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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
The loess hills of northern Shensi below the great wall, unsurpassed in their poverty and primitiveness in all China proper, are a traditional haven for rebels. Remote from major provincial power centres, this rugged terrain provides ideal sanctuary for roving armed bands. Here Li Tzu-ch'eng launched his campaign to overthrow the Ming, only to be thwarted by the Manchus after taking Peking in 1644. Much of the region was devastated by Moslem rebels in the mid-nineteenth Century, and in the chaotic final years of the Ch'ing, t'u-fei, (bandits) formed from the ranks of the military, secret societies and a population frequently on the brink of starvation, roamed unchecked. One early twentieth-century British observer described the area's reputation this way: “In the mind of the average Chinese of the Eastern provinces…north Shensi is a nest of plunderers lost in a wilderness.”
1 Keyte, J. C., The Passing of the Dragon. The Story of the Shensi Revolution and Relief Expedition (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913), p. 227Google Scholar.
2 Ibid., pp. 14–59; Borst-Smith, Ernest F., Mandarin and Missionary in Cathay. The Story of Twelve Years’ Strenuous Missionary Work During Stirring Times Mainly Spent in Yenanfu, a Prefectural City of Shensi, North China, With a Review of its History from the Earliest Date (London: Seeley, Service, 1917), pp. 107–113Google Scholar.
3 Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord. The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 101–109Google Scholar; Woodhead, H. G. and others (ed.), The China Yearbook (Tientsin and London: George Routledge, 1912–1939), 1925–26, pp. 1130–1132Google Scholar. MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, China in Revolution: An Analysis of Politics and Militarism Under the Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 52Google Scholar.
4 The China Yearbook, 1921–22, pp. 820–821.
5 Kang, Kao, Pien-ch'ü Tang ti Li-shih Wen-t'i Chien-t'ao (Examination and Discussion of Questions Concerning Border Region Party History) (Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party, 1943), pp. 2–3Google Scholar. This is the basic source for the study of the guerrilla movement in Shensi. Kao, representing the Northwest Bureau, delivered it to the High Level Cadre Conference in Yenan on November 17, 18, 1942, at the height of the first great cheng-feng campaign. An announcement in Chieh-fang Jih-pao (Liberation Daily), April 14, 1942, stated that compilation of the border region's official history was in progress and solicited information. From this time, having officially resolved the burning issues of inner-Party strife of an earlier era, Kao proceeded to consolidate his position as the leading Party and military authority in the northwest. Po-ch'ien, Meng, Hui Hsiang Jen-tao (Return to Humanity) (Hong Kong: Asia Pub., 1953), p. 2Google Scholar. The author was a founding member of the Marxist Study Group in Shensi and long active in communist and Kuominchtin military work. He defected from the Communist Party in 1938. Liberation Daily (in Shensi), February 7, 1944. Li Tzu-chou, a philosophy student of Li Ta-chao at Peking University and activist in the May Fourth student movement, was posthumously honoured as the founder and guiding spirit of the Shensi Party.
6 Hung Ch'i Fiao-p'iao (Red Flag Memoirs), 17 volumes, 1957Google Scholar and after. Hereafter abbreviated Red Memoirs, V, pp. 108–118. “Hsi-pei Yi-k'o Hung Hsing (Liu Chih-tan Ku-shih P'ien-tuan)” [“A Red Star in the Northwest (Fragmentary Stories of Liu Chih-tan)”], pp. 108–110. Ying-shen, Hua (ed.), Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Lieh-shih Chuan (Biographies of Chinese Communist Heroes) (Peking: Youth Publishing House, 1951)Google Scholar, “Li u Chih-tan T'ung-chih Ko-ming Shih-lueh” (“A Revolutionary Biographical Sketch of Comrade Liu Chih-tan”), p. 149. Hereafter, Liu, Biography.
