¹ Historically, there have been three criteria used by the United States in according recognition: (1) the ability of the government to control and rule the country; (2) acceptance of the government by the people; and (3) the willingness and ability of the government to carry out its international obligations. The emphasis given to these principles throughout American diplomatic history has varied widely. The first principle, stressing de facto control, prevailed prior to the Civil War; it was revived at the end of the nineteenth century, and again in the 1930s after a period when we insisted upon constitutional legitimacy as the governing criterion. The second principle was an outgrowth of the Civil War experience, and the third related specifically to the problem of recognising Soviet Russia. Currently, the United States recognises all Communist states belonging to the Soviet bloc and carries on diplomatic relations with all except Albania. It does not recognise Communist China.

² This section is based upon Browder, Robert Paul' The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Chap. 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Browder, , op. cit., pp. 96–97.Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 108.

⁶ Saul. G. Bron, former chairman of Amtorg, wrote in 1930 that more than fifty additional technical assistance contracts were being negotiated in almost all important industries. A number of agreements with individual American engineers and technicians invited to work in the Soviet Union were also in the process of negotiation. An appended list of technical assistance contracts negotiated between the Soviet Government and American firms and engineers included leading American companies. For example, Dupont was engaged to assist in erecting fertiliser factories; General Electric aided the Soviet electrical industry, and Sperry Gyroscope Company gave assistance in manufacturing marine instruments. See, Bron, Saul G., Soviet Economic Development and American Business (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), pp. 99, 144–146.Google Scholar

⁷ Ibid., pp. 108–112.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 75–76.

⁹ Whelan, Joseph G., United States Recognition of Soviet Russia: A Brief Historical Survey of American Public Opinion, 1917–33, (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1952), p. 34Google Scholaret seq. (unpublished).

¹⁰ Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), p. 149.Google Scholar

¹¹ The Literary Digest, 12 2, 1933, v. 116:13.Google Scholar

¹² U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy: U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Study No. 11, 02 14, 1960Google Scholar, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 45.Google Scholar

¹³ Stebbins, Richard P., The United States in World Affairs, 1958 (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), pp. 310–311.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The New York Times, 09 23, 1959, p. 26.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Quoted in The Economist, 02 20, 1960, p. 695.Google Scholar

¹⁶ World opinion on recognition of Communist China continues to be divided, although the gap is narrowing. By early 1959, forty-four countries recognised the Nationalist Republic of China, forty-two of which were members of the U.N. and three (Republic of Korea, Vietnam and the Vatican) were not. On the other hand, twenty-eight members of the U.N. (excluding the Ukraine and Byelorussia) recognised Communist China. Nine were from the Communist bloc. In addition, Switzerland and four unrecognised Communist régimes (North Korea, East Germany, Outer Mongolia, and North Vietnam) also recognised the Peking régime. Recently, Castro's régime in Cuba established diplomatic relations with Peking. A world-wide poll taken recently on the question of admitting China to the U.N. showed that while the United States stands virtually alone in opposing Peking's admission, still less than a majority approved. See, World Gallup Poll News Service, 11 19, 1958.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Republican Platform of 1952: in Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald Bruce, National Party Platforms, 1840–1956 (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 497Google Scholar. The Democratic Platform stated: “Our military and economic assistance to the Nationalist Government of China on Formosa has strengthened that vital outpost of the free world, and will be continued,” p. 476.

¹⁸ Porter, and Johnson, , op. cit., pp. 557 and 525.Google Scholar

¹⁹ At that time, the Administration's extended commitment in this crisis found little public support in 100 newspapers used by the State Department to test public opinion and in letters received in the Department from private citizens. Similarly, Congressional mail was “running heavily” against Administration policy. The New York Times, 10 5, 1958, p. 3Google Scholar. See also Lapp, J. Clement, “The United States and Quemoy,” Western World, 11 1958, pp. 12–14.Google Scholar

²⁰ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 222.Google Scholar

²¹ The Washington Post and Times Herald, 06 7, 1959, p. E4.Google Scholar

²² Building a Better America: Republican Platform, 1960 (Washington: Republican National Committee, 1960), p. 3.Google Scholar

²³ Democratic Platform, The Rights of Man, Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles, 07 12, 1960, p. 17.Google Scholar

