^1. As the evidence of Japan shows, the establishment of co-operative associations in order to promote backward and forward linkages and to guide rural finance can command a strong economic logic.

^2. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan shinian guihua he dibage wunian jihua gangyao (Outline of the Ten-Year Programme and Eighth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) (People's Publishing House, 1991), hereafter Jihua gangyao, pp. 75–155.Google Scholar The text can also be found in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), hereafter RMRB, 16 04 1991.Google Scholar An English translation is available in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: The Far East, hereafter SWB, FE/1058, 29 04 1991.Google Scholar

^3. This was the document which the Central Committee examined on 30 December 1990. See SWB, FE/0958, 31 12 1990.Google Scholar

^4. Such ambiguity is suggested by the advocacy of measures, designed simultaneously to “enhance the strength of the collective economy” and establish a “two-tier system combining unified and decentralized management.” See also below.

^5. State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 1991 (A Statistical Survey of China 1991), hereafter TJZY 1991 (Beijing: Statistical Publishing House, 1991), p. 53.Google Scholar

^6. In constant 1970 and 1957 prices, respectively. These figures are derived from data in Ministry of Agriculture (Planning Department), Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan, 1949–1986 (Compendium of Chinese Rural Economic Statistics, 1949–1986) (Beijing: Agricultural Publishing House, 1989), pp. 106 and 108.Google Scholar

^7. The relevant figures are as follows:

^8. Compare the following figures:

^9. In 1982 for cotton, oil seeds and sugar and in 1983 for food grains.

^10. For a detailed analysis of changes in the structure of agricultural production, as revealed by GVAO estimates, see Field, Robert Michael, “Trends in the value of agricultural output” in Kueh, Y. Y. and Ash, R. F. (eds.), Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture: The Impact of Post-Mao Reforms (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

^11. TJNJ 1991, p. 340.Google Scholar

^12. Ibid. The same source shows that in 1985 grain and economic crops accounted for 75.8 and 15.6 per cent of the total sown area.

^13. TJNJ 1991, p. 65.Google Scholar

^14. Vice-premier Tian Jiyun, the government's most senior spokesman for agricultural affairs, addressing the 16th meeting of the seventh NPC Standing Committee in October 1990. See SWB, FE/0908, 30 10 1990.Google Scholar

^15. Zou Jiahua (minister in charge of the State Planning Commission) in a written speech to a national meeting on exchanging experience in rural economic work in February 1991: see SWB, FE/1012, 5 03 1991.Google Scholar Zou's views were echoed by Song Ping, addressing the same meeting: SWB, FE/1024, 19 03 1991.Google Scholar

^16. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jinyibu jianqiang nongye he nongcun gongzuo de jueding” (“Decision of the CCP Central Committee on further strengthening agriculture and rural work”), hereafter “CCPCC 1991,” adopted by the eighth plenary session of the 13th CCP Central Committee on 29 November 1991. The text can be found in Zhenjiang ribao (Zhenjiang Daily), 26 12 1991.Google Scholar It is translated in SWB, FE/1268, 3 01 1992.Google Scholar

^17. From 11.1% (1979) to 3.0% (1988). TJNJ 1991, p. 156.Google Scholar For an analysis of state investment in agriculture and other forms of financial support, see Ash, Robert F., “The peasant and the state,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (09 1991), pp. 493–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^18. The word is carefully chosen. In 1978 the government similarly gave an undertaking to increase investment allocations to agriculture (from 10 to 15–18%) within a few years. A year or two later, it was clear that this commitment had been abandoned. See Lardy, Nicholas R., Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 191–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^19. “CCPCC 1991” is quite explicit on this. Thus: “… During the 8FYP period, state investment in… capital construction projects will increase each year, supplemented by the expanded use of foreign funds. Government support funds for agricultural development will also be increased. Counties' non-committed financial reserves should be used mainly for agricultural development. Agricultural development funds and other funds designated for agricultural use must be used for their proper purpose.…

“State banks should regard loans in support of agriculture as a priority and should ensure that the expansion of such loans is greater than that of the nation's bank loans… Credit co-operatives should appropriately increase deposits and extend more loans in support of agricultural production.” (“CCPCC 1991.”)

