of the European Union in favour of a speedy Chinese accession to the WTO.

61 Germany was one of the driving forces behind the EU's 1995 China policy initiative that recommended developing a long-term relationship with China that reflects China's worldwide, as well as regional, economic and political influence, A long-term policy for relations between China and Europe, European Commission Communication, Bulletin quotidien Europe, 12 October 1995 (1954 1955), p. 1.

62 In the case of the Christian Democrats, this could have been the reason for Beijing refusing the opening of a representative office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the capital. The foundation runs projects involving socio-political or socio-economic aspects and is politically close to the governing party.

63 uEm^rvmguberzuv\t\¥K\xnA\ic\ike\t,FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung,7July 1994 S. 4; CDU-Politiker: Vorrangig Menschenrecht einfordern (CDU politician: give priority to human rights, Ibid. 4 July 1994 p. 1.

64 E.g. Trade and Industry Minister Giinter Rexrodt as quoted in Proteste Gegen Li Peng in Deutschland CProtests against Li Peng in Germany), Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 9 July 1994 p. 3. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said in July 1995 that economic opening up, including the use of modern information technology, would of necessity lead one day to political reform. Menschenrechte nicht im Mittelpunkt (Human rights not at the centre), Frankfurter, Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 July 1995 p. 4.

65 Leitlinien zur deutschen Asienpolitik. In July 1995 Chancellor Kohl spoke of Beijing in view of China's different stage of economic development and different cultural traditions being entitled to its own concept of human rights. Kohl tolerant of China on rights, International Herald Tribune, 14 July 1995 p. 11.

66 Bonner Distanz zu Peking (Bonn distance vis-a-vis Beijing), Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 15 March 1992 p. 3.

67 Since 1989 the European Union and the U.S. have sponsored resolutions in the UN's Geneva Human Rights Commission condemning Beijing's record in this field. Whereas motions raised between 1990 and 1994 had been prevented by a majority of members from even being debated, there was a debate during the 51st session in March 1995 (although the motion was eventually turned down by one vote). Prior to that, Li Peng had written a letter to Kohl urging Bonn to drop its support in recognition of the favourable state of economic relations. Bonn muB nicht mit Vergeltung rechnen (Bonn need not fear retributions), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 12 March 1995 p. 11.

68 Kohl tolerant of China on rights.

69 This included a refusal to initiate new co-operation projects and continuation of existing projects only insofar as they directly benefited the overall Chinese population. Oskar Weggel, Auslandische Reaktionen auf das Massaker von Beijing (Foreign responses to the Beijing massacre), China Aktuell, Vol. 18, No. 6 (1989), pp. 423–27.

70 UNESCO data as provided by the Federal Ministry for Education and the Sciences. In 1994 the number of Chinese students reached 6,237.

71 Funfzig chinesische Agenten an deutschen Hochschulen (Fifty Chinese spies at German universities), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 25 July 1989 p. 4. The occurrence of such incidents was confirmed to the author by the representative of a major German university.

72 Bonner Abgeordnete treffen chinesische Dissidenten (Bonn MPs meet Chinese dissidents), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 7 October 1989 p. 3.

73 Le Monde, 8 June 1989 quoted in Anja, Feege, Internationale Reaktionen aufden 4 Juni 1989 in der VR China: Zwischen Solidaritat, Schweigen und Sanktionen (International Responses to 4 June 1989 in the PRC: Between Solidarity, Silence and Sanctions) (Hamburg: Institut fiir Asienkunde, 1992), p. 156. Leading representatives of German business had been pointing to less rigid policies practised by Japan and other Western countries. Leutner, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China, p. 321. Both the chancellor's foreign policy advisor Horst Teltschik and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had spoken up against economic sanctions after Tiananmen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 and 7 June 1989 as quoted in Feege, Internationale Reaktionen, p. 156. Germany's soft approach to China was less problematic within the G-7 group of industrial nations, where discussions were increasingly dominated during 1990 by the necessity to win Beijing's co-operation vis-a-vis Iraq.Google ScholarIbid.

74 Radio Beijing International in German, 7 November 1991 as quoted by Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 8 November 1991.

75 Jinren chumude Deguo duiwai guanxi (Germany's foreign relations under the scrutiny of today's people), Renmin ribao, 28 February 1992 p. 6.Google Scholar

76 According to the deputy chairman of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee after a visit to Beijing. Das enttauschende Ergebnis einer Dienstfahrt (The disappointing result of an official trip), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 30 January 1992 p. 15.

77 Among these was the broadening of activities of the Beijing Goethe Institut, opened in 1988 and restricted, on Chinese request, to language teaching. Peking erhofft Aufhebung der Sanktionen (Beijing hopes for lifting of sanctions), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 November 1992 p. 7. (The institute's deputy director is a Chinese.) The situation remains unchanged at the time of writing.

