^1. For background on rectification see Lowell Dittmer, “Party rectification in post-Mao China” (paper presented to the 13th Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, June 1984). See also the text of the rectification decision in Xinhua (12 October 1983), Foreign Broadcast Information Service – Daily Report China (FBIS-CHI), 13 October 1983, pp. K2–7. For a discussion of the doctrine and process of rectification in Communist Chinese history see Frederick, Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–1965 (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1979), pp. 1101.Google Scholar

^2. I hesitate to use the term “leftist” at this point largely for three reasons. First, the term is relatively undefined in the western literature on the PLA. Secondly, the empirical evidence, as scattered as it is, suggests that oppositionist behaviour by “leftists” tends to come in fits and starts, and does not indicate a consistent, purposeful, or organized pattern of across-the-board ideological resistance. The oppositionists are willing to live with some Dengist policies more than others. And finally, the term is a pejorative one used by the Dengists to describe a wide variety of oppositionist behaviour ranging from ultra-individualism and the lack of discipline to the allegiance to ultra-collectivist notions.

^3. For a general discussion of the problems of military opposition to Deng's agenda see McMillen, Donald H., “China's political battlefront: Deng Xiaoping and the military” (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 57, Australian National University, 05 1982)Google ScholarNethercut, Richard D., “Deng and the gun: Partymilitary relations in the People's Republic of China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 8 (08 1982), pp. 691–704;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ellis, Joffe, “Party and military in China: professionalism in command,” Problems of Communism, 10 1983, pp. 56–63.Google Scholar For the PLA-as-Dengist-model argument see Bullard, Monte R. and O'Dowd, Edward C., “Denning the role of the PLA in the post-Mao Era,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 6 (06 1986), pp. 706–720.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^4. Yu, Qiuli, “Making a success of Party rectification is of vital significance to the building of the people's army,” Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 29 11 1983;Google Scholar in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts: Part III BBC-Far East (SWB/FE) 7507/BII/6. See also Hu Yaobang's remarks made in the Shenyang MR in May 1984, “Kefu zhuguanzhuyi he zhengceshang ‘zuo’ de canyu” (“Overcome subjectivism and remnant ‘leftist’ tendencies in policy”), Renmin ribao, 20 May 1984, and Deng Xiaoping's comments in 1981 “We must work hard to make the PLA a model in thoroughly implementing the Party's line, principles and policies,” cited in Wang Tao, Cong san zhong quan hui dao shi er da (chugao) “From the Third Plenum to the 12th Congress (draft)” (Beijing, 1984), p. 37.

^5. Cited in Zhong, Yi, “Xi gongjun di er qi ‘zhengdang’ gongzuo” (“An analysis of the work on the second stage of Party rectification in the communist military”), Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies in Chinese Communism) (12 1985), p. 43.Google Scholar See also Yang, Shangkun, “Jianshe you Zhongguo tese de xiandaihua jundui” (“Build a modern army with Chinese characteristics”), Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 15 (08 1985), p. 8;Google Scholar and Richard, Baum, “China in 1985,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1 (01 1986), p. 37.Google Scholar

⁶ . For examples of the PLA “taking the lead” see the notice from the Central Rectification Guidance Commission of March 1984, “Daitou kaizhan tanxin huodong, nuli zucheng minzhu qifen” (“Take the lead in launching ‘heart to heart’ talks, work hard to create a democratic atmosphere”), Renmin ribao, 9 March 1984; the commendation from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, “Jiefangjun quanjun jiben shazhu zhufengfang jianfang zhong de waifeng” (“The entire PLA has basically exterminated the unhealthy practice of occupying or building extra living space”), Renmin ribao, 12 November 1984; the DIC's commendation, evidently at Chen Yun's urging, of a PLA corps‘ model for dealing with lower-level deception, “Jianjue xiuzheng nongxuzuojia zuobiaomian wenzhang de huai zuofeng” (“Resolutely rectify the bad work-style of ‘resorting to deception’ and ‘paying only lip service’”), Renmin ribao, 18 November 1984; and “Jundui zhengdang yiding yao jianchi gao biaozhun, gao zhilian” (“Rectification in the military must uphold high standards and high quality”), Renmin ribao, 21 August 1984.