^20. Jihua gangyao, p. 105.Google Scholar

^21. Acceleration of work designed to control major rivers and lakes has occurred since the publication of the 10YP/8FYP document and it is noticeable that an entire section is devoted to this issue in “CCPCC 1991.”

^22. SWB, FE/1024, 19 03 1991.Google Scholar

^23. Y. Y. Kueh has shown that between 1984 and 1988, the savings ratio of Chinese peasants fell from 22.9 to 12.5% During the three years from 1985 to 1987, their marginal propensity to save was negative. See “Food consumption and peasant incomes” in Kueh, and Ash, , Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture.Google Scholar

^24. “CCPCC 1991.” In the wake of decollectivization, such activities declined greatly in the 1980s. See Ash, , “The peasant and the state,” p. 499.Google Scholar

^25. That is, through the mechanism of yigong bunong (“using industry to assist agriculture”) and yigong jiannong (“using industry for agricultural construction”): see “CCPCC 1991.” Both were used at different times in the 1980s in order to inject funds into the farm sector, but with mixed results. See Ash, Robert F., “Agricultural policy under the impact of reform”Google Scholar and Sicular, Terry, “Ten years of reform: progress and setbacks in agricultural planning and pricing,”Google Scholar in Kueh, and Ash, , Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture.Google Scholar

^26. Jihua gangyao, p. 102.Google Scholar

^27. Thus: “… Ownership of land belongs to the collective. Individuals merely possess the right of operation, but cannot sell or lease the land.… Contractors must pay taxes to the state according to law, sell farm produce to the state at prices set by the state, and deliver funds and contract fees to the collective in accordance with the terms of the contract.” Jiyun, Tian in Nongmin ribao (Farmers' Daily), 9 10 1991Google Scholar, translated in SWB, FE/1234, 20 11 1991.Google Scholar

^28. SWB, FE/1269, 4 01 1992.Google Scholar

^29. For example, Nongmin ribao, 9 10 1991Google Scholar, which urged that “… our attention should be focused on expanded reproduction rather than [on] the few mou of peasants' land.…” The same source looked forward to peasants who abandoned fanning for industrial or tertiary occupations releasing their land “to the collective for unified operation.” See also RMRB, 22 12 1991Google Scholar, “The only way to invigorate agriculture,” which stated that: “… Socialist agriculture should be based on the continuous development of the collective economy.…”

^30. Ibid.

^31. RMRB, 13 12 1991Google Scholar, “Several issues concerning current rural work,” makes the point that in some regions of China contracted fees have been illegally increased and contracted land taken back from the peasants.

^32. During 1979–84 the average annual increase in the purchase, price of agricultural and sideline products was 7.62% (Bangding, Hu (ed.), Zhongguo wujia nianjian, 1990 (Chinese Price Yearbook, 1990), hereafter ZGWJNJ (Beijing: State Price Publishing House, 1990), p. 431).Google Scholar During 1985–89 the corresponding figure was 13% (State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo wujia tongji nianjian, 1990 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Prices, 1990), hereafter WJTJNJ 1990 (Beijing: State Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 113).Google Scholar That this pattern applied to grain is demonstrated by Claude Aubert: see his Rural China, 1985–90: Are the Reforms Really Bogging Down? (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies: Universities Service Centre Seminar Series, 1991), p. 4.Google Scholar Notice that these figures do not take account of changes in market price.

^33. Aubert, (Rural China, pp. 6–7)Google Scholar shows this to have been the case for both grain and cotton production.

^34. The relevant data can be found in TJNJ 1991, pp. 230 and 234.Google Scholar They should, however, be interpreted with some caution, for it seems likely that the category of “agricultural production materials” is narrowly defined and excludes certain critical agricultural inputs-notably, chemical fertilizers. Not until sufficient data are available to facilitate an analysis of price trends for a truly representative range of goods bought by farmers will it be possible to confirm that the price terms of trade did turn significantly against the farm sector during the second half of the 1980s.