²⁴ President (then Senator) Kennedy's views on China policy were set forth in a memorandum prepared early in 1960. According to President Kennedy, “this is not a proper time for the recognition of Red China. In view of the Peking Government's failure to free American prisoners, its aggressive designs and actions against Tibet and South Asia, and its unwillingness to guarantee the integrity of Formosa, there is strong reason to withhold recognition. I feel there is merit in the view that China should not be allowed to ‘shoot its way’ into the United Nations and thence to recognition by the United States. I do not see it as a moral issue primarily, but I do think we have every right to expect reciprocal benefits from such recognition. On the positive side, I believe it would be well if there were more open windows between the peoples of China and the peoples of the Western nations. Some promising approaches to this end could be made by allowing the press and other private individuals greater latitude in visiting and reporting on China.”

In an interview published in the New Republic on 06 27, 1960, p. 9Google Scholar, Mr. Kennedy remarked: “One of the first things I would do is bring Communist China into the nuclear test ban negotiations in the hope that this would lead to other things. If they were to participate actively and in a way that was responsive then I would go back to the newsmen issue. Then we would have to see about Formosa and the rest, We would have to continue to indicate that we're not going to permit them to dominate South-east Asia, that while we're glad to discuss Formosa we're still going to meet our treaty commitments.”

On February 6, 1960, Mr. Nixon remarked: “I can think of nothing which would be more detrimental to the cause of freedom and peace … than to recognise Red China and admit it to the United Nations at this time. … Now, will (this position) never change? The answer is: it will change, but only when the policies of the Communist Chinese Government change.” (See, The Congressional Quarterly, 03 11, 1960, p. 390.)Google Scholar

²⁵ Quoted in Packman, Martin, China Policy, Editorial Research Reports (1957), p. 552.Google Scholar

²⁶ Quoted in Stebbins, Richard P., The United States in World Affairs, 1958 (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 339.Google Scholar

²⁷ The New York Times, 10 8, 1959, p. 10Google Scholar. For the most complete explanation of United States policy of non-recognition of Communist China, see Department of State Bulletin, 09 8, 1958, pp. 385–390.Google Scholar

²⁸ For the most recent reference to this provision on China policy, see the Department of State Appropriation Act in Public Law 86–678Google Scholar, Eighty-Sixth Congress, 08 31, 1960, p. 7, under “General Provisions—Department of State.”Google Scholar

²⁹ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

³⁰ Packman, , op. cit., p. 546.Google Scholar

³¹ Ibid., p. 556.

³² The New York Times, 08 7, 1958, p. 19Google Scholar; September 14, 1958, p. E5; and October 5, 1958, p. 3.

³³ For the text of Senator Engle's speech, see, Congressional Record, 05 21, 1959, pp. 7877–7885 (daily edition).Google Scholar

³⁴ Congressional Record, 06 8, 1959, pp. 9145–9150 (daily edition).Google Scholar

³⁵ A radio-television debate on China policy between Senator Homer E. Capehart (R.—Ind.) and Representative Charles O. Porter (D.—Ore.) in August 1959 brought out very sharply contrasting views but caused no disturbances in the political atmosphere of the Congress. See, the American Forum, 08 9, 1959.Google Scholar

³⁶ The New York Times, 11 1, 1959, p. 27Google Scholar. Similarly, when asked to comment on the report, Senator Gale McGee (D.—Wyo.) asserted his opposition at this time, but believed that the United States should “reopen the whole question and see what changes we should make.” “Times have changed,” the Senator said, “and policies that were good for 1949 are not necessarily good for 1959.” On the other hand, Senator Michael J. Mansfield (D.—Mont.), a leading foreign policy spokesman in the Senate for the Democrats, pointed out that the Korean War has never been formally ended and American prisoners were still being held in Chinese Communist prisons. See, the Washington Star, 11 3, 1959, p. B3.Google Scholar

³⁷ See, Congressional Record, 02 23, 1960, pp. 2910–2911Google Scholar; April 19, 1960, pp. 7557–7558; June 23, 1960, pp. 12873, 12874 and 12876; May 23, 1960, pp. 1000–1002; May 23, 1960, pp. 10034–10035; and June 2, 1960, pp. 10793–10794 (daily edition). See also, addresses by Senator Joseph S. Clark, Jr. (D.—Pa.), before American Academy of Political Science, Philadelphia, April 8, 1960.

³⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 27.Google Scholar

³⁹ The Congressional Record, 08 25, 1960, pp. 16417–16421Google Scholar (daily edition). As in the case of the Engle speech a year before, the Cotton speech went unmentioned in the New York Times.

