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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 March 2020
If historians now recognize that the Habsburg Monarchy was developing into a strong, cohesive state in the decades before the First World War, they have yet to fully examine contemporaneous European debates about Austria's legitimacy and place in the future world order. As the intertwined fields of law and social science began during this period to elaborate a binary distinction between “modern” nation-states and “archaic” multinational “empires,” Austria, like other composite monarchies, found itself searching for a legally and scientifically valid justification for its continued existence. This article argues that Austrian sociology provided such a justification and was used to articulate a defense of the Habsburg Monarchy and other supposedly “abnormal” multinational states. While the birth of the social sciences is typically associated with Germany and France, a turn to sociology also occurred in the late Habsburg Monarchy, spurred by legal scholars who feared that the increasingly hegemonic idea of nation-based sovereignty threatened the stability of the pluralistic Austrian state. Proponents of the “sociological idea of the state,” notably the sociologist, politician, and later president of Czechoslovakia Tomáš Masaryk and the Polish-Jewish sociologist and jurist Ludwig Gumplowicz, challenged the concept of statehood advanced by mainstream Western European legal philosophy and called for a reform of Austria's law and political science curriculum. I reveal how, more than a century before the “imperial turn,” Habsburg actors came to reject the emerging scholarly distinction between “nations” and “empires” and fought, with considerable success, to institutionalize an alternative to nationalist social scientific discourse.
1 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, Das österreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- und Handbuch, 3d ed. (Vienna, 1907[1891]), 46Google Scholar.
2 See the introduction to Burbank, Jane and Cooper, Frederick, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 2010)Google Scholar. Mazower and Ther offer historical accounts of the destructive potential of the nation-state: Mazower, Mark, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (London, 1998)Google Scholar; Ther, Philipp, The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe (New York, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Others have drawn attention to the enormous role “premodern” corporate entities supposedly played in shaping the “modern” world. See, for example, Benton, Laura and Ross, Richard J., eds., Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850 (New York, 2013)Google Scholar.
3 For a comprehensive overview of the “imperial turn” and its impact on the historiography of Europe's continental empires, see Wendehorst, Stephan, “Altes Reich, ‘Alte Reiche’ und der imperial turn in der Geschichtswissenschaft,” in Wendehorst, S., ed., Die Anatomie frühneuzeitlicher Imperien: Herrschaftsmanagement jenseits von Staat und Nation: Institutionen, Personal und Techniken (Berlin, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the afterlives of these empires in East Central Europe, see Wheatley, Natasha, “Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a State,” Law and History Review 35, 3 (2017): 753–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Wimmer, Andreas and Schiller, Nana Glick, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State-Building, Migration, and Beyond,” Global Networks 2, 4 (2002): 301–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The authors of this influential article define methodological nationalism as the “assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (301). See also Smith, Anthony D., “Nationalism and Classical Social Theory,” British Journal of Sociology 34, 1 (1983): 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 The examination of sociology's relationship to nationalism began in the 1960s; anthropology's autocritical reflection on its relationship with empire dates from the 1930s. Recently, however, sociology's entanglements with empire, and anthropology's contributions to domestic nation-building agendas, have also come under scrutiny. See George Steinmetz, “The Imperial Entanglements of Sociology in the United States, Britain, and France since the Nineteenth Century,” Ab Imperio 4 (2009): 23–79, here 23–24. For a study of German anthropology and its relationship to German nation- and empire-building, see Zimmerman, Andrew, Anthropology and Anti-Humanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the French context, see Alice Conklin, In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in France, 1850–1950 (Ithaca, 2013). In general, recent historical analyses treat the metropole and the colony as mutually constitutive and the boundary between sociology and anthropology as porous. For an overview of the push to “decolonize” social science, see Steinmetz, George, ed., Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Field (Durham, 2013), esp. ix–xvi (Preface)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Historians of imperial Russia have recently begun to consider the ways in which Russian intellectuals conceived of and contested the supposed abnormality of their regime. They employ the apt phrase “languages of rationalization and self-description.” It seems the Russian context, however, did not produce an explicit justification of continental empire per se. See Gerasimov, Ilya, Kusber, Jan, and Semyonov, Alexander, eds., Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire (Leiden, 2013)Google Scholar.
