Among the scanty remains of poetry attributed to Eumelus of Corinth two lines (fr. 13 Kinkel, fr. 1 Bergk, Diehl, Edmonds, fr. 696/1 Page)2 stand out as different from the rest, first because they are concerned not with the legendary past but with an actual, present occasion, and secondly because they are composed not for Corinthians but for Messenians. Our evidence comes from Pausanias and may be set out at the start:

(Proposed text) Atque etiam in ipsis uocalibus grammatici est uidere an ahquas pro consonantibus usus acceperit, quia ‘iam’ sicut ‘tarn’ scribitur et ‘uos’ ut ‘cos’, at quae ut uocales iunguntur aut unam longam faciunt, ut ueteres scri-pserunt, qui geminatione earum uelut apice utebantur, aut duas,—nisi quis putat etiam ex tribus uocalibus syllabam fieri, si non aliquae officio consonantium fungantur. quaeret hoc etiam, quo modo duabus demum uocalibus in se coeundi natura sit, cum consonantium nulla nisi alteram frangat. atqui littera i sibi insidit— ‘conicit’ enim est ab illo ‘iacit’—et u, quo modo nunc scribitur ‘uulgus’ et ‘seruus’. sciat etiam Ciceroni placuisse ‘aiio Maiiamque’ geminata ‘i’ scribere: quod si est, etiam ‘i’ iungetur ut consonans.

A Papyrus commentary on Alcman published in 19571 brings us news of a poem in which Alcman “physiologized”. The lemmata and commentary together witness to a semi-philosophical cosmogony unlike any other hitherto known from Greece. The evidence is meagre, but it seems worth while to see what can be made of it; for it is perhaps possible to go a little farther than has so far been done.

The question of the source of the pronominal forms (in which Seiva itself is indeclinable), and of the later fully declined forms, presents an unusual situation. It seems clear from earlier work that we should not look for the answer outside Greek, nor probably even outside colloquial Attic Greek of the fifth century. These are strong advantages, but despite them one cannot have much confidence in the solutions so far provided, and there is room for a fresh approach. In addition to this, the usage of the forms does not seem to have been explained satisfactorily, and I shall attempt to clarify it.

Received interpretation. As far as I have been able to determine, all scholars who have dealt with this fragment have followed Plutarch (to whom the preservation of the fragment is due) in holding (i) that and are synonyms for ‘body’ and ‘void’ respectively, and (ii) the purport of the pronouncement is simply that ‘even void has a nature and substantiality of its own’ (). But (i) is included in Aristotle's dictionary of Atomist jargon, while (ii) is put better in the celebrated Fragment 125 . In consequence, Fragment 156 has been deemed more curious than important. Despite the extreme scarcity of Democritean fragments other than moralizings, Kirk and Raven do not even print it. No doubt this assumed unimportance explains why it has not been noticed how unsatisfactory Plutarch's exegesis is.

By presenting ‘an Arab view’ on the much-discussed ‘footprint-scene’, Aeschylus, ch. 205ff., L. A. Tregenza (Greece & Rome N.s. ii [1955], 59–61; cf. H. Lloyd-Jones, C.Q. N.S. xi [1961], 171ff.) was able to prove that, judging by Bedouin customs, this strange method of recognition is not so impossible and childish as some ancient and modern critics have believed. In addition, a specifically Greek aspect of the problem may be pointed out.

This article falls into two parts: the first is an analysis, in the light of my earlier discussions of and of the Homeric usage of and the second, an attempt to show that, as in the case of the effects of Homeric usage persist to a considerable degree in the moral philosophy of Aristotle. In the earlier discussions I have argued that the higher value placed upon the competitive in Greek entails that co-operative relationships, even when valued and necessary, take the form dictated by the more valued qualities, the The most general words to denote co-operative relationships in Greek are and its derivatives: my purpose here is to show how the Homeric usage of these words is related to the Homeric standard and to Homeric society, and to sketch in the outline of a wider discussion, which I hope to be able to fill in later.

This difficult passage has been much discussed and the text of L emended usually by rearrangement of the verses. The work of commentators before Wilamowitz is practically valueless, for their inexact knowledge of Theban topography, with which Euripides' account of this battle shows a good acquaintance, was based largely upon the unsatisfactory description of Pausanias: despite the good sense of Markland, they misunderstood 653.

In classical Greek poetry there is a familiar distinction between verse which repeats line upon line, and that which forms patterns liable to closure at intervals, in stanzas or lyric sections. This is often equated with the distinction between spoken and sung verse, but the equation is only approximate. At an earlier stage all verse had some musical accompaniment—so much can be deduced from a number of passages in Homer, and is in any case implicit in the nature of quantitative verse. By Hellenistic times it seems that, in new composition, the more complex lyric structures had died out, while of the simpler ones more and more were being taken over as spoken verse. In the fifth century—and this can probably be extended to at least the late sixth and most of the fourth—only two kinds of verse are known to have dispensed with music altogether in performance: the heroic hexameter and the iambic trimeter.

I Want in this paper briefly to contribute two points to the elucidation of this famous passage, and apologize for the fact that my possessing the same name as one of its most illustrious interpreters may add confusion to the doxographic tradition.

The first point is not an original one. It is simply to revive an interpretation given by Henry Jackson in an article which strikes me as the most profound and pellucid which I have read on the subject, and which is in some danger of being forgotten. Raven, about ten years ago, insisted as a criterion of interpretation that the entire passage should be viewed ‘as a single and indivisible whole’. This is precisely what Jackson does, though he concentrates his attention, as indeed does Raven, on the line and the cave.

