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Franco and Hitler: The Myth of Hendaye 1940

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2010

Abstract

The Hitler/Franco encounter at Hendaye in October 1940 was a central myth of Francoist propaganda. Allegedly, faced with threats and blandishments to force Spain into war on the Axis side, Franco coolly stood his ground and thereby secured Spanish neutrality. However, there is little evidence that Hitler did threaten Franco. His purpose in travelling to Hendaye, and to Montoire where he met Laval and Pétain, was to compare the relative cost of closer relationships with Spain and Vichy France. Far from cleverly holding off Hitler, Franco was disappointed that the meeting foundered. Germany's need to maintain good relations with Vichy ensured that Hitler could not meet Franco's price for belligerence, the dismemberment of the French North African empire.

La rencontre entre Hitler et Franco en octobre 1940 constitue l'un des mythes centraux de la propagande franquiste. Confronté tour à tour aux menaces et séductions destinées à forcer l'Espagne à entrer en guerre aux côtés des forces de l'Axe, Franco s'en serait froidement tenu à ses positions et par là assuré la neutralité de l'Espagne. Il existe cependant peu de preuves que Hitler ait menacé Franco. Le but de son voyage à Hendaye, puis à Montoire où il rencontra Lavel et Pétain, était de comparer le coût relatif de relations plus étroites avec l'Espagne et la France de Vichy. Loin de tenir habilement Hitler à distance, Franco fut en fait déçu de l'issue de la rencontre. Vu la nécessité pour l'Allemagne de maintenir de bonnes relations avec Vichy, Hitler n'était pas pret à payer le prix réclamé par Franco pour son entrée en guerre, à savoir le démembrement de l'empire colonial français en Afrique du Nord.

Das Treffen Hitlers mit Franco Oktober 1940 ist zu einer der zentralen Mythen der Franco-Propaganda geworden. Der Legende nach hat Franco trotz Drohung und Schmeichelei an seiner Position festgehalten, dass Spanien sich in den Krieg auf Seite der Achsenmächte nicht einmischen sollte. In dieser Weise wurde die Neutralität seines Landes garantiert. Es gibt jedoch keine Beweise dafür, dass Hitler Franco gedroht hat. Er war nach Hendaye und auch nach Montoire, wo er Laval und Petain traf, angereist, um die relativen Kosten näherer Zusammenarbeit mit Spanien oder mit der Vichyregierung Frankreichs zu vergleichen. Es war nicht Hitler sondern Franco der entaüscht wurde, weil die Notwendigkeit auf Seite Deutschlands gute Beziehungen zur Vichyregierung aufrechtzuerhalten bedeutete, dass Hitler nicht bereit war, den Preis der spanischen Unterstützung im Krieg, namentlich die Zergliederung des französichen nordafrikanischen Reichs, zu bezahlen.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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