^7. See Yu Qiuli's remarks to a MAC meeting in November 1984, Xinhua (3 November 1984); in SWB FE/7793/BII/1, 6 November 1984; “Dui di er qi zhengdang dangwei shixing fenlei zhidao” (“Implement guidelines for the classification of second stage Party rectification units”), Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985; and the circular from the All-Army Party Rectification Guidance Office, Beijing Domestic Service (BDS)(25 June 1985), FBIS-CHI, 26 June 1985, p. K3.

^8. See Zhong, Yi, “An analysis of the work,” p. 36.Google Scholar

^9. Ibid. p. 40.

^10. “Lianxi shijian chongxin xuexi ‘fandui ziyouzhuyi,’ duanzheng renshi renzhen kaizhan piping yu ziwopiping” (“Link up with reality, restudy ‘Oppose Liberalism,’ correct one's understanding, conscientiously launch criticism and self-criticism”), Renmin ribao, 11 November 1983).

^11. See Xinhua, 3 November 1984; in SWB FE/7793/BII/l, 6 November 1984.

^12. See BDS, 30 March 1985; in FBIS-CHI, 1 April 1985, p. Kl.

^13. On the structure and functions of the DIC system see Graham, Young, “Control and style: discipline inspection commissions since the 11th Congress,” The China Quarterly, No. 97 (03 1984), pp. 24–52Google Scholar See also Wang, Tao, From the Third Plenum, p. 293 and SWB FE/77793/BII/4, 5 November 1984.Google Scholar

^14. For a description of the political commissar system see Monte, Bullard, China's Political-Military Evolution: The Party and the Military in the PRC, 1960–1984 (Boulder Col.: Westview Press 1985), pp. 78–82.Google Scholar

^15. Dittmer, , “Party rectification,” p. 9.Google Scholar

^16. “Zhongyang junwei paichu di yi pi zhengdang lianluo xiaozu” (“The MAC dispatches the first group of Party rectification liaison groups”), Renmin ribao, 21 02 1984.Google Scholar

^17. Zhong, Yi, “An analysis of the work,” p. 40;Google Scholar and “Choudiao ganbu bangzhu jiceng gaohao junzheng xunlian” (“Transfer cadres to help basic levels carry out military practice well”), Renmin ribao, 26 01 1985.Google Scholar

^18. Zai zhengdangzhong zhuanbian jiguan zuofeng (“Transform the work-style of leading organs in the process of Party rectification”), Renmin ribao, 5 March 1985.

^19. See Yang Shangkun's speech to members of investigation and study groups, Ming Pao, 23 January 1985; in FBIS-CHI, 23 January 1985, p. W1.

²⁰ “Implement guidelines,” Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985.

^21. For information on the liaison groups see, “The MAC dispatches the first group,” Renmin ribao, 21 February 1984; Nanfang ribao (Nanfang Daily), 9 November 1984, SWB FE/7799/BII/2, 13 November 1984, and “Wulun ruhe bu neng gao ‘zuo’ de yi tao” (“Under no circumstances may ‘leftist’ policies be carried out”), Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), in Renmin Daxue, Fuyin baokan ziliao–junshi (People's University, Duplicated Periodical Materials–Military affairs), No. 1 (1985), p. 33.

^22. Xinhua, 5 January 1986; in SWB FE/8151/BII/1–2, 8 January 1986.

^23. Ibid. p. 1.

^24. “Actively take part in Party rectification with a high degree of consciousness,” Jiefangjun bao, 28 November 1983, in SWB FE/7505/BII/2–3, 1 December 1983; and “Tigao dangyuan guanxin quanxin quanyi wei renmin fuwo de juewu” (“Raise Party members’ consciousness of wholeheartedly serving the people”), Renmin ribao, 15 March 1985.

