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Balancing Hope and Fear: Muslim Modernists, Democracy, and the Tyranny of the Majority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2023

Megan Brankley Abbas*
Affiliation:
Department of Religion, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA

Abstract

During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, many Muslim modernists exhibited mixed records regarding democracy. On the one hand, they articulated cogent arguments that Islam was, at its heart, democratic in nature and worked to counter Islamist claims to the contrary. Some crafted robust visions for Islamic democratic governance. On the other hand, many of the same modernists forged political alliances with military authoritarian regimes. How can we explain this seeming inconsistency between modernist democratic ideals and their not-so-democratic practices? This article argues that this paradoxical pattern stems from a classic dilemma within democratic theory: the tyranny of the majority. After providing a brief history of majoritarian fears in Western political theory, the article investigates two prominent case studies from mid-twentieth-century Pakistan and Indonesia. The first examines Fazlur Rahman’s ties to Ayub Khan’s military regime in 1960s Pakistan, and the second analyzes why a movement of young modernists was willing to collaborate with Suharto’s New Order regime in 1970s Indonesia. Together, the two cases demonstrate that Muslim modernists balance their genuine hopes for an Islamic democratic future with persistent fears of majoritarian tyranny by advocating for constraints on the majority will. While these constraints can be controversial and even authoritarian in nature, they have important parallels in Western democratic thought. Ultimately, this article argues that Muslim modernists’ mixed records are a function of democratic theory itself rather than some Islamic exception to it.

Type
Hidden Lives of States
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History

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References

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2 Ibid., 209.

3 I define “Islamic modernism” as a loosely affiliated movement of scholars and activists who share two foundational commitments: First, they view Islam as a dynamic religion and therefore reject taqlid, or adhering to interpretative precedent within one’s school of Islamic law. Modernists instead endorse ijtihad, or deriving fresh interpretations from the Qur’an and Sunnah, as the primary way to ensure Islam’s contemporary relevance. Second, modernists tend to approach Islam and Western-style modernity as compatible rather than antagonistic ways of life. For similar definitions of Islamic modernism, see: Kurzman, Charles, Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Source Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 327 Google Scholar; and Euben, Roxanne and Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)Google Scholar, 5–9.

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5 For more on Muslim modernists and Suharto’s New Order, see Abbas, Megan Brankley, Whose Islam? The Western University and Modern Islamic Thought in Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), 92200 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ali, Fachry and Effendy, Bahtiar, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1986)Google Scholar; Feener, R. Michael, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 118–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hassan, Muhammad Kamal, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980)Google Scholar; Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 94166 Google Scholar.

6 For a sampling of such work on my two case studies, see Ali Akbar, “Fazlur Rahman’s Influence on Contemporary Islamic Thought,” Muslim World 110 (2020): 148–51; Armajani, Jon, “Islam and Democracy in the Thought of Fazlur Rahman and Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi,” in Mattson, Ingrid, Nesbitt-Larking, Paul, and Tahir, Nawaz, eds., Religion and Representation: Islam and Democracy (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar, 37–49; Greg Barton, “Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia, Studia Islamika 2, 3 (1995): 1–76; Saleh, Fauzan, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 240–94Google Scholar.

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10 While such majorities have certainly existed in history, I want to stress that the tyranny of the majority typically functions as a plausible and yet imprecise fear. Fears are, by nature, forward-looking and hence hypothetical. They also involve a degree of numerical imprecision. For democratic theorists, majorities are usually surmised, not counted. For more, see Nyirkos, Tamas, The Tyranny of the Majority: History, Concepts, and Challenges (New York: Routledge, 2018), 16 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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18 Ibid., 1213. See also Skinnell, Ryan, “Using Democracy against Itself: Demagogic Rhetoric as an Attack on Democratic Institutions,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 49, 3 (2019): 248–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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42 Ibid., 209.

43 Ibid.

44 Rahman’s democratic ethos closely resembles that of Robert Dahl, who identifies human equality and personal autonomy as the two presuppositional justifications for democracy. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 83–105.

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49 Ibid., 108.

50 Ibid.

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52 Ibid., 217.

53 Ibid., 209.

54 Ibid., 218.

55 Fazlur Rahman, review of Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography, by Ayub Khan, Islamic Studies 6, 2 (1967): 197–99.