7 Austrian sociologists and legal scholars, as we will see, frequently criticized the tendentious theories of state formation advanced by German legal theorists. The above-cited quotation from Gumplowicz provides just one example.
8 Early sociology, one expert notes, looked more like the discipline of “international relations” than a science modernity. It was deeply concerned with understanding the nature of the modern state, both normatively and empirically. Santoro, Marco, “Empire for the Poor: Imperial Dreams and the Quest for an Italian Sociology, 1870s–1950s,” in Steinmetz, George, ed., Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline (Durham, 2013), 106–65, 135Google Scholar. Multiethnic states could be accommodated in the modernist vision of sociologists only with difficulty. In the sociological discourse of the time, the state, assumed to be uninational at its core, was associated with modernity, while multiethnic empires were regarded as anachronistic. Steinmetz, George, “Major Contributions to Sociological Theory and Research on Empire, 1830s to Present,” in Steinmetz, George, ed., Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline (Durham, 2013), 1–50, esp. 16–17Google Scholar.
9 The prominent Italian (nationalist) sociologist Giuseppe Sergi argued the following during the First World War: “Powerful and gigantic states like Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary … represent a past: states which are not really nations, but conglomerates of different nations, like the ancient empires.” Quoted in Santoro, “Empire for the Poor,” 138.
10 John Deak, for example, emphasizes the accomplishments of the Austrian bureaucracy, in Forging a Multinational State: State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War (Palo Alto, 2015).
11 See Judson, Pieter, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (Cambridge, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 3. For more on the failure of nationalist activist efforts, see Judson, Pieter, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, 2006)Google Scholar; and Zahra, Tara, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Borderlands, 1900–1948 (Ithaca, 2008)Google Scholar.
13 Recent work on the Concert of Europe has revealed the extent to which the (European, Christian) right to national self-determination became enshrined in international law in the decades before the First World War. See Reynolds, Michael A., Shattering Empires: The Crash and Collapse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, 1908–1918 (Cambridge, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Walter Rauscher provides further evidence of the declining stature of the Monarchy among Europe's Great Powers in the second half of the nineteenth century, in Die Fragile Großmacht: Die Donaumonarchie und die europäische Staatenwelt 1866–1914 (Vienna, 2014).
14 For a study of the imperial cult in the era of Francis Joseph, see Unowsky, Daniel, Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848–1916 (West Lafayette, 2005)Google Scholar.
15 While it is true that the Habsburg Monarchy recognized the rights of its Volksstämme, or national groups, and often put imperial diversity on display, few studies have addressed the efforts of Habsburg scholars to reconcile the state's multinational composition with the constitutional and social scientific thought of the time.
16 In the nineteenth century's second half, politicians, scholars, and intellectuals frequently debated whether there existed an Austrian “state idea,” what this idea entailed, and whether it was growing or declining in influence. Gumplowicz and Masaryk should be seen as attempting to provide a (social) scientific answer to this question.
17 Natasha Wheatley's dissertation makes the case that historical rights, not self-determination, underpinned nationalist political claims at Saint-Germain and Trianon; “Law, Time, and Sovereignty in Central Europe: Imperial Constitutions, Historical Rights, and the Afterlives of Empire” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2016).
18 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, “Staat, Kulturkreis und Menschheit,” Die Zukunft (Berlin), 26 (1899): 434–39, 438Google Scholar. Gumplowicz's use of this term is analyzed below.
