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State-enlisted Voluntarism in China: The Role of Public Security Volunteers in Social Stability Maintenance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 February 2022
Abstract
This article explores how the Chinese government aims to maintain social stability by encouraging citizens to become volunteers. We propose that a new type of governance, namely, “state-enlisted voluntarism,” is being deployed in which public security volunteers are mobilized and monitored by the state. Analysis based on ten-year nationwide empirical data gathered from local areas in China suggests that the government intentionally enlists citizens into its hierarchical system to strengthen its administrative capacity and maintain a stable society without the risk of domestic threats. We find that direct enlistment approaches empower citizens as state proxies, and that indirect enlistment approaches ensure that various social stakeholders are comprehensively controlled. In general, the Chinese government has four reasons to institutionalize the state enlistment of voluntarism: to increase human resources at the grassroots; transform social organizations into subordinates; frame policy innovations as political credits; and to avoid blame. Our findings also suggest that China's party-state system mobilizes citizens into implementation-oriented activities rather than engages them in policymaking to maintain social stability at the grassroots.
摘要
本文旨在探究中国政府如何通过鼓励公民成为志愿者来加强社会稳定,提炼了一种新的治理形式,即 “国家征召的志愿主义”。在这种治理形式下,国家动员并管理公共治安志愿者。基于 10 年全国性的地方经验数据,本研究发现,中国政府能够有意识地征召公民,并将他们纳入到自己的科层系统中来强化行政能力,维护社会稳定。直接的征召途径能够赋予公民一定的权力,并使得公民成为国家意志的代理人,而间接的征召途径,则能够确保社会中不同的利益相关者被纳入到统一的控制系统中。整体而言,中国政府有四种动机来推动 “国家征召的志愿主义” 的制度化:增加基层工作的人手,令社会组织听从政府安排,将政策创新转化为政绩,以及实现避责。本研究同样认为,为了维护基层社会稳定,中国目前的党政系统主要动员公民参与政策执行,而非政策制定。
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London
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