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² On this shift see Kori Schake's article in this issue.

³ This argument follows Ullman, Richard H., Securing Europe (London: Adamantine Press, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴ ibid., 30.

⁵ ibid., 138.

⁶ Defence Minister Volker Rühe (March 1993), then SPD spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Carsten Voigt, and finally Ambassador Holbrooke argued that the United States had to stick out its neck – i.e. embark on NATO enlargement – in order to forestall the redevelopment of either a German-Russian condominium over eastern Europe or a contest about who was to guarantee Poland's ‘integrity’. The more general thesis is that the United States recruited the FRG as an ally in order to prevent Germany from falling back into the trap of ‘nationalism’, in particular a ‘Schaukelpolitik’ between East and West.

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¹² On the disparities between regional collective defence (NATO) and collective security (UN) see Lawrence Kaplan's article in this issue.

¹³ Czempiel, Emst-Otto, Machtprobe. Die USA und die Sowjetunion in den achtziger Jahren (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1989).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Acheson Report, ‘A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future’, March 1961.

¹⁵ Such as development aid, sustaining the US dollar, opening markets for products of Third-World exporters, and so on.

¹⁶ This was most visible in the domain of nuclear diplomacy: the United States resolved not to encourage French soundings about French efforts in similar vein, as it assisted Britain's ‘leap’ into the missile age; German Atlanticists (Schröder) would have regarded this as a deadly blow to the Atlantic Community – Schertz, Adrian W., Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons: Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung (Cologne/Weimar/Berlin: Böhlau, 1992), 286 ff.Google Scholar F. J. Strauss advocated the idea of transferring the special nuclear relationship from Britain to Europe; he objected to Britain's claim of a second veto for London, but did not dispute that US presidents must have the final decision-making power; Winand, Pascaline, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (London: Macmillan, 1993), 238Google Scholar; Schertz, , Deutschlandpolitik, 170–1, 274 ff., 283Google Scholar; Hoppe, Christoph, Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache. Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959–1966 (Baden–Baden: Nomos, 1993) 216 ff.Google Scholar Britain (Macmillan, Heath) warned Washington that its search to accommodate the German claim for nukleare Mitwirkung was counterproductive, with regard to both detente and to reconciliation between the three Western allies, and urged Washington instead to acknowledge the ‘reality’ of France (rather than ‘NATO’) being fourth nuclear power; Gustav Schmidt, ‘Test of Strength: The United States, Germany and de Gaulle's ‘No’ to Britain in Europe, 1958–63', in Schmidt, Gustav, ed., Zwischen Bündnissicherung und privilegierter Partnerschaft: Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1955–1963 (Bochum: Veröffendichungen des Arbeitskreises Deutsche England-Forschung 33, 1995), 281–348.Google Scholar

¹⁷ ‘Bündnis im Bündnis’ applies to the UK-US, US-FRG, US-Italy, US-Norway relationships within NATO. Jan van der Harst, ‘US Forces in the Netherlands, 1950–60’, Nuti, Leopoldo, ‘US Forces in Italy, 1945–1963’, both in Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe. The Early Years, 1945–1970 (Boulder: Westview, 1994) 224, 230 ff., 267Google Scholar; Nuti, Leopoldo, ‘Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63’ in Heuser, Beatrice and O'Neill, Robert, eds., Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–1962: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Macmillan, 1992) 226, 228 ff.Google Scholar; Megens, Ine, ‘Problems of Military Production Co-ordination’, in Heuser, and O'Neill, , Securing Peace, 279 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Soviet and East German propaganda argued during the 1950s and 1960s that (West) German ‘militarism’ (with the United States serving as Germany's ‘nuclear rearmer’) was threatening peace in Europe; Moscow had a right to press for ‘security' against the ‘German threat’ rather than the reverse.

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²¹ O'Neill, Robert, ‘Securing Peace in Europe in the 1990s’ in Heuser, and O'Neill, , Securing Peace, 313Google Scholar; Croft, Stuart, ‘British policy towards western Europe: 1945–51’, in Stirk, Peter M. R. and Willis, David, eds., Shaping Postwar Europe: European Unity and Disunity 1945–1957 (London: Pinter, 1991), 77.Google Scholar

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²³ Allen, W. D., head of the German political department at the Foreign Office, cited in Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 47.Google Scholar

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²⁵ Croft, ‘British policy’, 77.