^25. “Gao zhiliangde gaohao quanjun di er qi zhengdang gongzuo” (“Carry through work on the second stage of Party rectification in the army at a high standard”), Renmin ribao, 4 November 1984.

^26. “Shenru jiceng diaocha yanjiu yindao ganbu gaige chuangxin” (“Go down to basic levels, investigate and research, blaze new trails in cadre reform”), Renmin ribao, 21 January 1985.

^27. See Johnston, Alastair I., “Changing Party-army relations in China, 1979–1984,” Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 10 (10 1984), p. 1030.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^28. See supra fn. 3.

^29. See, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun liandui zhengzhi zhidaoyuan gongzuo tiaoli” (“Regulations concerning the work of political commissars at the company level of the PLA”) (August 1978), Art. 2; and “Zhongguo gongchandang liandui zhibu gongzuo tiaoli” (“Regulations concerning the work of company level branches of the CCP”) (August 1978).

³⁰ . Political work now includes studying the documents of the Third Plenum and the 12th Congress, adjusting leadership organs, studying science, technology and culture, developing socialist spiritual civilization activities, and improving leadership workstyle. See “Renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fayang chuantong kaituo qianjin” (“The PLA's political work carries forward traditions, and makes big strides”), Renmin ribao, 1 February 1984.

^31. See Ming, Pao, 31 December 1985, in SWB FE/78146/BII/6; Renmin ribao, 4 June 1985, in FBIS–CHI, 12 June 1985, p. K18; and BDS, 9 November 1984, in SWB FE/7799/BII/l, 13 November 1984.Google Scholar

^32. “Kongjun dangwei zhuzhong dui dangyuan jinxing dangxing jiaoyu” (“The PLAAF Party committee pays close attention to carrying out education on Party spirit among Party members”), Renmin ribao, 26 January 1985. See also Zhong, Yi, “An analysis of the work,” p. 38.Google Scholar

^33. These figures are based on conversations with various PLA soldiers in Beijing and Xinjiang.

^34. See the MAC decision, “Work system for developing Party members in the ranks,” in “Dui Deng pai zhengjun celue zhi fenxi” (“An analysis of the Deng faction's tactics for rectifying the army”), Zhonggong yanjiu (June 1985), p. 78. One former soldier in Shanghai told me this figure is now as low as 12% in some units. For a discussion of the problems of rush entrance into the Party see the speech by Shi Jinqian of the GPD, (January 1981) in Guanyujiceng yufang zhengzhi shigu gongzuo deji xiang guiding (Several Decisions Concerning Work on the Prevention of Political Incidents at Basic Levels), PLA GPD Document No. 7 (1981) reprinted in Zhonggong yanjiu, Vol. 17, No. 2 (15 February 1983), pp. 120, 123.

³⁵ . Ming, Pao, 23 January 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 23 January 1985, pp. W-2.Google Scholar

^36. “Muqian zhengdang zhongxin renwu shi rezhen xuexi wenjian” (“Presently the central task of Party rectification is to earnestly study the documents”), Renmin ribao, 9 November 1983.

^37. Deng, Xiaoping, “Jundui yao fucong zhengge guojia jianshe daju” (“The army must subordinate itself to the construction of the entire country”) in Jianshe you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi (Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics) (Beijing, 1984), pp. 69–72.Google Scholar

^38. Xinhua, 30 November 1983; in SWB FE/15X l/BII/4, 8 December 1983.

^39. It is not clear how wide-spread this leave restriction was. It appears to have applied only to those units that were the key targets for rectification. The Kunming MR also prohibited Party members in first stage rectification units from taking leave, possibly to prevent individuals from avoiding criticism or investigations. Kunming Yunnan provincial service, 5 August 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 9 August 1984, p. Q6.