56 Rahman, “Reflections,” 115–19.

57 Zaman, Islam in Pakistan, 71.

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63 Fazlur Rahman, “Islam and Social Justice,” Pakistan Forum 1, 1 (1970): 4–5, 9, quote from p. 4.

64 Abbas, “Between Western Academia and Pakistan,” 748–59; Zaman, Islam in Pakistan, 72–74.

65 Fazlur Rahman, “Currents of Religious Thought in Pakistan,” Islamic Studies 7, 1 (1968): 1–7, 5. For an overview of Mawdudi’s activities during the Ayub Khan years, see Nasr, Seyed Vali Reza, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 147–69Google Scholar.

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67 Ibid.

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69 Rahman, “Qur’anic Solution,” 323.

70 Rahman, “Implementation,” 205.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., 207–8.

73 Ibid., 205.

74 Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, Federalist, 327.

75 Rahman, “Islamic Modernism,” 321.

76 Ibid., 321–22.

77 For some of these insights, Rahman drew on Gunner Myrdal’s Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 3 (New York: Penguin Press, 1968). Rahman, “Islamic Modernism,” 321.

78 Rahman, “Implementation,” 206.

79 Ibid., 210.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid. Rahman once advised Khan that Mawdudi’s work was “a direct attack on his government,” which led to the Jamaat leader’s arrest. Nasr, Vanguard, 158–59.

82 Ibid., 215.

83 Rahman, Islam, 38–39.

84 For an authoritative history of these anti-Communist massacres, see Robinson, Geoffrey, The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018)Google Scholar.

85 Tragically, Wahib died in a traffic accident at the age of thirty. His diary, which Effendi edited and helped to publish, provides an invaluable contemporaneous window into the young modernist movement. For more on its importance, see Barton, “Neo-Modernism,” 10–11.

86 In the early 1980s, Madjid earned his doctorate under Rahman’s supervision at the University of Chicago. Although Madjid would later draw inspiration from Rahman, he had not yet met him nor likely read his works during the period under examination. For more on their relationship, see Abbas, Whose Islam?, 122–54; Barton, “Neo-Modernism,” 5–6, 16; and Kersten, Carool, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 6984, 95100 Google Scholar.

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88 Ibid., 1341.

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91 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 304. For more on Madjid’s interpretation of khalifa, see Kersten, Carool, “Khilafa as the Viceregency of Humankind: Religion and State in the Thought of Nurcholish Madjid,” in al-Rasheed, Madawi, Kersten, Carool, and Shterin, Marat, eds., Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 165–84Google Scholar.

92 Ibid., 305–6.

93 Ibid., 326–27.

94 Ibid., 332–33.

95 Wahib, Pergolakan, 36–37.

96 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 282–83.

97 Ibid., 1348.

98 Wahib, Pergolakan, 197.

99 Ibid., 198.

100 Ibid., 14, 111.

101 Mill, On Liberty, 62.

102 Ibid., 63–64.

103 Mill, John Stuart, Considerations on Representative Government (Luton: Andrews UK Ltd., 2011), 132–34Google Scholar.

104 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 277–79.

105 Ibid., 283.

106 Wahib, Pergolakan, 7.

107 Ibid., 9–10.

108 For a detailed history of Masyumi, see Madinier, Remy, Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism, Desmond, Jeremy, trans. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2015)Google Scholar.

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110 Ahmad Gaus, AF, Sang Pelintas Batas: Biografi Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace, 2009), 6672 Google Scholar.

111 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 282.

112 Wahib, Pergolakan, 18–19.

113 Ibid., 37.

114 Ibid., 146–50.

115 Ibid., 151.

116 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 337.

117 Ibid., 278.

118 For more on Madjid’s speeches and the resulting controversies, see Barton, “Neo-Modernism,” 17–21; Hefner, Civil Islam, 116–19; Feener, Muslim Legal Thought, 133–37; and Kersten, Cosmopolitans, 52–67.

119 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, 279.

120 Wahib, Pergolakan, 157, 208, 291.

121 Gaus, Sang Pelintas Batas, 106.

122 Madjid, Karya Lengkap, xlvii–iii.

123 Wahib and Effendi did take personal actions to protect leftist friends; Wahib, Pergolakan, 30–31, 184, 223–24; Gaus, Sang Pelintas Batas, 36, 68–69.

124 This latter question becomes all the more relevant when we consider the extent to which the earlier Western democrats were involved in Native American genocide, slavery, and imperialism.

125 Nyirkos, Tyranny, 103–5.