78 Kinkel supported the proposed sale of six aircraft to be built by the European Airbus consortium to China and criticized France for endangering the deal by selling Mirage fighters to Taiwan. M. Kinkel fait etat d'une assistance silencieuse aux victimes des violations des droits de rhomme (Mr Kinkel announces a silent assistance for victims of human rights violations), Le Monde, 3 November 1992 p. 6.

79 ‘Ties with Germany back on an even keel, The China Daily, 3 November 1992 p. 1.

80 German foreign minister in Peking, Ibid. 31 October 1992 p. 1.

81 ‘Ties with Germany improving, Ibid. 2 November 1992 p. 1.

82 Xinhua in English, 2 November 1992 as quoted by Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 3 November 1992.

83 Similar to German politicians, Chinese security planners conceived the need to stabilize Russia through economic co-operation. In contrast to Germany, however, this line of thinking was most prominent within the armed forces, centred on military co-operation and had an anti-American bias. Lianhe bao. Hong Kong, 12 October 1994 citing the chief of staff of the Chinese army, as quoted in SWB, FE/2141/F2-3 of 1 November 1994.

84 Ibid, and Peking erhofft Aufhebung der Sanktionen, p. 7.

85 Ibid.

86 Chancellor Kohl at a press conference in Beijing, XNA in English, 17 November 1993 as quoted by Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien, 18November 1993. Regular consultations at the level of foreign ministers had already been agreed upon in November 1988 but not practised at the time because of Tiananmen.

87 Peking: Deutschland soil in den UNO-Sicherheitsrat (Beijing: Germany should join the UN Security Council), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 28 September 1993 p. 1. It is arguable whether Beijing's motives were rooted in genuine hopes for a pragmatic Germany contributing to the making of a multipolar world or cynical in the sense that Security Council reform was no medium-term perspective, anyway. A recent Chinese think-tank article emphasizes advantages of the present Security Council structure and is sceptical about thorough structural change in the foreseeable future. Liu Wenzong, Lun anlihuizhongde foujuequan wenti (An analysis of veto power in the Security Council), Guoji wenti yanjiu,Vol. 58, No. 4 (1995), pp. 18–23. One Chinese analyst explained Germany's interest in a permanent seat on the Council in purely military terms as the apex of a strategy beginning with participation in UN peacekeeping and gathering momentum with the setting up of a Franco-German brigade. Su Huimin, Ouzhoude Deguo, p. 21.

88 China laBt zwei seit 1990 festgehaltene Bischofe frei (China releases two bishops detained since 1990), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1993 p. 1. In March 1994 PRC Justice Minister Yang Xiao, when visiting Bonn, declared that among the prisoners on the German list, two were still in prison, eleven did not exist and the others had either been released or released on probation. Streit mit Yang Xiao um Menschenrechte (Human rights controversy with Yang Xiao), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 March 1994 p. 4.

89 Kohl: G-7-Teilnahme Chinas nur bei Demokratisierung (Chinese G-7 membership conditional on democratization), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 1993 p. 8.

90 U-Boote fur Taiwan: China setzt Bonn unter Druck (Submarines for Taiwan: China exerts pressure on Bonn), Kieler Nachrichten, 20 January 1993 p. 1.

91 Das chinesische Minenfeld (The Chinese minefield), Rheinischer Merkur, 5 February 1993 p. 3.

92 In early 1993 German manufacturer Thyssen Henschel sent a delegation to Taiwan to be briefed on the army's planned purchase of 190 armoured personnel carriers and 56 8 lmm mortar carriers. ‘Taiwan prepares for 1000 APC purchase, Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 12 (20 March 1993), p. 8.

93 Keine Kriegsschiffe fur Taiwan (No warships for Taiwan), Siiddeutsche Zeitung,21 January 1992 p. 2.

94 Waffen fur Taiwan entzweien Mollemann und Kinkel (Arms for Taiwan separate Mollmann and Kinkel), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 17December 1992 p. 1. The eventual German share in this project was said to amount to DM 80 billion and to include the ICE high-speed train. Ibid. 12 February 1993 and Keine deutschen U-Boote an Taiwan (No German submarines for Taiwan), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 1994 p. 15.

95 Abgeordnete fordern U-Boot Export nach Taiwan (MPs demand submarine exports to Taiwan), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 12 February 1993 p. 2.

96 Total verheddert (Totally entangled), DerSpiegel, Vol. 46, No. 30 (20 July 1992), pp. 78–80. The minesweepers were being fitted with Swedish and other weapons technology. Three federal navy officers were reported to have instructed Taiwanese counterparts in their operation in late 1990 early 1991. Ibid. and Minenraumer, Mord und deutsche Moneten (Minesweepers, murder and German money), Die Tageszeitung, 4 August 1995 p. 4.