^35. WJTJNJ 1991, p. 115.Google Scholar

^36. See WJTJNJ 1990, p. 113.Google Scholar Not since 1979 had there been such a large increase in a single year. The unwillingness of the government in the past to offset increases in the purchase prices of agricultural products by raising urban retail prices was the source of an increasingly severe drain on fiscal resources, which also constrained the ability to use price rises in order to stimulate farm production. From this point of view, the decision-effective as of 1 May 1991 – to raise the prices of rationed grain and edible oils was something of a watershed.

^37. See, for example, Jiyun, Tian in SWBGoogle Scholar, FE/1026. Official data show that market prices of grain fell by more than 18% in 1990 (cf. a decline of 6.8% for grain procurement prices): TJNJ 1991, pp. 248 and 254.Google Scholar See also Aubert, , Rural China, p. 10.Google Scholar Interestingly, Liu Zhongyi (minister of agriculture) commented in 1990 that sales and storage difficulties affecting grain indicated not a surfeit of production, but “incompatibility in the circulation field” (Roben Ash, F., “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” hereafter “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 126 (06 1991), p. 663).Google Scholar

^38. Market prices for 1980–88 can be found in State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo shangye waijing tongji ziliao, 1952–1988 (Statistical Materials Relating to China's Commerce and External Economic Relations, 1952–1988) (Beijing: State Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 399.Google Scholar Data for 1989 and 1990 are from WJTJNJ 1991, p. 93.Google Scholar It is of some interest to compare market price trends for grain with those of fresh vegetables, fish, and meat and dairy produce: the latter three categories all experienced rising prices in both the first and second halves of the 1980s, although in no case was the average annual price increase after 1985 as great as that in the grain sector. Thus:

^39. See ZGWJNJ 1991, p. 32.Google Scholar

^40. Jihua gangyao, p. 139.Google Scholar

^41. Ibid. “CCPCC 1991” also spoke of “…steadily making grain purchase prices the same as retail price during the 8FYP period.…” In this respect, State Council decisions to raise urban retail prices of grain and edible vegetable oils (May 1991 and April 1992) are important developments. No doubt the adjustments were mainly designed to reduce the increasingly serious budget deficit suffered by the state in its grain transactions in circumstances in which the gap between procurement and retail prices had widened significantly during the 1980s. Special wage and pension supplements and other subsidies in any case served to cushion the cost to urban residents and thereby dampened the impact upon their demand for grain. Nevertheless, the state's willingness to sanction such price increases has introduced an added element of flexibility into its pricing policy, which-if sustained-is quite likely to impinge upon urban demand for grain and oilseed products.

^42. That is, 10 kilograms of fertilizer for deliveries of wheat and maize; 15 kilograms for husked rice and soyabeans. See ZGWJNJ 1990, p. 44.Google Scholar

^43. Quoted by Crook, Frederick W., “China's Eighth Five Year Plan: goals and targets for the agricultural sector (Part II),” Economies in Transition Agriculture Report, Vol. 5, No. 1 (01–02 1992), p. 40.Google Scholar

^44. The State Council decision to build additional warehouses to accommodate anticipated additional grain sales was announced by Tian Jiyun in a report which he made to the 16th session of the Seventh NPC Standing Committee on 2 7 October 1990. See Ash, , “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 125 (03, 1991), pp. 192 and 202.Google Scholar Note that the novelty of the State Council's 1990 decision lay in its proposal to establish the system of special grain reserves, rather than to increase physical storage capacity. Authorization to add 20 million tonnes to the national grain storage capacity was, for example, given by the State Council in 1983. I am grateful to Professor Nicholas Lardy for pointing this out to me.