^40. “Haijun kaishi chuxian bianzheng biangai xinjumian” (“A new phase of rectification and correction appears in the navy”), Renmin ribao, 3 March 1984. Fora detailed example of “comparison and investigation” see Zhang, Tingfa, “High and strict demands are indispensable in the‘comparison and examination’ stage of Party rectification,“ in Renmin ribao, 10 July 1984; in FBIS, 16 July 1984, pp. K4–6.Google Scholar

^41. “Take the lead,” Renmin ribao, 9 March 1984.

^42. Ibid.

^43. Renmin, ribao, 4 June 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 12 June 1985, p. K16.Google Scholar

^44. “Jizhong yiduan shijian shenru zhenggai” (“Concentrate a period of time on delving into rectification and correction”), Renmin ribao, 29 June 1984.

^45. ‘“Gao biaozhun gaozhiliang wancheng zhenggai renwu” (“With high standards and high quality, complete the tasks of rectification and correction”), Renmin ribao, 9 October 1984. See also “Zai zhenggai zhong jianli jianquan ganbu ganwei zerenzhi” (“In the process of rectification and correction, build and perfect a responsibility system for cadre positions”), Renmin ribao1, 10 November 1985.

^46. See the reports from the Wuhan MR, “Caiqu cuoshi gaobiaozhun wancheng zhengdang renwu” (“Adopt measures to complete the tasks of rectification at a high standard”), Remin ribao, 4 December 1984; and from the Guangzhou MR, “Guangzhou junqu dangwei he lingdao jiguan zhuaji luoshi zhenggai cuoshi” (“Guangzhou MR Party committee and leading offices grasp measures to implement rectification and correction”), Renmin ribao, 23 December 1984.

^47. See Nanfang, ribao (9 November 1984); in SWB FE/77799/BII/2, 3 November 1984.Google Scholar

^48. Jinan Shandong provincial service, 19 January 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 23 January 1985, p. O2.

^49. See Guanyu, jiceng yufang, Zhonggong, yanjiu, Vol. 17, No. 2(15 02 1983).Google Scholar

^50. Lanzhou Gansu provincial service, 11 November 1983; in SWB FE/7494/BII/3, 18 November 1983.

^51. See Yu Qiuli's remarks in “Yange zhangwo zhengce jiexian, zhengque jinxing qinggchu jingshenwuran gongzuo” (“Strictly adhere to the boundaries of policy, correctly carry out the eradication of spiritual pollution”), Renmin ribao, 24 December 1983.

^52. “Qingchu jingshenwuran cujin shehui fengqi genben haozhuan” (“Eradicate spiritual pollution, promote a fundamental turn for the better in social atmosphere”), Renmin ribao, 17 November 1983.

^53. This debate in the PLA played out the main lines of debate over the spiritual pollution campaign in the Party as a whole. Indeed, Yu Qiuli's remarks in December 1983 on strictly limiting the scope of the campaign, and criticizing those who wanted to turn it into a mass campaign, was commended and circulated by the Central Committee's Rectification Guidance Commission to all Party organs. See “Strictly adhere to the boundaries,” Renmin ribao, 24 December 1983. On the education and training reform forum, see Xinhua, 20 November 1983; in SWB FE/7498/BII/l–3, 23 November 1983.

^54. “Dizhi jingshenwuran he jiaqiang lilun jiaoyu” (“Resist spiritual pollution, strengthen theoretical education”), Jiefangjun bao, 28 January 1984.

^55. Yang, Shangkun, “Build a modern army,” p. 7.Google Scholar

^56. See “Implement guidelines,” Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985; and “Conglilun dao shijian chedi fouding wenge” (“From theory to practice thoroughly negate the Cultural Revolution”), Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984.

