¹ Ch'en, Jerome, “Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference,” The China Quarterly, No. 40 (October–December 1969), pp. 1–38.Google Scholar

² Ibid. p. 35.

³ Ibid. pp. 34–35.

⁴ All these articles were published in the review Ke-ming yü chan-cheng (Revolution and War). This review, dedicated exclusively to military problems, appeared in two separate editions. The first was published in Juichin by the General Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Two issues of this edition, printed in August 1932 at the time of the Ningtu Conference, are on file in the Ch'en Ch'eng Collection. The second edition was published by the Military Revolutionary Commission of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The first issue of the second edition appeared in November 1933 and the ninth issue, probably the last, in September 1934. Hua Fu's articles can be found in the second edition of this review (Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8). Curiously, Hsiao Tso-liang, in the bibliography of his Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), p. 371, cites only the first edition of Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, but does not mention the existence of the second.Google Scholar

⁵ En-lai, Chou, “Tsai ch'üan-kuo cheng-chih kung-tso hui-i shang ti pao-kao” (“Report at the National Political Work Conference”), Hung-hsing (Red Star), No. 29 (18 February 1934), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

⁶ See Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao (A Draft History of the CCP) (Taipei, 1965), Vol. II, p. 712.Google Scholar

⁷ En-lai, Chou, “Wu-tz'u chan-i chung wo-men ti sheng-li—Lun ch'ih-chiu-chan” (“Our Victory in the 5th Campaign—On protracted war”), Hung-hsing, No. 33 (18 March 1934), pp. 1–3.Google Scholar

⁸ This “encumbering rear system” was to become later the target of Mao's criticism. See his Selected Works (Chinese edition, Peking, 1966), pp. 185 and 200.Google Scholar

⁹ Hung-hsing, No. 33 (18 March 1934), p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Fu, Hua, “Ke-ming chan-cheng ti p'o-ch'ieh wen-t'i” (“An urgent problem of the revolutionary war”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 2 (April 1934), pp. 1–5. The exact date of publication of this issue is not indicated. But we may suppose that it was printed in the beginning of April because the third issue of the review came out on 20 April and the fourth issue on 18 May.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid. pp. 2–3.

¹² Ibid. p. 3.

¹³ Fu, Hua, “Lun hung-chün tsai pao-lei chu-i hsia ti chan-shu” (“On the tactics of the Red Army in the block-house war”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 3 (20 April 1934), pp. 1–9Google Scholar. This article has been reproduced in extenso in the Ch'ih-fei fan-tung wen-chien hui-pien (A Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents), compiled under the sponsorship of General Ch'en Ch'eng (n.p., June 1935), Vol. VI, pp. 1852–1859.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁵ En-lai, Chou, “Wei t'u-ti, wei tzu-yu, wei su-wei-ai cheng-ch'üan chan-tou tao ti!” (“Fight to the end for territory, for freedom, and for the Soviet regime!”), Hung-hsing, No. 39 (29 April 1934), p. 1. Article written on 27 April.Google Scholar

¹⁶ En-lai, Chou, “Kuangch'ang sui-jan hsien-luo liao, wo-men wo-lun ju-ho yao fen-sui ti-jen!” (“Although Kuangch'ang has fallen, we must smash the enemy at all costs!”), Hung-hsing, No. 40 (5 May 1934), pp. 1–2. Article written on 30 April.Google Scholar

¹⁷ En-lai, Chou, “Chi-nien pa-i, wo-men yao hsiao-mieh ti-jen tsai su-ch'ü men-nei, yao wa-chie ti-jen tsai ta-men ti pei-hou!” (“In celebrating 1 August, we must annihilate the enemy within the Soviet Zone and destroy them within their own base areas!”), Hung-hsing, No. 53 (15 July 1934), p. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Fu, Hua, “Fan-tui chü-chieh wo-men ti chan-shu” (“Combat all misinterpretations of our tactics”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 4 (18 May 1934), pp. 1–7.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 5.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 5.

²¹ Ibid. p. 7.

²² The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 8.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid. point 9.

²⁴ Fu, Hua, “Tsai-lun chan-shu yüan-tse” (“More on the principles of our tactics”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 4 (18 May 1934), pp. 8–13.Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁶ En-lai, Chou, “Hsin ti hsing-shih yü hsin ti sheng-li” (“A new situation and a new victory”), Hung-hsing, No. 60 (20 August 1934), pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Teh, Chu, “I-ko chih-ch'eng-tien ho tuan-t'su t'u-chi ti chan-li” (“A case of defending a fortified post and of launching a short, swift thrust”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 9 (10 September 1934), pp. 7–14.Google Scholar

²⁸ See P'eng Teh-huai, “Kei mou shih-chang ti hsin” (“Letter to a Division commander”), Ibid. pp. 1–6. P'eng especially supports in this article Hua Fu's idea of wresting victory in every battle to open the door to a victory in campaigns.