7 Yen, Ch'en, Shen-Kan Tiao-ch'a (Investigation Record of Shen-kari) (Peking: 1936), p. 80Google Scholar.
8 Sheridan, pp. 206–209; The China Yearbook, 1928, p. 164; Kao, pp. 3–4; Chien-nung, Li, The Political History of China, 1840–1928 (New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 467–502Google Scholar.
9 Sheridan, pp. 199, 210–211; Red Memoirs, V, p. 111; Liberation Daily, November 19, 1941; Meng, p. 19.
10 Kao, pp. 4–6; Meng, p. 17; Shinkichi, Eto, “Hai-Lu-Feng—The First Chinese Soviet Government,” The China Quarterly, Nos. 8 and 9 (10–12 1961, January-March 1962), I p. 182Google Scholar; Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 100–101Google Scholar; Sheridan, pp. 215, 226.
11 Kao, pp. 4–8; MacNair, p. 119. The speed with which the communists were rooted out of all areas of activity suggests the fragility of the Party's hold over its membership and the mass movements it championed, commensurate with its rapid development and ambiguous relationship with the KMT. Available evidence is singularly evasive on two points: communist strength vis-à-vis that of Feng and the KMT organisation in the revolutionary movements in Shensi, and the degree of bloodshed in the summer of 1927 as Feng and the KMT turned against the Reds. On the first, Kao Rang mirrors contemporary Party charges against the Ch'en Tu-hsiu leadership, noting the rapid development of the CP but castigating Shensi Party Secretary Keng Ping-kuang for hewing to a right opportunist policy of “only uniting not struggling” with the powerful landlord and capitalist class. Concerning the second point, Kao observes that some Shensi communists were killed while many abandoned the Party in the face of relentless pressure. Sheridan, pp. 230–231, states that Feng Yii-hsiang killed no communists in the initial purge in Shensi. though he took harsher measures in late 1927 and early 1928.
12 Kao, pp. 9–11; Meng, pp. 37–44; Red Memoirs, V, p. 112; Chien-min, Wang, Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Shih-kao (Draft History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taipei: Published privately, 1965), 3 volumes, II, p. 263Google Scholar.
13 See James Sheridan's excellent discussion of many of these factors, pp. 16–21, 210–215.
14 Feng, Kuan, “Hung Er-shih-liu Chun ti Er-t'uan Shih-pai ti Ching-yan yü Chiaoshün” (“The Experience and Lessons of the Defeat of the 2nd Regiment of the 26th Red Army”), Tou-cheng (Struggle), LXI, 01 12, 1934Google Scholar. Abbreviated as “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 44. Struggle was a Shanghai organ of the Central Committee.
15 It is intriguing that the first chapter of the novel Shut Hu Chuan (Water Margin) mentions this area, Hua Yin hsien and the nearby Sbao Hua mountains as the target and hideout of a formidable robber band numbering over 700 men. As I hope to show, in its early phases, the guerrilla movement shared much in common with other armed bands in the Shensi hills, even as the stories relating Liu Chih-tan's activities are reminiscent of the numerous tales of officials turning to banditry. I am, however, familiar with no indication that Liu or his compatriots were directly inspired by these stories as was, for example, Tse-tung, Mao. Nai-an, Shih, Water Margin. Translated by Jackson, J. H.. (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1963), 2 volumesGoogle Scholar. See Schram, Stuart, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 193Google Scholar.
16 Ch'en Yen, p. 80.
17 Red Memoirs, V, p. 112; Kao, p. 8. The reaction of the Party Centre to this internal struggle is not recorded in these accounts.
18 Red Memoirs, V, pp. 112–114; Liberation Daily, May 15, 1943. In Wang Tzu-yi's recollection of the incident, published in Liberation Daily, Liu is said to have organised the poor, who provided the winning margin of support. But Wang also notes that Liu succeeded in winning the support of local gentry, who spoke to the hsien magistrate on his behalf.