^45. See Aubert, , Rural China, p. 12.Google Scholar

^46. Ash, , “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (09 1991), pp. 663–64.Google Scholar

^47. Jiyun, Tian, 27 10 1990Google Scholar, introducing the system of special grain reserves. Quoted in Ash, , “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 125 (03 1991), p. 192.Google Scholar

^48. Ash, , “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 126, p. 664.Google Scholar

^49. See Stone, Bruce, “Developments in agricultural technology,” The China Quarterly, No. 116 (12 1988), pp. 767–822.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^50. Jihua gangyao, p. 126.Google Scholar

^51. Ibid. p. 103.

^52. See Stone, Bruce, “Developments in agricultural technology,” pp. 790–818.Google Scholar Also Kueh, Y. Y., “Fertilizer supplies and foodgrain production in China, 1952–82,” Food Policy, 08 1984.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^53. “CCPCC 1991,” p. 5.Google Scholar

^54. For example, both grain and cotton experienced a sharp fall in total output in 1985, but a sharp increase in 1990. In both cases, these changes were against the previous trends and they lend a specious impression of growth. The case of oil crops is analogous, but different: total production rose sharply in 1985 and 1990, so that a growth estimate derived from these two years understates the “true” trend.

^55. It is not of course coincidental that the targets for 1995 and 2000 were drawn up against the background of the slower growth recorded during 1986–89, rather than that of the fine 1990 harvest. There may be political advantages too in formulating conservative plans: better by far to claim the over-fulfilment of low targets than admit the under-fulfilment of high ones! In any case, notice that the 1990 bumper grain harvest owed most to the regional performance of the North and North-east. Together, they contributed two-thirds of the increase in national production during 1990 (half coming from the North-east – i.e. Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang-alone). See TJNJ 1990, p. 367Google Scholar and TJNJ 1991, p. 350.Google Scholar

^56. State Statistical Bureau (SSB), “Statistical Communiqué of the SSB of the PRC on National Economic and Social Development in 1991,” SWBGoogle Scholar, FE/W0222,18 March 1992. Estimates of total production for major agricultural products in 1991 are as follows (all in million tonnes):

^57. Jihua gangyao, p. 83 and p. 146.Google Scholar

^58. It could be that a feed deficit already exists and has been accommodated by a combination of imports, running down reserves, cutting rations and using less than efficient grain-meat conversion ratios. See Aubert, Claude, “Problems of agricultural diversification: some aspects of animal husbandry and grain utilization in China,” in Vermeer, Eduard B. (ed.), From Peasant to Entrepreneur: Growth and Change in Rural China (Pudoc: Wageningen, 03 1992), pp. 105–128.Google Scholar Elsewhere, the same author points out that consumption of grain fodder rose from 13 to 18% of total production between 1978 and 1984 and reached 25% (100 million tonnes) in 1988: “The agricultural crisis in China at the end of the 1980s” in Delman, Jorgen, Qstergaard, Clemens Stubbe and Christiansen, Flemming (eds.), Remaking Peasant China: Problems of Rural Development and Institutions at the Start of the 1990s (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), p. 25.Google Scholar

^59. It is worth recording that in July 1990, in an address to a conference on non-staple foodstuffs, Li Peng noted that “… with China's limited availability of arable land and low level of grain consumption per head, it would be impossible to raise the animal protein intake by a big margin…” (Ash, , “QCD,” The China Quarterly, No. 123 (12 1990), p. 767).Google Scholar Note too that every 1% rise in the animal protein content of human food consumption requires an extra 5 million tonnes of feed grain: see Kang, He (principal editor), Zhongguo liangshi fazhan zhanlue duice (Strategic Measures for the Development of Food Grains in China), hereafter ZGLSFZZL (Beijing: Agricultural Publishing House, 1990), p. 31.Google Scholar

^60. See Walker, Kenneth R., “40 years on: provincial contrasts in China's rural economic development,” The China Quarterly, No. 119 (09 1989), p. 472.Google Scholar

^61. This is a rough figure, Conversion ratios differ between individual meats and dairy produce and the true conversion ratio therefore depends upon the structure of meat production. See Aubert, , “Problems of agricultural diversification.”Google Scholar