^57. Li's reasons for writing the article are obscure. In a comment on an article Li wrote criticizing “leftism” exactly a year earlier, Ellis Joffe suggests that Li was in fact conducting a self-criticism. This indicated that at that time Deng's battle against “leftist” had gained considerable ground. Li Desheng, “Continue to eliminate ‘leftist’ ideological influence, strive to create a new phase of armed forces building,” Renmin ribao, 13 April 1983; in FBIS–CHI, 14 April 1983, pp. K1–5; and Joffe, “Party and military,” pp. 62–63. It may have been, however, that Li was simply trying to divert attention from his “leftist” past for reasons of personal political survival. Certainly Li's second article might be seen in this light. The 1984 critique of the “left” came shortly after extensive public exposure of corruption in a tank division under Li's command. The incident involved cadres in the division Party committee, at a level high enough that Li was likely aware of the problem, and possibly knew the players personally. Other reports suggested, as well, that Shenyang was a key target of rectification. The 1984 critique therefore may have been designed to take some of the attention off himself and the MR Party committee, of which he was first secretary. See Johnston, “Party-army relations,” p. 1030. He followed this piece with another politically correct denunciation of the Cultural Revolution in October 1984. If Li's 1983 article was a self-criticism that indicated Deng had turned the tide against the “left” in the PLA, then two follow-up self-criticisms would seem to be over-kill. In fact, the October piece came in the midst of a stepped-up campaign against “leftism” in the PLA. Li Desheng, “Chedi fouding ‘wenge’ de yige zhongyao wenti” (“A critical question in the thorough negation of the Cultural Revolution”), Renmin ribao, 9 October 1984.

^58. Li, Desheng, “Persistently seeking truth from facts is the key to unifying the thinking of the whole Party,” Renmin ribao, 30 04 1984;Google Scholar in FBIS–CHI, 30 April 1984, p. K8.

^59. An ex-soldier who is related to a senior PLA officer told me that most of the PLA oppositionists are of this latter type. Ideology is an excuse not a real point of contention.

^60. Li, Desheng, “Persistently seeking truth from facts,” p. K11.Google Scholar

^61. Jinan Shandong PS, 9 May 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 10 August 1984, pp. Q2–3.

^62. “From theory to practice,” Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984. “Emphasis added.”

^63. See Kunming, Yunnan PS, 19 April 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 23 April 1984, pp. Q1–2, and Renmin ribao, 30 April 1984; FBIS–CHI, 3 May 1984, p.Q2.Google Scholar

^64. “From theory to practice,” Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984. The CCP Rectification Guidance Commission noted the importance of this work in the PLA and commended it to all Party first and second stage rectification units in a note attached to the Renmin ribao editorial. See also, “Concentrate a period of time,” 29 June 1984; and “Zai zhengdangzhong tigao renshi nengli” (“Raise levels of knowledge during Party rectification”), Jiefangjun bao, 13 August 1984; in Fuyin boakan ziliao, No. 8 (1984), p. 35.

^65. See “Zhuoyan yu zongjiejingyanjiaoxun” (“Focus attention on summarizing the lessons of experience”), Jiefangjun bao editorial (18 May 1984) reprinted in Renmin ribao (20 May 1984); and Li, Desheng, “A critical question,” Renmin ribao, 9 10 1984. Despite this pressure, there seems to have been continued debate into the summer of 1984 in the pages of Jiefangjun bao over whether “leftist” or rightist deviations ought to have been the main targets of political work in the PLA. See Yang Guoqing, “ Tuchuzhengzhi’ bixu chedi fouding” (“ ‘Putting politics above everything’ must be completely negated”), Jiefangjun bao, 10 July 1984, Fuyin baokan ziliao, No. 7 (1984), p. 19.Google Scholar

^66. Sichuan, ribao, (24 May 1984); in FBIS–CHI, 8 June 1984, pp. Q1–2.Google Scholar

^67. See supra, fn. 65 and “From theory to practice,” Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984.

^68. “Focus attention,” Jiefangjun bao, 18 May 1984.

^69. “From theory to practice,” Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984.