19 Kao, p. 11; China Yearbook, 1931–32, p. 523; Chung-yang Tiao-ch'a T'ung-chi Chü (Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics) (Chinese Nationalist Government). Hereafter abbreviated Bur.Inv. Shen-Kan-Ning Pien-ch'ü Shih-k'uang (The True Situation in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region), p. 2. Hereafter, True Situation.
20 Kao, p. 11; Schwartz, Benjamin, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 166–169Google Scholar; Tso-liang, Hsiao, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 114–124Google Scholar.
21 Meng, pp. 88–94.
22 Liao Hsing-hsü, “Shen-hsi Kung-ch'an-tang chih Chiu-fen” (“Confusion in the Shensi Communist Party”), Bur.Inv. Report; Jen-li (Truth), No. 1, April 12, 1931Google Scholar. This newspaper was a n organ of the Shensi Communist Party; Kao, p. 12.
23 Jen-li, ibid.
24 Ibid.; Sheng-wei, Chung-kung Shen-hsi (The Provincial Communist Party Committee of Shensi), Cheng-chih Yi-chien Shu {Political Opinion Tract), 02 25, 1931Google Scholar. Manuscript.
25 Sheridan, pp. 248, 251, shows clearly how the effects of warlordism and banditry contributed to the great famine after 1928. As a result of war and the heavy tax burden exacted by the warlords, no surplus remained in the economy, and when natural disaster occurred it therefore exacted a much heavier toll in suffering and lives.
26 Buck, John Lossing, Land Utilisation in China. A Study of 16,786 Farms in 168 Localities and 38,257 Farm Families in Twenty-two Provinces in China, 1929–1933 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), p. 9Google Scholar.
27 Stampar, A., “The Northwestern Provinces and their Possibilities of Development,” quoted in Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 229Google Scholar.
28 Wei-yuan-hui, Hsing-cheng Yuan Nung-ts'un Fu-hsing (Rural Rehabilitation Commission of the Executive Yuan), Shen-hsi Sheng Nung-ts'un Tiao-ch'a (Shensi Province Rural Investigations (Shanghai: 1934), pp. 3–76, 136Google Scholar. 3·5 mou of land were equal to 1 hsiang in N. Shensi. Mou: approx. 1½6 acre; hsiang: approx. ½ acre.
29 Ibid., pp. 79–112.
30 Yen-an Nung-ts'un Tiao-ch'a Tua n (Yenan Village Investigation Group), Mi Chih Yang Chia K'ou Tiao-ch'a (Investigation of Mi Chih Hsien Yang Chia K'ou). Hereafter, Mi Chih Investigation. (Peking: San Lien, 1957), pp. 2–14Google Scholar. Research for this study was completed in 1942. Although there are a number of Moslem communities in northern Shensi, the Ma clan of Mi Chih hsien are Han Chinese.
31 Ibid., pp. 71–74. Tou: 35 catties (chin), approx. 47 1b.
32 Ibid., pp. 52–56, 97.
33 Shensi Rural Investigation, pp. 15–56. Scattered evidence from other provinces suggests that a variety of new types of landlord organisation with broad economic functions began to develop from the last half of the nineteenth century. This phenomenon appears related to rural commercialisation and social disintegration. See Muramatsu Yuji's stimulating article “A Documentary Study of Chinese Landlordism in Late Ch'ing and Early Republican Kiangnan,” to be published in a forthcoming Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
34 The degree of landlord commercialisation ought not to be exaggerated, particularly in the northern portion of Shensi. Much of the area continued to subsist on a barter economy; there was virtually no industry and scarcely even any handicraft or cottage production transportation and communications remained primitive; no effects of the world depression are discernible here.
35 Shensi Rural Investigation, p. 144. The extensive cultivation of opium, particularly from the 1920s, was a contributing factor both to rural commercialisation and to the widespread starvation produced by the famine after 1928. Much fertile land which had been planted in grain was given over to opium.