^62. Aubert, , “The agricultural crisis in China at the end of the 1980s,” p. 25.Google Scholar

^63. Remember too that demand for grain for industrial processing is also likely to increase dramatically in the coming years: see Ash, , “Prospects for the grain sector: a Chinese perspective,” in Kienner, Wolfgang (ed.), Trends of Economic Development in East Asia (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989), pp. 419–431CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There exists a wide variety of estimates of grain requirements in the year 2000, ranging from 480 to 593 million tonnes! For some of the relevant evidence, see Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), Research Group for the Development of Food Grains and Crops, Economic, “Woguo liangshi he jingji zuowu de fazhan” (“A study of the development of food grains and economic crops in China”), Zhongguo nongcun fazhan zhanlue wenti (Strategic Issues Relating to China's Rural Development) (Beijing: Agricultural Scientific Publishing House, 1985)Google Scholar, hereafter CAAS, 1985, pp. 377–456Google Scholar; Jingde, Gu, “2000 nian woguo nongcun fazhan de qige da qushi” (“Seven major trends in China's rural development to the year 2000”), reprinted in Agricultural Economics, No. 5 (1985), pp. 20–23Google Scholar; Shiping, Guo, “2000 nian woguo heli shiwu jiegouliang de queding ji shengchan nengli de guji” (“Determining a rational food structure and estimating the production capacity of China in the year 2000”), Nongye xiandaihua yanjiu (Research on Agricultural Modernization), No. 3, (1985) pp. 23–26Google Scholar; Anni, Cong et al. , “Lengjing yuce nongye xingshi; shenzhong jueze zhanlue juece” (“A sober projection of the agricultural situation; a careful choice of strategic decisions”), Caizheng yanjiu (Financial Research), No. 2 (1989), pp. 34–39Google Scholar; Hong, Ma (chief editor), 2000 nian de Zhongguo (China in the Year 2000) (Beijing: China, Social Science Publishing House, 1989), pp. 206–229Google Scholar; Yu, Chen Liang and Buckwell, Allan, Chinese Grain Economy and Policy (Wallingford, Oxon: C.A.B. International, 1991).Google Scholar

^64. Paradoxically, China has been an exporter of feed products. One Chinese source highlights the irrationality of such exports through the following example: in 1987, 4.3 million tonnes of animal feed were exported. Had these supplies been used domestically, they would have raised 12.28 million pigs. These would, in turn, have yielded 861,000 tonnes of pork, which, if exported, might have earned US$7.83 million more than the value of the original feed exports. Meanwhile, the 12.28 million pigs would have generated the equivalent of 890,000 tonnes of chemical fertilizer and so raised domestic grain production by an estimated 1.96 million tonnes. If the additional foreign exchange earned through the sale of the pork were allocated to the grain sector, several extra million tonnes of cereal could have been produced! See ZGLSFZZL, p. 35.Google Scholar

^65. In a speech on 2 March 1991 at a national meeting on exchanging experience in rural economic work. See SWB, FE/1026, 21 03 1991.Google Scholar

^66. The preliminary SSB estimates of grain production and population available for 1991 indicate a per capita grain output of 375.8 kg. Given the decline in cereal production during 1991, the improvement over 1990 implied by this figure clearly reflects a fall in the rate of natural increase of China's total population.

^67. The 1978 figure is from Walker, Kenneth R., “Trends in crop production, 1978–86,” The China Quarterly, No. 116 (12 1988), Table 1, p. 595Google Scholar. The 1990 figure is given in TJNJ 1991, p. 314.Google Scholar

^68. Most Chinese sources would appear to concede the likelihood of a continuing decline in arable area during the 1990s. See, for example, CAAS, 1985, pp. 394–95; and 2000 nian de Zhongguo, pp. 230–31Google Scholar. A very recent source predicts a loss of 6.67 million hectares by the end of the century, but argues that this figure underestimates the true loss by some 50–100% because so much of the encroachment is likely to affect good-quality land. See Ziping, Wu et al. , “Bawu qijian he 2000 nian woguo nongye fazhan de chubu yuce” (“Initial projections of agricultural development during the 8FYP period and in the year 2000”), Yuce (Projections), No. 1 (1991), p. 51Google Scholar. I am grateful to Dr K. C. Yeh for bringing this article to my attention.