It seems very commonly agreed that Sappho's wedding-songs display none of the ritual obscenity so frequent in the genre. Thus D. L. Page wrote of fr. i ioa (Lobel-Page) that ‘There is no trace here or elsewhere in Sappho of that ribaldry which was characteristic of the songs recited at this and other stages of Greek wedding-ceremonies’ (Sappho and Alcaeus [Oxford, 1955], p. 120). Similarly Sir Maurice Bowra asserted of fr. 111 (L.-P.) that it is ‘neither bawdy nor exalted, but playful. If the humour is a bit primitive, that is due to tradition, which expected jokes at this level’ (Greek Lyric Poetry [Oxford, 1961], p. 216). On the next page he writes of the songs sung outside the bridal chamber, as distinct from those sung in the procession thither, that ‘Here too Sappho seems to avoid bawdry but is not averse from rather elementary jokes’.

At the beginning of Book 5 Plato catalogues the ways in which men ‘dishonour’ ( 727 c 3) their souls, and at 728 ab sums up by saying that any man who does not practise what the lawgiver describes as noble and good is treating his soul dishonourably. He goes on to say that hardly anyone takes account of (728 b 2), which is to cut oneself off from good men and be completely assimilated to the bad (6). We the n read (c 2 + ):

The short hymn to Hypnos at the opening of the first komrnos of the Philoctetes is of particular interest in view of Sophocles' association with the cult of Asclepius.

As suggested by the invocation the hymn is in fact intended to recall the paean, a form of liturgy with which Sophocles' audience must have become increasingly familiar in the years since the introduction in 420/19 of the Asclepius cult. Indeed if we are to judge by inscriptional and other remains the output of hymns for the cult of the healing gods from the fifth century onwards must have been a prolific one and considerably in excess of that for other deities in the same period. It is well known that amongst the earliest writers of hymns for the cult was Sophocles himself. The Suda in the list of his works records one of which at least, a paean to Asclepius, was known as late as the second and third centuries A.D. Probably this is not to be identified with the Sophoclean paean on the Sarapion monument of the same period, which in so far as the extremely fragmentary state of the inscription will allow us to determine would seem to be addressed not to Asclepius himself but to his mother Coronis.

It is perhaps worth briefly discussing a subject on which Demosthenes has so much to say and on which there is so little satisfactory evidence. In every speech which he delivered after 346 he referred, in greater or less detail, to breaches of the Peace of Philocrates, and this insistence on Philip's may mislead us.

The case of Cardia is suggestive. In 341, in the speech On the Chersonese, he sought to create the impression that Philip was acting in breach of the peace by sending troops to help defend Cardia against Diopeithes:

Otto Schneider, the first editor to use II, wrote , and he has been followed by Gow-Scholfield. The form is used by Antimachus, though not elsewhere by Nicander. Nicander uses tetrasyllabic forms from the stem ; he also uses

Chapters 12 and 13 of the De Interpretations present some puzzles, which it is my purpose to try to solve. The latest commentator, Professor Jaakke Hintikka, attempts in Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv (1962), 5–22, to abolish the difficulties by taking certain verbs in an unusual way. He suggests that in these chapters , which is usually taken to denote logical consequence, sometimes expresses simply compatibility (21b35–22a1, 22b11–14, 22b17–22), sometimes equivalence (22a14 and 33, 22b22ff., 23a18ff.), and that at 22a38ff., 22b3O, and 23a17 , which again is usually taken to denote consequence, in fact expresses compatibility. I propose to counter Hintikka's arguments and to maintain that both verbs express consequence; but as my main purpose is to give my own explanation of the general trend of Aristotle's remarks, I shall take the passages discussed by Hintikka in the order in which they occur in Aristotle's text.

None of the emendations proposed so far (cf. Ludwich's apparatus) is satisfactory. As Keydell (cf. his apparatus) reminds us, Ap. Rhod. I. 1205 makes Nonnus' untouchable, and thereby disposes of all the conjectures which would alter these words; consequently, the corruption must be hiding in the impossible .

When the theory of Forms was first developed by Plato, it was the final stage of a series of philosophical investigations which began with Socrates' search for definitions. The Form was regarded as a ‘one over many’ that is separate from particulars. It is by their participation in the perfect Form that the particulars derive their transitory existence. There is a Form, according to the Republic (596 a 5–7) corresponding to every set of things that have a common name. There are Forms of moral qualities, mathematical entities, and material objects. In the Parmenides Socrates admits that he is in doubt whether there are Forms of Man, Fire, and Water (130 c), but by the time of the Timaeus (51 b) Plato has no doubts about Forms of the four elements, and in the Philebus (15 a) he accepted a Form of Man also. This fact is well known to Aristotle, who speaks of Man as a typical Form at E.N. 1096b1. Finally, we may add that regress arguments, such as that about the Form of Largeness at Parmenides 132 ab, were generally referred to in antiquity as Third Man arguments—arguments, that is, which used the Form of Man as a paradigm for Forms in general.

A. F. Norman has recently suggested that a hitherto overlooked passage in Suidas is a fragment from the history of Eunapius of Sardis. He is clearly correct in referring the passage to an incident at the siege of Maiozamalcha during the Persian campaign of the emperor Julian, but I am not so sure that he is right in ascribing it to Eunapius, or in the conclusions he draws from this ascription. I give in parallel columns the accounts of Ammianus Marcellinus, Zosimus, and the passage from Suidas, together with a further version of the incident, unfortunately without names, from the pen of Libanius:

In his valuable contribution to the Fondation Hardt Entretiens of 1960 on Hesiod Professor La Penna dealt with the famous ‘theodicy of labour’ in Virgil, Georgics I. 118–59. He recalled that, whereas Hesiod made Prometheus' trickery the reason for Zeus' hiding fire and the other goods and so rendering labour necessary, Virgil omits mention of Prometheus or of any element of guilt (121–4):