19 “Since modern nationalism provided the main framework through which political, social, and cultural reality were interpreted in the overwhelming majority of the economically and socially most developed countries of Europe that constituted what Ernest Gellner has called ‘the Atlantic belt,’ the mainstream development of humanities and social sciences took place within the framework of the national paradigm.” Gerasimov, Ilya, Glebov, S., Kaplunovski, A., Mogilner, M., and Semyonov, A., “In Search of a New Imperial History,” Ab Imperio 1 (2005): 33–56, 41–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Gerasimov et al. refer to “state,” “society,” and “nation” as three of modernity's key concepts.
20 For a detailed discussion of the dilemmas facing empires, both continental and overseas, around the turn of the twentieth century, see Lieven, Dominic, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London, 2000)Google Scholar, esp. pt. 2.
21 Pieter Judson argues that German liberals did not equate centralization with ethnonational Germanization. Non-German groups, however, viewed the project of centralism as a German effort to maintain the privileged position of the German language in the Monarchy. See his Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914 (Ann Arbor, 1996); and King, Jeremy, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 (Princeton, 2002), 36–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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23 As Stourzh and others have shown, the late Empire was slowly beginning to transform itself into a truly multinational state through creative electoral reform measures, first in Moravia in 1905, then in the Bukovina in 1910 and Galicia in 1914. See Stourzh, Gerald, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs (Vienna, 1985)Google Scholar. See also Cohen, Gary B., “Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy: New Narratives on Society and Government in Late Imperial Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 29 (1998): 37–61, 59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
24 The Austromarxists, it seems, believed in the backwardness of empires and the modernity of nation-states. Proposed reforms to the imperial structure, such as those of Otto Bauer, were likely understood more as stopgap measures than steps toward some ideal political form. For a concise treatment of the Viennese Social Democrats’ German nationalism, see Wolfgang Maderthaner, “Empire, Nationalism, and the Jewish Question: Victor Adler and Otto Bauer,” Religions 7, 1 (2016), https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/7/1/2/htm (accessed 30 Nov. 2019).
25 This above-cited volume, Sociology and Empire, edited by Steinmetz, includes references to various Austrian sociologists, but offers no systematic treatment of their work.
26 See Karl Acham, “Ludwig Gumplowicz und der Beginn der soziologische Konflikttheorie im Österreich der Jahrhundertwende,” in Britta Rupp-Eisenreich, Justin Stagl, and Karl Acham, eds., Kulturwissenschaften im Vielvölkerstaat: zur Geschichte der Ethnologie und verwandter Gebiete in Österreich, ca. 1780 bis 1918 = L'anthropologie et l'état pluri-culturel: le cas de l'Autriche, de 1780 à 1918 environ (Wien, 1995). As Acham observed, fin de siècle Austria was associated as much with sociology as with artistic or literary modernism.
27 LaCapra, Dominick, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher (Ithaca, 1972), esp. 200–11Google Scholar. In Durkheim's “normal society,” according to LaCapra, the interests of the state, the corporation, and the individual would be triangulated in a dialectical balance. While Durkheim's theory of nation-state rejected theories of ethnic homogeneity, it was blind to ethnic and religious diversity and limited the corporation to professional and commercial spheres. Weber, trained in the German tradition of Staatswissenschaft, was a nationalist in both his methodology and his political commitments. For his methodological nationalism, see the above-cited articles, by Wimmer and Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” and by Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism and Classical Social Theory.” Weber's chauvinistic and racist views have been discussed and debated since the publication in 1959 of Wolfgang Mommsen's influential biography of the sociologist, Max Weber and die deutsche Politik, 1890–1920 (Tübingen, 1959).
28 Lindner, Gustav Adolf, Ideen zur Psychologie der Gesellschaft als Grundlage der Sozialwissenschaft (Wien, 1871)Google Scholar; Eubank, Earle Edward, “Thomas Garrigue Masaryk: Sociologist,” Social Forces 16, 4 (1938): 455–62, 458–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 Hoffmann, Roland J., T. G. Masaryk und die tschechische Frage: Nationale Ideologie und politische Tätigkeit bis zum Scheitern des deutsch-tschechischen Ausgleichsversuchs vom Februar 1909 (München, 1988), 68Google Scholar.