^70. Ibid.

^71. On the Shenyang MR see Xinhua, 6 January 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 6 January 1985, pp. K24–27. On the Xinjiang MR see Urumqi Xinjiang service, 11 January 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 15 January 1985, pT4. On the Nanjing MR see, “Nanjing junqu dangwei daitou gaohao junzheng junmin tuanjie” (“The Nanjing MR Party committee takes the lead in developing army-government and army-people unity well”), Renmin ribao, 19 December 1984.

^72. “From theory to practice,” Renmin ribao, 15 December 1984.

^73. Some border on the absurd. In the Shenyang MR, for example, after a rectification directive to cut down on the length and expense of meetings was communicated to the appropriate cadres, a meeting on PLA reforestation work was reduced from its proposed length of five days to a telephone conference lasting 27 minutes. “Renzhen jiejue qunzhong zui you yijian de ‘laodanan’ wenti” (“Earnestly resolve those old, persistent problems about which the massed are concerned”), Jiefangjun bao, 27 January 1984.

^74. “Mianxiang jiceng fuwu shangmen guanxin zhanshi reqing zhoudao” (“Cater to the needs of the basic levels, drop in and provide good service, concern yourself with officers and soldiers, and offer good service”), Renmin ribao, 8 December 1984.

⁷⁵ . “Transform the work-style,” Renmin ribao, 5 March 1985.

^76. “Modi zhu jun dangwei zhiding gaizheng cuoshi” (“A certain corp Party committee formulates corrective methods”), Renmin ribao, 18 November 1984.

^77. Interestingly, one prominent case of housing corruption involved two members of the Standing Committee of the Shenyang MR Party committee–individuals whom Li Desheng must have known personally. The press reported that children of these two officials had been illegally occupying a residence for officers for a few years. When the “masses” complained the two cadres investigated and ordered their children to vacate the space. Note that the cadres did not take the initiative to oust their offspring (nor evidently did Li) even though they had been living there for some time. This was another in a series of embarrassing exposes of Li's MR. (See “Shenyang junqu dangwei zai zhengdangzhong renzhen chachu buzhengszhifeng” (“The Shenyang MR Party committee earnestly roots out unhealthy tendencies during the course of Party rectification”), Renmin ribao, 27 November 1984).

^78. “The entire PLA,” Renmin ribao, 12 November 1984.

^79. “Guard against new unhealthy trends,” Jiefangjun bao commentator, 6 December 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 10 December 1984, p. K5.

^80. “Piping yixie danwei yong gongkuan qingke songli” (“Criticize certain units for using public funds to feast guests and give presents”), Renmin ribao, 21 January 1984.

^81. See “Fujian junqu zhizhi feifa jingshang huodong” (“The Fujian MR curbs illegal commercial activities”), 3 February 1985 and “Guangzhou MR Party committee,” Renmin ribao, 23 December 1984.

^82. See Hu Yaobang's speech, “Zhongyang jiguan yao zuo quan guo de biaoshuai (”The central leading organs must serve as examples for the entire country“), Renmin ribao, 11 January 1986.

^83. Ming, Pao, 26 February 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 26 February 1986.Google Scholar

^84. Cited in BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 14 January 1986, p. K12.

^85. “Lizheng jinnian shixian jundui dangfeng genben haozhuan” (“Strive to realize this year a fundamental turn for the better in the Party's work-style in the army”), Renmin ribao, 3 February 1986.

^86. See Xinhua, 10 June 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 10 June 1985, p. Kl. See also John, Frankenstein, “Military cuts in China,” Problems of Communism, 07 08 1985, pp. 56, 59–60.Google Scholar

^87. Frankenstein, “Military cuts,” p. 57.

^88. This suggests that formally, at least, spiritual civilization work by the PLA will be reduced in scope, and possibly handed over to retired PLA cadres under civilian Party control, as part of the further reduction in the PLA's societal roles.