^69. Or by increased application of inputs, designed to raise yields per unit area.

^70. TJNJ 1991, p. 340Google Scholar. Differences between sowing and harvesting seasons of crops make it possible to obtain more than one harvest a year from a single price of land. Sown area differs from arable area by the extent to which such multiple cropping is I practised.

^71. Walker, , “Trends in crop production,” p. 594.Google Scholar

^72. In its projections for the 1990s, CAAS, 1985, p. 395Google Scholar, looked to the re-establishment of a MCI at the 1977 level of 155.

^73. CAAS, 1985, p. 446.Google Scholar

^74. Such a comparison is not altogether fair, since average sown area yields are higher in the South than in the North. Notice too that the rise in the North's MCI from 138 (1983) to 146 (1990) already constitutes an impressive achievement which will be hard to sustain.

^75. CAAS, 1985, p. 409Google Scholar, looked towards sown areas of 146.4–151.5 million hectares (1990); and 143.3–153.6 million hectares (2000).

^76. In this context, what Table 10 does not reveal is that between 1978 and 1990 the area sown to vegetables almost doubled, whilst that under green fertilizers fell by about the same proportion.

^77. CAAS, 1985, p. 409.Google Scholar

^78. The reason for the wider range of the estimates for 1996–2000 is that the nature of the underlying assumptions allows for greater variation in sown area, compared with the 8FYP period.

^79. Oi, Jean C., State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 235.Google Scholar

^80. Some aspects of agriculture's performance during 1991 suggest the wisdom of such caution!

^81. The same conclusion was reached by Kenneth Walker in 1989: see his “40 years on,” The China Quarterly, No. 119 (09 1989), p. 474.Google Scholar

^82. TJNJ 1991, p. 346.Google Scholar

^83. The contribution to the increase in total grain output of Centre, South and Southwest between the first and sixth FYP periods was 60%. That of the northern regions of China was 40%. The CAAS projections anticipated a dramatic reversal of this pattern, the northern provinces accounting for 52% of the expected rise in total grain production between 1982 and 2000, compared with only 48% from central and southern regions. See Ash, , “Prospects for China's grain sector,” p. 427.Google Scholar

^84. This statement follows Kenneth R. Walker in assuming that basic self-sufficiency may be defined in terms of levels of per capita grain output between 275 and 309 kilograms. See Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 3.Google Scholar

^85. An average per capita grain production of 400 kilograms or above is my benchmark in making this statement. This is a figure which has acquired almost talismanic status in China in recent years-although it is noticeable that 8FYP and 10YP targets imply levels that fall below it. See ZGLSFZZL, pp. 30–31Google Scholar. It is worth recording that an average per capita grain output of 400 kg. was achieved in the United States and developed European countries some 50–60 years ago. Current levels in these countries are typically in excess of 750kg.-and over 1,500kg. in Canada, Australia and the United States.

^86. In 1990 average per capita grain production in the North-east rose by 46% (from 400.1 kg.). The point has already been made that the fine 1990 harvest owed most by far to the performance of this single region.

^87. But again notice that in 1990 alone, average per capita grain output in the Northwest rose by 13.7%. Can this too be sustained?

^88. By 2.4% and 3.2% respectively.

^89. For the former, overfulfilment of targets by 29.6–34.4% and 17.7–30.6%; for the latter, underfulfilment by 7.1–10.8% and 12.7–20.6%.

^90. These figures are obtained by multiplying the projected national average per capita estimates given in CAAS by total populations of 1,294.56 and 1,326.88 million (these, in turn, derived from 1990 population by applying average rates of natural increase of 1.25% and 1.5% p.a.).