30 Gumplowicz introduced his idea of “race” (group) conflict in his first major monograph, Raçe und Staat: Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung (Vienna, 1875).
31 For more on Habsburg Catholicism's relationship to nationalism, see Hacohen, Malachi Haim, Jacob and Esau: Jewish European History between Nation and Empire (Cambridge, 2019), 191–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Catholic sociology was an early recipient of state support. The Monarchy's first Professor of Sociology, Rev. Kazimierz Zimmerman, occupied a chair in “Christian Sociology” at the Jagiellonian University.
32 Benno Gammerl, Untertanen, Staatsbürger und andere: Der Umgang mit ethnischer Heterogenität im Britischen Weltreich und im Habsburgerreich 1867–1918 (Göttingen, 2010). Gerald Stourzh cites Gammerl, in “The Ethnicizing of National Difference in Late Imperial Austria,” published in his Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte: ausgewählte Studien 1990–2010 (Vienna, 2011), 283–323, 295.
33 Bluntschli, Johann Caspar, Die nationale Staatenbildung und der moderne deutsche Staat. Ein öffentlicher Vortrag (Berlin, 1870), 28Google Scholar.
34 Ibid. This explicit identification of the state with masculinity can be found already in Bluntschli's early works. See his Psychologische Studien über Staat und Kirche (Zürich, 1844), 251–54.
35 Bluntschli, Die nationale Staatenbildung, 28.
36 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Allgemeines Staatsrecht, geschichtlich begründet (Munich, 1852), 43
37 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Lehre vom modernen Staat: Allgemeine Staatslehre, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: 1875), 110.
38 Ibid.
39 Georg Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht (Leipzig, 1843).
40 von Mohl, Robert, Das deutsche Reichsstaatsrecht: rechtliche und politische Erörterungen (Tübingen, 1873), 37Google Scholar.
41 Ibid., 30–31 n1.
42 Ibid., 28–31.
43 Michael A. Reynolds argues that the 1878 Congress of Berlin implicitly sanctioned, perhaps for the first time in history, the right of great powers to intervene in foreign states to protect or “restore” the national rights of minority populations. See Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 14–18. Reynolds cites there the Polish historian Jedlicki, who presents a similar argument about the significance of 1878. See Jedlicki, Jerzy, A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization (Budapest, 1999[1988]), 260Google Scholar.
44 Held, Das Kaiserthum als Rechtsbegriff (Würzburg, 1879), 63.
45 Ibid., 38.
46 Ibid., 57.
47 Ibid., 48–49.
48 Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992)Google Scholar.
49 Legal scholars from Germany, France, and Britain agreed on the basic features of the modern state and tended to express doubt that those nations not already in possession of a modern state could ever create one. See Koskenniemi, Martii, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960 (Cambridge, 2004), 102–6Google Scholar.
50 According to Koskenniemi, “historical and organic” jurisprudence, rather than Austinian command theory, represented the legal mainstream in both Britain and continental Europe. See his Gentle Civilizer, 48.
51 The Polish historian Michał Bobrzyński used German legal concepts, particularly those of Mohl, to demonstrate the organic unity of the Polish Kingdom. See Pajakowski, Philip, “History, the Peasantry, and the Polish Nation in the Thought of Michal Bobrzyński,” Nationalities Papers 26, 2 (1998): 249–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Mohl also provided key concepts for Chinese nationalists. Matten, Marc A., “China Is the China of the Chinese”: The Concept of Nation and Its Impact on Political Thinking in Modern China,” Oriens Extremus 51 (2012): 63–106Google Scholar. The Japanese politician and constitutional lawyer Hiroyuki Katō drew heavily on Bluntschli; see Der Kampf ums Recht des Stärkeren und seine Entwickelung (Berlin, 1894).