36 Kanichi, Hatano, Chu-goku Kyo-san-to Shi (History of the Chinese Communist Party), 7 volumes (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1962), IV, p. 435Google Scholar.
37 Shensi Rural Investigation, p. 150.
38 Snow, Edgar, Red Star, pp. 220–221Google Scholar; True Situation, pp. 1–2; Bur.Inv., Shen-Kan-Ning Pien-ch'ü Tiao-ch'a Chuan-pao (Special Investigation Report on the ShenKan-Ning Border Region). Hereafter, Special Investigation, pp.1–2.
39 Feng, Kuan, “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 41Google Scholar; Kao, pp. 12–14; Liu Biography, p. 149.
40 Feng, Kuan, “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 41Google Scholar.
41 Kao, p. 14; Red Memoirs, V, p. 115; Anonymous, “Ch'ing-chu Chung-kuo Kungnung Hung-chun Shen-Kan Yu-chi Tui Ch'ung-p'o Pai Chun ti Ying-yung Sheng-li” (“Celebrate the Courageous Victory of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army Shensi-Kansu Guerrilla Forces in Smashing the White Army”), Struggle, 11, April 30, 1932, p. 8. Hereafter, “Celebrate the Victory.”
42 “Chung-kung Chung-yang Kuan-yü Kan-Shen Pien-ch'ü Yu-chi-tui ti Kung-tso chi Ch'uang-tsao Kan-Shen Pien Hsin Ch'ü ti Chueh-yi” (“Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the Work of Guerrilla Forces on the Kan-Shen Border and Establishment of a New Kan-Shen Area,”) Pei-fang Hung-ch'i (Northern Red Flag), No. 4, 06 12, 1932, pp. 44–46Google Scholar. The resolution is dated April 20, 1932. Northern Red Flag was an organ of the Northern Bureau.
43 Wei, Shensi Sheng (Shensi Provincial Committee), “K'ai-chan Yu-chi Yun-tung Ch'uang-tsao Wei-pei Hsin Su-ch'u Chiieh-yi” (“Resolution on Development of the Guerrilla Movement and Creation of a New Wei Pei Soviet Area”), 06 6, 1932Google Scholar.
44 “Celebrate the Victory,” pp. 8–9.
45 Chun, Li, “Chung-kuo Kung-nung Hung Chün Shen-Kan Yu-chi-tui ti Ch'e-ti Kai-tsao yü Liang T'iao Chan-hsien” (“Thoroughly Reform the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army Shensi-Kansu Guerrillas and the Two War Fronts”), Struggle, No. 15, 06 9, 1932Google Scholar. Abbreviated “Reform the Guerrillas,” pp. 10–11; “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” pp. 40–42.
47 “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” pp. 40–42; (Shensi) Provincial (Communist Party) Resolution, “ Kuan-yü Ti-kuo Chu-yi Kuo-min-tang Szu-ts'u Wei-chiao Ch'uang-tsao Shen-Kan Pien-ch'ü Hsin Su-wei-ai Ch'ü chi Hung Er-shih-liu Chün Chüeh-yi” (“Resolution on the Imperialist KMT's 4th Encirclement Campaign, Creation of a New Shen-Kan Soviet Area and the 26th Red Army”), August 25, 1932. Abbreviated as “KMT's 4th Encirclement.” Manuscript.
47 The Chinese term yu-chi-tui obscures essential differences between roving armed bands and guerrillas as they have come to be defined in the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other theoreticians of guerrilla warfare. Liu and his men were yu-chi-tui from their initial ventures to incite rural insurrection after the 1927 split. From 1932, and particularly after 1934, their behaviour appears increasingly consonant with classical guerrilla principles. I am familiar with no contemporary attempt to rationalise or explain their strategy. The record of the inner-Party debate contains only the voices of their critics from the Shensi Party on up to the Central Committee. Kao Kang's 1942 explication of the guerrilla line of course follows the publication and extensive discussion of Mao Tse-tung's major studies on this subject.