²⁹ This Maoist strategy was to be developed later, particularly in Mao's articles of December 1936 and April 1945: “Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War” and “Resolution on Some Historical Problems.”Google Scholar

³⁰ The “pure defence line” was precisely what Mao himself had been criticized for by Chou En-lai and other leaders of the Central Committee in the course of the 4th Encirclement Campaign and during the fight against the Lo Ming line.Google Scholar

³¹ See Yi, Ch'en, “I-ko chih-ch'eng-tien shou-pei-tui ti chiao-hsun” (“Lessons drawn by units assuring the defence of fortified posts”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 4 (18 May 1934), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

³² The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 8.Google Scholar

³³ Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, Nos. 2, 3, 4.Google Scholar

³⁴ The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 11.Google Scholar

³⁵ After the Tsunyi Conference, concern to conceal the fact that a foreigner had played so considerable a role in China's revolutionary war probably constitutes one of the reasons for the non-diffusion of the Tsunyi Resolutions to the public at large. One can also point out that one of the principal differences between the Tsunyi Resolutions and the “Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War” or the “Resolution on Some Historical Problems” turns out to be the fact that Hua Fu's name has completely disappeared from the latter two documents, although allusions to the tactic of short, swift thrusts remain.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 180.Google Scholar

³⁷ According to KMT sources, Li Teh arrived in the Kiangsi Soviet in the second half of August 1933 by way of Fukien. See Chiao-fei chan-shih (History of the Extermination War against the Bandits) (Taipei, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 253–254.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Hua-lun, Kuo, “Wu-tz'u wei-chiao yü su-ch'ü hung-chün ti shih-pai” (“The 5th Encirclement Campaign and the defeat of the Red Army of the Soviet areas”), Fei-ch'ing yüeh-pao (Communist Affairs Monthly) (Taipei), Vol. X, No. 6 (July 1967), p. 102.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Wales, Nym, in Snow, Helen, Red Dust (Stanford, Calif., 1952), p. 67.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 11.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See the comment by Heinzig, Dieter on Otto Braun and the Tsunyi Conference in The China Quarterly, No. 42 (April–June 1970), pp. 131–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

The publication of Otto Braun's China memoirs came to my knowledge only after I had finished this article. It was then too late for me to make full use of this new source which certainly deserves a careful study. Nevertheless, several footnotes have been added to this article to take into account some of the most important items of Braun's statements on the Tsunyi Conference.Google Scholar

⁴² Kung Ch'u maintains that, in August 1933, his membership in the CCP was suspended for six months by Chou En-lai, in the presence of Li Teh. See Ch'u, Kung, Wo yü hung-chün (The Red Army and I) (Hong Kong, 1954), pp. 378–381.Google ScholarChou En-lai himself affirmed in 1936 that it was Li Teh who had persuaded the CCP not to co-operate with the Fukien rebels. See Edgar Snow, Random Notes on China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 60.Google Scholar

⁴³ Sometimes this name is written Li T'eh. It makes sense to suppose that the name Li Teh, which means Li the Virtuous or more modestly Li the German, must have been chosen by Otto Braun himself. The name Li T'eh, which means Li the Special Agent (in the pejorative sense of the term) was no doubt given to the Comintern's agent by those Chinese Communists who did not appreciate his presence. One may note in addition that the name Hua Fu means “Chinese man,” a perfect pseudonym for a foreigner!Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Judged by a military court presided by Ho Shu-heng, Tung Pi-wu and Ho Chang-kung, Hsiao Ching-kuang, Commander of the Minkan (Fukien-Kiangsi) Military Area, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Chou En-lai himself presented both the oral and the written statements of the accusation.Google ScholarSee Chou's, article in Tou-cheng (Struggle), No. 38, (12 December 1933) pp. 3–5;Google Scholar see also the items published in Hung-hsing, No. 22 (31 December 1933), p. 2 and in Hung-se chung-hua (Red China), No. 143 (13 January 1934), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Mao's name is never mentioned in the official accounts of the conference.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Hung-hsing, No. 33 (18 March 1934), p. 1.Google ScholarSee also Tso-liang, Hsiao, Power Relations, pp. 284–285.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The simultaneous existence in the Chinese Soviet Republic of two Communist organs bearing the name of Military Commission has created a lot of confusion. The first of these organs is the Military Revolutionary Commission of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. It was founded after the First National Soviet Congress. Its members were named by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Originally, its composition was the following:—Chairman: Chu Teh; Vice-Chairmen: Wang Chia-hsiang and P'eng Teh-huai; members: Lin Piao, T'an Chen-lin, Yeh Chien-ying, K'ung Ho-ch'ung, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Shao Shih-p'ing, Ho Lung, Mao Tse-tung, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Kuan Hsiang-ying, Wang Sheng-jung (Hung-se chung-hua, No. 2 (18 December 1931), p. 4). After the 4th Encirclement Campaign, in May 1933, two additional members were named by the Council of People's Commissars: Hsiang Ying and Po Ku. Hsiang Ying was nominated Chairman ad interim (Hung-se chung-hua, No. 78 (11 May 1933), p. 1). After the Second National Soviet Congress, Chu Teh was re-elected Chairman; Chou En-lai replaced P'eng Teh-huai as Vice-Chairman while Wang Chia-hsiang retained his post (Hung-se chung-hua, No. 148 (12 February 1934), p. 1). In the Kiangsi period, when one spoke of the Military Commission, the term always referred to this organ attached to the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. And it was the work of this Commission, according to the Tsunyi Resolutions, that Hua Fu had monopolized.Google ScholarThe other Military Commission is the Military Revolutionary Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP, headed by Chou En-lai. During the entire Kiangsi period, and even during the first stage of the Long March, this Commission was completely put aside and it was only at the Tsunyi Conference that it emerged again. Mao then replaced Chou En-lai at the head of this Commission. Throughout the Long March, Chou kept the title of Vice-Chairman (See Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, Vol. 11, pp. 29–51), not of the Military Revolutionary Commission of the Central Committee, but of the Military Revolutionary Commission of a Soviet Republic which had already ceased to exist.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 2 (April 1934).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ibid. No. 8 (15 August 1934).