52 Of course, Reich is not a perfect translation of “empire” in the contemporary academic sense, since the unmodified term refers generally to a “dominion,” a space of authority. As will be further explained below, however, Reich was frequently agglutinated after roughly 1840 with Vielvölker or modified by “polynational” to achieve the semantic meaning of “multiethnic empire.”
53 For a general history of the historical school of law and an account of its German roots, see Stein, Peter, Legal Evolution: The History of an Idea (Cambridge, 1980)Google Scholar, particularly chapter Three, “The German Historical School of Law.”
54 Franz Fillafer, “Leo Thun und die Aufklärung: Wissenschaftsideal, Berufungspolitik, und Deutungskämpfe,” in Brigitte Mazohl and Christof Aichner, eds., Die Thun-Hohenstein'sche Universitätsreform 1849–1860: Konzeption—Umseztung—Nachwirkungen (Vienna, 2017), 55–75, 66.
55 Ibid., 65.
56 Ibid., 73.
57 Gutachten und Anträge zur Reform der juristischen Studien, erstattet von den rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Facultäten der österreichischen Universitäten (Vienna, 1887).
58 See ibid., 22–25.
59 Ibid., 148–50.
60 Ibid., 156.
61 Ibid., 110.
62 Stenographische Protokolle, Austrian House of Representatives, Session XI (1892), 4780.
63 Ibid., 4800.
64 Ibid., 4712.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 4722.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 4716–17.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 4722.
73 Ibid., 4716.
74 Ibid., 4722.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. Here the term used is Staatsgedanke.
77 Ibid., 4845–46.
78 Ibid., 4846.
79 Ibid.
80 Rady, Martin, The Habsburg Empire: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2017), 106–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Cole, Laurence, “Visions and Revisions of Empire: Reflections on a New History of the Habsburg Monarchy,” in Louthan, Howard, ed., Austrian History Yearbook 49 (2018), 261–80, esp. 268CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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82 Ibid., 268–70.
83 The topic of epistemological “in-betweenness” has recently become a subject of scholarly research in the field of East Central European history. See Rachel Trode and Eszter Varsa, “Tagungsbericht: Epistemologies of In-Betweenness: East-Central Europe and the World History of Social Science, 1890–1945,” at: http://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-6117 (last accessed 23 Jan. 2019). Jan Surman analyzes Masaryk using a similar framework, in “Imperiale ‘Go Betweeners’: Józef Dietl und Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk,” in Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf, eds., Eliten im Vielvölkerreich: Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich-Ungarn (1850–1918) (Berlin, 2015), 311–37.
84 Karel Čapek, Talks with T. G. Masaryk, Dora Round, trans., Michael Henry Heim, ed. (North Haven, 1995), 142.
85 Ibid., 75.
86 Ibid., 92.
87 Ibid., 92–93.
88 Ibid., 92.
89 Ibid., 142.
90 Ibid. The “philosophy of history” and “sociology,” he noted, are equivalent terms; see p. 92.
91 Several article-length biographical studies of Gumplowicz exist. See Mozetič, Gerald, “Ein unzeitgemäßer Soziologe: Ludwig Gumplowicz,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 37 (1985): 621–47Google Scholar; and Adamek, Wojciech and Radwan-Praglowski, Janusz, “Ludwik Gumplowicz: A Forgotten Classic of European Sociology,” Journal of Classical Sociology 6, 3 (2006): 381–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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93 Adamek and Radwan-Praglowski, “Ludwik Gumplowicz,” 392–93.
94 Ibid., 384, 390.
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96 Gumplowicz frequently expressed dismay at the small-mindedness and cruelty of Graz's Pan-Germans. Weiler, Bernd, “Die akademische Karriere von Ludwig Gumplowicz in Graz: Analysen und Materialien aus der Zeit von der Ernennung zum Extraordinarius bis zur Emeritierung (1883–1908),” Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich Newsletter 25 (2004): 3–54, 6Google Scholar.