⁴⁰ See, Congressional Record, 06 4, 1959, pp. 8948–8956Google Scholar; June 9, 1960, pp. 11435–11436; June 28, 1960, pp. A5564–A5565; June 3, 1960, p. 10973; and June 16, 1960, pp. 11887–11888 (daily edition).

⁴¹ Bowles, Chester, “The ‘China Problem’ Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs, 04 1960, pp. 476–486.Google Scholar

⁴² Congressional Record, 08 17, 1959, pp. 14727–14736Google Scholar (daily edition), and the New York Times, 08 18, 1959, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁴³ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Expressing the Sense of Congress Against Seating of the Communist Régime in China as Representative of China in the United Nations, Report No. 825, First Session, Eighty-Sixth Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959)Google Scholar. Representatives William Meyer (D.—Vt.) and Thomas L. Ashley (D.—Ohio) voted against the resolution.

⁴⁴ The question of admission to the U.N. has obvious relevance to this analysis as an indicator of general attitudes among Americans toward China and as an indicator, too, of possible hints of a shift in public opinion for revision of policy. Admission of China to the U.N. with United States approval would undoubtedly be regarded as a démarche of the first importance, possibly even a prelude to formal recognition.

⁴⁵ World Gallup Poll News Service, 11 19, 1958.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Congressional Record, 06 25, 1960, p. 13330 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The Washington Post and Times Herald, 06 30, 1957, p. B12Google Scholar, and Congressional Record, 05 14, 1959, pp. A4087–A4088Google Scholar (daily edition).

⁴⁸ Public Opinion News Service, 09 26, 1958.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ The Christian Science Monitor, 11 21, 1958, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 222.Google Scholar

⁵¹ American Assembly, The United States and the Far East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 225–227.Google ScholarPubMed

⁵² The New York Times, 12 8, 1959, p. 24.Google Scholar

⁵³ The Washington Post and Times Herald, 05 30, 1957, p. A17, and June 6, 1957, p. A19.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The Washington Post and Times Herald, 10 10, 1958, p. A14.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The New York Times, 08 11, 1958, p. 20.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ The Evening Star (Washington), 11 24, 1958, p. A12.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The Christian Science Monitor, 12 9, 1959.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Congressional Record, 07 30, 1959, pp. A6597Google Scholaret seq., and 06 30, 1959, pp. 11087–11088 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Congressional Record, 02 23, 1960, pp. 2910–2911 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Congressional Record, 05 26, 1960, pp. 4527–4529 (daily edition).Google Scholar

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⁶³ The Progressive, 11 1958, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Report of the Department of International Affairs, N.C.C., 09 30, 1959, p. 9.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ These judgments are based upon surveys of literature, correspondence with leading groups, and direct inquiries with organisation headquarters.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ The New York Times, 06 9, 1957, p. E3.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ The Christian Science Monitor, 07 17, 1959, p. 15Google Scholar

⁶⁹ The New York Times, 12 13, 1959, p. 23.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, pp. 221–222.Google Scholar

⁷¹ The New York Times, 05 31, 1957, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁷² Journal of Commerce, 06 22, 1959, p. 21.Google Scholar

⁷³ Friedman, Ralph, “The United States and China Trade,” Eastern World, 11 1958, p. 39.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

⁷⁵ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Friedman, , op. cit., p. 39.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The Economist, 07 15, 1957, p. 977.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Friedman, , op. cit., p. 38.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Congressional Record, 06 4, 1959, p. 8753 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

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⁸² Ibid., p. 37.

⁸³ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Congressional Record, 05 21, 1958, p. 8191 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Congressional Record, 05 26, 1959, p. 8171 (daily edition).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Business Week, 06 8, 1957, p. 118Google Scholar; the Evening Star (Washington), 07 17, 1957, p. A5Google Scholar; the Denver Post, 05 23, 1957, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ The Washington Post and Times Herald, 05 22, 1959, p. A6.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ The Economist, 07 25, 1959, p. 221Google Scholar. For a survey of views on China policy of six members of the Oregon Congressional delegation, see Congressional Record, 06 1, 1959, pp. 8458–8459Google Scholar (daily edition).

⁸⁹ Hearings of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on “Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”

⁹⁰ The Congressional Record, 08 25, 1960, p. 16420 (daily edition).Google Scholar

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