1. See Wallerstein, I., “Dependence in an interdependent world,” African Studies Review, No. 17 (04 1974), pp. 1–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wallerstein, I., The Modem World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 348 and 351Google Scholar.

2. There is no liberation from necessary labour time as a defining experience of life. With state control over travel, residence and job assignments, there is nothing like a socialist liberation from the realm of necessity to that of freedom. In China, state power-holders proved incapable of finding sufficient urban jobs for young city dwellers except at a cost of such overhead capital and high investment that it threatened to take too much from the rural poor. This state has ripped some 20 million such young from home, family, neighbours, friends and all that is familiar for life-time rural work assignments in often harsh frontier areas. For the populist and paternalistic state, a commodity-like calculation is being made. The workers sacrifice community or the peasants sacrifice equality. In either case, humanity cannot prevail, only a lesser evil.

3. Regis Debray wrote that “all the revolutionaries I have known personally were ardent patriots whose ‘internationalism’ was generally a national messianism,” and that “in Cuba and Vietnam being a revolutionary…means being a nationalist.” See, Debray, R., “Marxism and the national question,” New Left Review (september–October 1977), pp. 25–41Google Scholar.

4. See McDonald, Angus (transl.) “Mao Tse-tung and the Hunan self-government movement, 1920: an introduction with five translations,” The China Quarterly No. 68 (12 1976), pp. 750–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui, 1967 (Wan-sui, 1967), pp. 226–27.

6. Ta-chao, Li, Li Ta-chao hsuan-chi (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1962),p. 214Google Scholar.

7. Hsien-wen, Chang “Li Ta-chao t'ung-chih shih chieh-ting ti Ma-k'o-ssu chu-i-ch'o,” in Nan-ching ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao, No. 4 (1978), pp. 94–99Google Scholar.

8. Wan-sui, 1967, p. 135.

9. Marx, K. and Engels, F., On Colonialism (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 24Google Scholar.

10. Schram, S., Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 148Google Scholar.

11. Schram, S., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 374Google Scholar.

12. Mao Tse-tung chi (Hong Kong, 1975), Vol. V, p. 231Google Scholar.

13. Dittmer, L., Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 25Google Scholar.

14. Po-ta, Chen, Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953)Google Scholar.

15. Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

16. See my article “A careful look at the Sino-Vietnamese flare-up and how it all began,” New China, Autumn 1979, pp. 19–22.

17. Shao-ch'i, Liu, Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), pp. 191–92Google Scholar.

18. Dulles, A., The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Signet, 1965), p. 208Google Scholar.

19. Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 12 December 1963.

20. Friedman, E., “China's changing role in the world economy,” Stanford Journal of International Studies, No. X (Spring 1975), p. 4Google Scholar.

21. Wan-sui, 1967, p. 42.

22. Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. V (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 292Google Scholar.

23. Ibid. p. 306.

24. Ibid. pp. 365, 376, 377 and 378.

25. Interview between Keng Piao and a U.S. delegation of civic and world leaders, Peking, 25 November 1978.

26. I detail this united front position and two other competing positions in “Superpowers and challengers: The United States and China” in Spiegel, S. and Waltz, K. (eds.). Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge: Winthrop Pula lishers, 1971)Google Scholar. What I analysed in terms of social base and historical experience as united front, paper tiger and major military backer approaches to the world has more recently and too abstractly been called moderate, radical and military approaches.

27. Pi-wu, Ch'en, “A discussion with regard to the crumbling of a unified world market,” KJMP 22 05 1957Google Scholar (this paper was then very much an organ of the united front approach associated with such people as Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yun and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

28. Kuang-ming jih-pao treated the point as obvious. The paper did not detail how shipping, insurance, finance, markets, technology, etc. had an international aspect which was more than national production. Marx in Capital, Vol. I, had written that “ modern industry…makes science a productive force distinct from labour…” The usual focus on such snippets from Marx is to see whether or not a non-capitalist technology is a useful category. But all we need see is how production forces are multiplied by scientific developments which, as with science itself, can not be a matter of single nation hegemony. Marx, discussing France of about 1848, commented that “French relations of production are conditioned by…her position on the world market and the law thereof.” A proletarian revolution therefore could not win in France. “Accomplishment begins only at the moment when…the proletariat [revolution] is pushed to the van of the nation which dominates the world market…” The world-systems approach which sees a number of core states explains why the lever of revolutionary change has no single fulcrum.

29. Foreign Languages Press, Ugly Features of Soviet Social-Imperialism, Peking, 1976, p. 35Google Scholar. For a fuller analysis of the issue of Soviet economic imperialism see, Ray, D. M., “Chinese perceptions of social imperialism and economic dependence,” Stanford Journal of International Studies, No. X (Spring 1978), pp. 36–82Google Scholar. A 1975 Soviet defence of CMEA argued that “division of labour between socialist states cannot be reduced to some countries developing their natural wealth with due regard for the needs of fraternal states,” because with some products the producer nation is also permitted to become the processor and even manufacturer of end products. But in investment-accumulation, “member states are able to concentrate their efforts on creating and expanding a number of sectors for which they have favourable conditions.” [Mikulsdy, K., Lenin's Teaching on the World Economy and its Relevance to Our Times (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 86Google Scholar.] To the extent that this permits greater national independence of the Soviet Union for Eastern Europe, to that extent Chinese critiques of Soviet domination through CMEA may perhaps be said to have been not without consequence.