97 Bestechung fur Marineauftrag? (Bribes for naval purchases?), Weserkurier, 1 March 1995 p. 1. The scandal became public after the murder in December 1993 of the head of Taiwan's naval procurement who had been on his way to meet the representative of another German shipyard. Ibid.

98 U-Boote fur Taiwan verboten. Raketen erlaubt (Submarines for Taiwan vetoed. Missiles permitted), Die Tageszeitung, 15 February 1993 p. 2.

99 Kohl lehnt Lieferung von U-Booten nach Taiwan ab (Kohl vetoes sale of submarines to Taiwan), Handelsblatt, 28 April 1994 p. 3; Trade with Taiwan, Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 21 (28 May 1994), p. 4.

100 BND hilft angeblich Taiwan bei Spionage gegen China (BND allegedly assists Taiwan with spying on China), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 1 November 1993 p. 2. 101. Foreign Minister Kinkel and an advisor to Chancellor Kohl, as quoted in Kohl lehnt Lieferung von U-Booten nach Taiwan ab, p. 3.

102 Bonn will Beziehungen zu Taiwan ausbauen (Bonn wants to expand relations with Taiwan), Suddeutsche Zeitung, 31 March 1993 p. 2.

103 In 1994 a foreign office diplomat was given leave to head the German liaison office in Taipei.

104 In 1994 bilateral trade totalled almost DM 14 billion, 7.213 billion imports from Taiwan and 6.638 billion exports to Taiwan. Bundesstelle fur Aufienhandelsinformationen (Federal office for Trade Information, Cologne) 1995.

105 Taiwan ladt deutsche Untemchmen zu ‘strategischen Allianzen’ ein (Taiwan invites German business to conclude ‘strategic alliances’), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,16 September 1993 p. 17. Investment on the island might increasingly be affected in the context of Taiwan-mainland trade, as with the 1994 opening of a Volkswagen factory which will supply spare parts to VW's mainland plants.

106 U-Boote sind nicht alles (Submarines are not everything), Rheinischer Merkur,18 June 1993 p. 6. PRC consent was granted on condition that the route would not be serviced by national carriers.

107 The chancellor cited a long-standing personal (cultural) interest as a motive. Radio Beijing in German, 10 July 1987 as quoted in Bundespresseamt/Ostinformationen, 13 July 1987. He did however not declare that leg of the visit private, as other European politicians had done before.

108 Kritik an der Bonner Tibet-Politik (Bonn's policies vis-a-vis Tibet under attack), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 October 1987 p. 2.

109 Minister in the Chancellor's Office Rudolf Seiters as quoted in Empfang des Dalai Lama nicht moglich (Receiving the Dalai Lama impossible), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 January 1990 p. 5.

110 Xinhua in English, 6 October 1990 as quoted in Deutsche Welle Monitordienst Asien,8 October 1990.

111 In Bonn wird die Absage des Dalai Lama nicht bedauert (In Bonn, cancellation of the Dalai Lama's visit is not being regretted), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 February 1994 p. 4.

112 According to press reports, Foreign Minister Kinkel had suggested the same date for an important committee hearing on foreign service reform. Parliament thereupon postponed the hearing on Tibet to September. Der Dalai Lama sagt Besuch in Bonn ab (The Dalai Lama calls off Bonn visit), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 April 1994 p. 3. The federal foreign office denied the reports. Der Dalai Lama in Bonn (The Dalai Lama in Bonn), Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2 May 1994 p. 4. The September hearing did not materialize either, ostensibly because of the FRG's general elections. Anhorung iiber Tibet abgesagt (Tibet hearings called off), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 June 1994 p. 4.

113 Klage des Dalai Lama iiber Tibets Unterdriickung (Dalai Lama complains about Tibet's oppression), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 June 1995 p. 3.

114 Bonn will sich fur Tibets Autonomie cinsetzen (Bonn will support Tibet's autonomy), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5 May 1995 p. 2.

115 Kohl rehabilitiert Chinas Militar (Kohl rehabilitates China's military), Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 November 1995 p. 2.

116 Kohl handed over a list with names of 15 political prisoners, most of whom had already figured on the 1993 list.

117 Bonner Einsatz fur China-Korrespondenten vergebens. Deutsch-chinesische Beziehungen erheblich getriibt (Bonn's intervention on behalf of China correspondent without success. German-Chinese relations gravely affected), Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20 December 1995 p. 1. Following the decision on the journalist's expulsion, the PRC ambassador to Bonn was summoned to the foreign office to be notified about the federal government's disappointment.