⁵⁰ See Fu, Hua, “Tuan-t'su t'u-chi ti chan-li” (“Examples of short, swift thrusts”), Ke-ming yü chan-cheng, No. 7 (25 July 1934), pp. 1–10. This article gives an eye-witness account of these two battles and furnishes topographical details of the battle-grounds. The troop movements are described hour by hour.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, Vol. 14, pp. 55, 57, 63–68.Google Scholar

⁵² See the telegram sent by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Red Army in care of Chou En-lai (Hung-se chung-hua, No. 58 (6 March 1933), p. 2).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, Vol. 11, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid. pp. 29–31.

⁵⁵ For further evidence indicating Li Teh's presence at the Conference, see the comment by MacFarquhar, Roderick in The China Quarterly, No. 41 (January–March 1970), p. 113.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ This affirmation is in accordance with Otto Braun's report on the Tsunyi Conference. See Heinzig, Dieter, The China Quarterly, No. 42, p. 132.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ch'en, Jerome, relying on information given by a Red Guard newspaper and Hatano Kenichi, names 18 participants in the Conference and discusses their factional alignment. (The China Quarterly, No. 40, pp. 18–20.)Google ScholarKuo Hua-Iun, basing himself on Ch'en Jan's report, gives a list of 19 persons who attended the Conference (see his article “Tsun-yi hui-i” (“The Tsunyi Conference”) in Fei-ch'ing yüeh-pao, Vol. X, No. 7). Only 12 names on the first list reappear on the second. As for Otto Braun, he asserts that the number of participants was 35–40, mainly military leaders (Dieter Heinzig, The China Quarterly, No. 42, p. 132). The figure given by Braun seems to be more reliable than the two others not only because Braun's presence at the Conference can be taken for granted, but also because the number 35–40 more becomes an enlarged meeting of the Politburo than the scant total of 18 or 19. Furthermore, if Jerome Ch'en or Kuo Hua-lun is to be believed, only about half of the participants in the Tsunyi Conference were military leaders. If one takes into consideration the context in which the Conference took place, one would be tempted to side with Braun who, in his description of the composition of the Conference, stresses the numerical predominance of military commanders.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ This proposition is implicitly confirmed by Otto Braun who considers the success of Mao to be a result of the composition of the Conference and of the preparatory work done by Mao and his followers. See Dieter Heinzig, The China Quarterly, No. 42, p. 132.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 12.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ According to Otto Braun, Chou En-lai, severely attacked by Mao at the Tsunyi Conference, finally came over to Mao's line, while Liu Po-ch'eng and P'eng Teh-huai intentionally kept to themselves. See Dieter Heinzig, The China Quarterly, No. 42, p. 132.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The Tsunyi Resolutions, point 13.Google Scholar

⁶² Among the “prisoners” was Fang Ch'iang, the political commissar of the 22nd Division of the Red Army in 1934. See his article, “Mao-chu-hsi tao nan-hsien ti i-chien shih-shih” (“The historical truth about Chairman Mao's visit to the southern front”), Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, Vol. 11, pp. 77–85. Fang Ch'iang was to become, in September 1963, Minister of the 6th Ministry of Machine-building Industry of the People's Republic of China.Google Scholar

⁶³ See Wen-hua, Mo, “T'an-t'an Tsunyi hui-i” (“Let's talk about the Tsunyi Conference”), Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, Vol. 14, p. 100.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ The Tsunyi Resolutions (point 11) acknowledge that, during the first three months of the Long March, the reduction of Red Army forces due to desertion “reached an unprecedented rate.”Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See, for instance, Tseng Jih-san's article “Tang tsai hung-chün chung ti tsui-chin tsu-chih jen-wu” (“Recent tasks of Party organization in the Red Army”), Cheng-chih sheng-huo (Political Life), No. 3 (April 1932), pp. 9–15.Google Scholar