30. Jui-sheng, Wang and Shih-p'eng, Liang in CCYC, No. 1 (1958), pp. 70–82Google Scholar.

31. China's commitment by May 1958 to build nuclear weapons absolutely contradicted any tendency to woo the Soviet Union.

32. The two usually unmentioned things the Soviet Union did do were to permit this hungry China not only to repay the debt in textiles rather than food but also to import some food from the Soviet Union. It is true that China also exported food to the Soviet Union in this period and that piece of the trade is stressed by Chinese patriots out to discredit the Soviet Union for its clearly inhuman treatment of the Chinese people in China's moment of great need.

33. Kinoshita, J., “The world viewed from China,” Sekai, September 1963 (transl. in Summary of Selected Japanese Magazines, 12 11 1963), p. 17Google Scholar.

34. This Hong Kong journal writes with authority. It was said to be related to people in the Teng Hsiao-p'ing ruling group.

35. There are 1960 writings of Mao which could be used to legitimate this position. “Where food is concerned, reliance on other countries or other provinces is extraordinarily dangerous.” “We must disperse the residents of big cities to the rural areas and construct numerous small cities for under the conditions of atomic war this would be comparatively beneficial” (Mao, , Wan-sui, 1967 pp. 227, 226)Google Scholar. These sentences alone actually could be accommodated by all three tendencies in China, united front, paper tiger and major military backer.

36. This essay by Kuan in Cheng ming argues that as China's ultra-left took a leap into inhumanity by this interpretation, so Cambodia's Pol Pot regime took the next great leap in this chain of preposterous logic. That is, corrupt cities must be purified. The metropolises of the world are the enemies of revolution. Hence the Pol Pot regime's war on Cambodia's cities was not merely a functional imperative of preventing starvation and stopping saboteurs.

37. Friedman, E., “Mao's long courtship bears late fruit,” Washington Post, 18 07 1971Google Scholar.

38. Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui (1969) (Wan-sui, 1969), p. 456.

39. Ibid. p. 514.

40. Ibid. p. 578. Independence and one's own modern weaponry were inseparable for Mao. “If we are not to be bullied…we cannot do without the bomb ” (p. 288). He noted that “Lumumba's Congo had launched a guerrilla war, but lacked any modern weaponry” (p. 456).

41. Ibid. p. 456.

42. Ibid. p. 499.

43. Jen-min jih-pao, 15 June 1972 (a special front page editorial). The public position reflects earlier commitments. Chou En-lai declared in December 1971, “We are resolutely on the side of the third world “ (Chen, K. C., China and the Three Worlds (White Plains: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), p. 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. The most accessible English language guide to this reconceptualization is the collection of 1972 articles gathered by Yenan Books of Berkeley, California (2506 Haste St.) and titled “On studying world history.”

45. The post-1968 openness to Yugoslavia alienated Albania which allied itself with Lin Piao and China's ultra left. Not surprisingly, behind Albania's ultra-left phrases is the priority of statist thinking in a world where all is defined by relations to the major threat to one's independence seen in Albania as Yugoslavia. Thus, as in the 1950s and 1960s, indeed throughout the history of the Maoist movement, a world drawn from a Chinese nationalistic focal point did not harmonize with all other nationalisms. The notion that China changed its general approach to the world in the 1970s, however, is wrong. What changed was Moscow's and Washington's policies towards Peking. For more on Mao's views on the need to compromise, in terms of China's national plight, with all imperialisms but the worst, cf. his 25 December 1940 directive “On policy.” Mao concludes, “The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now, between German and Italian imperialism which are allies of Japan and have recognized Manchukuo and British and American imperialism which are opposed to Japan, and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today which have abandoned this policy and are now in favor of China's resistance. Our tactics are guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one.” (Chen, K. C., China and the Three Worlds, p. 70Google Scholar.) This essay cannot take the space to provide the facts which give the lie to some 1970s distortions of Chinese foreign policy such as an alleged Chinese opposition to Chile's Marxist Allende and a supposed preference for Chile's fascist Pinochet. Actually Allende, Chairman of Chile's China Friendship Organization, received great aid from China. Peking, a copper importer (still trying to develop copper mines) co-operates with copper producers Zaire, Zambia and Chile just as Cuba, a sugar exporter, co-operates with Brazil's murderous rulers who are also sugar exporters. The alternative to such co-operation is deep injury to one's own citizens from ruthless world market forces.

46. Chen, K. C., China and the Three Worlds, p. 145Google Scholar.

47. Friedman, E., “Political independence in China and the international political economy of imperialism” (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies Working Paper, 1970), p. 2Google Scholar.

48. P'ing-hua, Chang speech in Issues and Studies, Vol. 14, No. 12 (12 1978), p. 102Google Scholar.

49. For that position see Kraus, R., “Withdrawing from the world system,” in Goldfrank, Walter (ed.), The World System of Capitalism (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 237–59Google Scholar. For a toppling of that position see DiazAlejandro, D. F., “Delinking North and South: unshackled or unhinged?” Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 85–162Google Scholar.

50. Draper, H., Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Vol. II (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p. 639Google Scholar.

51. Interview between Keng Piao and a U.S. delegation of Civil and World Affairs leaders, Peking, 25 11 1978Google Scholar.

52. Yahuda, M., China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 257Google Scholar.

^* This article benefited from the criticism of an earlier version by Bruce Cumings, Richard Kraus, Mark Selden and Vivienne Shue. An expanded version of this article will be published in Hopkins, Terence and Wallerstein, Immanuel (eds.) Processes of the World System (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, forthcoming)Google Scholar.