^89. See, e.g., Frankenstein, “Military cuts,” p. 58; BDS, 6 February 1986, in FBIS–CHI, 7 February 1986; Yang, Dezhi, “Xinshiqijiqiang wo junjianshedezhanlue juece” (“A strategic decision to strengthen the construction of our country's army in the new period”), Hongqi, No. 15 (1985), p. 4; “Google ScholarHebei shengjunqu lixie ganbu jiji canjia jingshen wenming jianshe” (“Hebei MD retired cadres actively participate in the building of socialist spiritual civilization”), Renmin ribao, 22 February 1986; and Zhengzhou Henan PS, 8 January 1986, in FBIS–CHI, 16 January 1986, p. P2.

^90. See, “Zhonggong anzhi tuiwu junren xiankuang” (“The present situation in the Chinese Communists’ arrangements for the retirement of soldiers”), Zhonggong yanjiu, Vol. 19, No. 2(1985), p. 110.

^91. See “Implement guidelines,” Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985.

^92. Moral exhortations were not the only methods used to encourage retirement. In late November 1985 the State Council and the MAC issued a notice which stipulated that cadres transferred to civilian units after 1 July 1985 had to receive salaries commensurate with their old PLA post – regardless of whether their new post was at a lower level. The notice also provided a number of other financial perks. See Ming Pao, 8 December 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 18 December 1985, p. W4, and the China Daily, 26 June 1985. Evidently the Civil Affairs Ministry set aside one billion yuan for the resettlement of soldiers, some of which was to go towards the subsidization of civilian payrolls. The demobilization of division-level cadres, being the most numerous, was officially incorporated into the State Plan.

^93. BDS, 25 January 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 26 January 1985, and Xinhua, 5 March 1985, cited in Baum, “China in 1985,” p. 37.

^94. “Dang de jilu bu neng songbang” (“Party discipline must not be loosened”), Jiefangjun bao, editorial, 12 December 1984; in Renmin ribao, 13 December 1984.

^95. BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 13 January 1986, p. K10.

^96. Xinhua, 2, 3 November 1984; in SWB FE/7793/BII/3, 6 November 1984.

^97. Deng, Xiaoping, “The army must subordinate itself,” pp. 72–73; and BDS, 10 March 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 13 March 1985, pp. K20–21.Google Scholar

^98. For reports on training programmes see the six articles on the Nanjing PLA in Renmin ribao, 14 January 1985; “Jundui peiyang liangyong rencai you chengji” f’The cultivation of’dual-use’ talents in the army achieved results“), Renmin ribao, 1985; and ”Lanzhou junqu mo tuan peiyang kaifa jianshe da xibei de liangyong rencai“ (”A regiment in the Lanzhou MR cultivates dual-use talents that will launch the construction of the great north-west”), Renmin ribao, 19 March 1985.

^99. See “Quan guo he difang kaifa tuixiu junren liangyong rencai” (“The entire country launches dual-use talent training for retired soldiers”), Renmin ribao, 1 February 1985; and “Shenyang junqu peiyang liangyong rencai chuxian xin jumian” (“A new phase in the cultivation of dual-use talent appears in the Shenyang Military Region”), Renmin ribao, 10 March 1985.

^100. Comments by various participants in the panel on “Economic Reform and Emerging Patterns of Rural Change in China.” Annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 21–23 March 1986.

^101. According to the China Daily (25 January 1986) the PLA was three months ahead of schedules in the demobilization programme. Another report in February contended that the number of division-level transfers of cadres to the localities reached 97.7% of the target in the State plan. BDS, 6 February 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 7 February 1986. As of May 1987, however, the Chinese reported that 730,000 officers and men had been demobilized, 73% of the total planned. The means that demobilization may now be behind schedule, since earlier reports expected most of the reductions to be made by the end of 1986. China Daily, 29 May 1987.