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100 Ibid., 48.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 51.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., 53–54.
105 Ibid., 53.
106 Ibid., 51–52.
107 Ibid., 49–50.
108 Ibid., 50.
109 Gumplowicz, “Staat, Kulturkreis,” 434.
110 Ibid.
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113 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, “Rezension: Hugo Preuß: Gemeinde, Stat, Reich als Gebietskörperschafen: Versuch einer deutschen Statsconstruction auf Grundlage der Genossenschaftstheorie. Berlin, Springer, 1889,” Deutsche Litteraturzeitung, 10 (1891): 343–45, 344Google Scholar.
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118 Ibid., 40.
119 Ibid., 48.
120 On more than one occasion, Gumplowicz explicitly named these three figures as exemplars of the flawed logic of German political science. See his “Rezension: Fr. J. Neumann,” 679. His vexed relationship with Polish nationalism and Polish academia is discussed in Porter-Szücs, Brian, When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland (Oxford, 2002), 177–82Google Scholar.
121 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, 2000), 6Google Scholar. According to Chakrabarty, the two pillars of Eurocentrism are historicism (historical teleologies) and the “idea of the political” (the project of secular nationalism).
122 Gumplowicz, “Staat, Kulturkreis,” 438.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Historical sociologists are returning today to the relationship between nationalism and imperialism, many of them coming to the same conclusion Gumplowicz seems to have reached: imperialism is not the opposite of nationalism, but in fact an aggressive, exaggerated form of it. See Hall, John A., “Imperialism, the Perversion of Nationalism,” in The Importance of Being Civil: The Struggle for Political Decency (Princeton, 2013), 226–46Google Scholar.
126 Emperor Francis Joseph's “secret pact” with Victor Adler, leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, against the bourgeois nationalist parties offers an illustrative example of this alliance between the state and anti-nationalist forces. See Hacohen, Jacob and Esau, 291.
127 Exchanges between imperial peripheries, according to Jan Surman, “function as a necessary and constitutive moment in the intellectual geography of empires, and their interplay with the center prove essential for intellectual productivity”; see his “Paris-Wien-St. Petersburg oder Alger-Brno-Charkiv? Wissenstransfer und die ‘composite states,’” Quaestio Rossica 3 (2015): 98–118, 98.
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135 Acham, Karl, “Ludwig Gumplowicz—Ein Grazer Pionier der Soziologie,” Rechts-, Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften aus Graz: zwischen empirischer Analyse und normativer Handlungsanweisung: wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Befunde aus drei Jahrhunderten (Vienna, 2011), 433–48, 443Google Scholar.
136 Perusing scholarly introductions to the discipline from the turn of the century, and even from the interwar period, one finds that Gumplowicz's Grundriss der Soziologie (Outline of sociology) (Vienna, 1885), for example, figures more prominently and receives more attention than Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and society) (Leipzig, 1887). For a representative example of historical overviews of the discipline from this period, see Salomon, Gottfried and Oppenheimer, Franz, Soziologische Lesestücke (Karlsruhe, 1926)Google Scholar.
137 A scan of the list of members from the Institute's Annales between the years 1894 and 1900 reveals a different picture of the constitution of the early discipline. See, for example, “Liste des membres de l'institut,” Annales de l'institut de sociologie, 1–2 (1895): xii–xvi.
138 Zimmerman, Andrew, “Decolonizing Weber,” Postcolonial Studies 9, 1 (2006): 53–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Zimmerman, Andrew, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South (Princeton, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
139 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed; and Zahra, Tara, “The Minority Problem and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands,” Contemporary European History 14, 2 (2008): 137–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
140 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, “Oesterreichische Reichsgeschichte,” Juristisches Litteraturblatt 7/8 (1895–1896): 74–78, 74Google Scholar.
141 Ibid.