^102. Ming Pao, 27 August 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 28 August 1985, p. W2. See also Yang Shangkun's remarks in BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 14 January 1986, p. K11; and “Renzhen dui dangyuan jinxing dangfeng dangji jiaoyu” (“Earnestly undertake education of Party members in Party work-style and Party discipline”), Renmin ribao, 4 May 1986.

^103. BDS, 25 June 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 26 June 1985, p. K2; and Zhong Yi, “An analysis,” p. 37.

^104. BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 14 January 1986, p. K11.

^105. See “Responsible officials of the discipline inspection commission under the Central Military Commission talks about rectification of Party style,” Liaowang (Outlook), Nos. 6–7 (February 1986); in FBIS–CHI, 20 February 1986, p. K4.

^106. Ming, Pao, 3 December 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 4 December 1985, p. W2.Google Scholar

^107. Urumqi regional service, 27 March 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 27 March 1984, p. T4.

^108. “Strive to realize,” 3 February 1986.

^109. BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 14 January 1986, p. K13.

^110. See Li Desheng's defence of local Party committee autonomy in Renmin ribao, 20 April 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 30 April 1984, p. K9.

^111. Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 40. A similar instance was reported in Renmin ribao, “Zhengdang bu jiuchang gaigezhong de shiwu” (“Do not mix up Party rectification with flaws in the process of reform”), Renmin ribao, 26 June 1986. See also, Yu Qiuli's remarks on how to define “unhealthy tendencies,” “Ba liu jie renda sanci huiyi jingshen zuowei zhengdang xuexi de zhongyao neirong” (“Take the spirit of the third session of the Sixth People's Congress as important content in rectification study”), Jiefangjun bao, 12 April 1985.Google Scholar

^112. See BDS, 10 March 1985; in FBIS–CHI, 13 March 1985, pp. K20–21; and Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 40.Google Scholar

^113. Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 39.Google Scholar

^114. Jilin ribao (Jilin Daily), 1 November 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 27 November 1984, p. S2.

^115. Cited in Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 38.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ . Fujian ribao (Fujian Daily), 21 December 1984; in FBIS–CHI, 7 January 1985, pp. O4–5. An all-army work conference on the second stage of rectification concluded that in general the first stage of rectification had gone unevenly and much work still remained to be done among these units. See “Jundui zhengdang yao ba zengqiang dangxing jiaqiang jilu zuowei zhongdian” (“The enhancement of Party spirit and the strengthening of discipline must be taken as a focal point in Party rectification in the military”), Jiefangjun bao, 1 April 1985; in Fuyin baokan ziliao, No. 4 (1985), p. 18.

^117. Ming, Pao, 2 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 3 January 1986, p. W3Google Scholar. See also Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 40.Google Scholar

^118. Zhong, Yi, “An analysis,” p. 41.Google Scholar

^119. Ming, Pao, 2 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 3 January 1986, p. W3.Google Scholar

^120. Cited in BDS, 13 January 1986; in FBIS–CHI, 14 January 1986, p. K9.

^121. See “Jundui duanzheng dangfeng zhengdang chengji mingxian” (“The achievements of the army in correcting Party style and carrying out rectification are clear”), Renmin ribao, 4 July 1986, and “Ji yao zhichi ge tiao zhanxian de gaige you yao gaohao jundui zishen de gaige” (“The army must support every battlefront of reform as well as carrying out its own reform well”), Renmin ribao, 7 July 1986.

^122. “Chengdu junqu dangwei shenru jinxing dangxing jiaoyu” (“The Party committee of the Chengdu Military Region undertakes education in Party spirit in a penetrating way”), Renmin ribao, 13 May 1986.

^123. Xinhua, 28 May 1987; in FBIS–CHI, 1 June 1987, p. K3.

^124. His one line in reference to the PLA was that high level leading organs in the first stage of rectification in the PLA were in the “forefront” of rectification–hardly a ringing endorsement of rectification in the entire military. See ibid. p. K10.