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²⁹ The interest in ‘saving’ – or getting more ‘bang for the buck’ – implied the ‘conventionalisation of tactical atomic weapons’; according to J. F. Dulles – 24 April 1954, North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at Paris – it should become agreed NATO policy to use in case of either general or local war atomic weapons as conventional weapons ‘whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so’. Dulles, however, made a strong case for exempting Europe from the United States's and subsequently NATO's move towards massive retaliation. Western Europe was the one region in the world where the doctrine of massive retaliation was expressedly not intended to apply. ‘That is one situation where we are not relying exclusively by any means upon the deterrent of striking power’ – Dulles, 21 December 1953.

³⁰ Trachtenberg, ‘Nuclearisation’, 421; Maier, Klaus A., ‘Amerikanische Nuklearstrategie unter Truman und Eisenhower’, in Maier, Klaus A. and Wiggershaus, Norbert, eds., Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949–56 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 225–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³² See below; the authorisation of the military (Joint Chiefs of Staff and SACEUR) to plan for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe and the deployment of atomic weapons on German territory since mid-1953 left German governments no choice but to demand Nukleare Mitwirkung.

³³ That the coincidence of basic German and US security and defence interests was no ‘given’ became public for the first time in 1956; on the vicissitudes in the German-US security partnership see Hanrieder (note 79 below).

³⁴ Adenauer, alarmed at the Radford plan and other signals of a shift in US foreign policy priorities, argued that the West Europeans must start to prepare for the ‘1960s’, when US presidents would no longer be able (and/or willing) to defend Europe at any price; should Britain and France assign their nuclear potential to a European nuclear weapons authority, under the aegis of NATO, there would be a chance to prevent ‘nationalists’ in Germany from pushing the government to embark upon ‘national’ nuclear rearmament.

³⁵ The main argument of the interviewees still is: How could you expect British and French political elites to forget that the war had ended just a decade ago?

³⁶ Schmidt, Gustav, ‘Tying (West) Germany into the West – But to What? NATO? WEU? The European Community?’ in Wurm, Clemens A., ed., Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings of European Integration (Oxford/Washington: Berg, 1995), 137–74.Google Scholar

³⁷ Schmidt, Gustav, ‘Die Auswirkungen der internationalen Krisen 1956 auf die Strukturen des ‘Kalten Kriegs’’ in Wiggershaus, Norbert und Heinemann, Winfried, eds., Das internationale Krisenjahr 1956.Google Scholar (Veröffentlichungen des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes) (forthcoming).

³⁸ Schmidt, Gustav, ‘Anglo-German Relations, 1955–67: The “American Connection”’, in Ritter, Gerhard A. and Wende, Peter, eds., Festschrift for Antony Nicholls (Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, 1999) (forthcoming)Google Scholar; idem, ‘Vom Anglo-amerikanischen Duopol zum Trilateralismus: Großbritannien-USA-Bundesrepublik’, Amerikastudien, Vol. XXXIX (1994), 73–109.

³⁹ The main German argument was that NATO's strategy and forces structure must be designed in such manner that the USSR could never see a chance to exploit differences within NATO, i.e. to ‘singularise’ Germany. That danger could become reality if the USSR challenged any of the Western nuclear powers (Cuba; ‘another’ Suez) and simultaneously threatened a non-nuclear member (Germany), or if NATO divided itself into zones of different risks and different capabilities to deal with ‘accidental war’ (‘local conflicts’).

⁴⁰ The fact that Moscow did not react too harshly against the Paris Accords of October 1954 and invited Adenauer to Moscow shortly after the FRG became a member of NATO, was seen by Dulles, Adenauer and others as a justification of their thesis that the ‘West’, by sticking to its own agenda and solve its problems first, would convince the ‘Soviets’ that they had better negotiate.

⁴¹ On the connection between the Berlin crisis – following the inconclusive disengagement debate – and the Soviet campaign against the ‘nuclear rearmament’ of the FRG see Trachtenberg, Marc, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Schake, Kori, Contingency Planning for the Berlin Crisis (University of Maryland: Nuclear History Project, 1989)Google Scholar; Conze, Eckard, Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958–1963 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² The rhetoric of Eisenhower and subsequently of the ‘Europeanists’ during the Kennedy and Johnson era, of course, goes further on the 'European option' than the terms of reference of US delegations in their consultations with NATO members.

⁴³ On the different detente strategies and arms control negotiations as well as the various nuclear force-projects see Soutou, Georges-Henri, L'alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratègiques francoallemandes 1945–1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1997)Google Scholar; Haftendom, Helga, Kemwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO-Krise von 1966/67 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994)Google Scholar; Bluth, Christoph, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buteux, Paul, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The stance in public was that Europe could only be defended with nuclear forces; the German claim for ‘Nukleare Mitwirkung’, the anxieties about the zero options, etc. were based on this assessment. That 'nuclear weapons are not for use', can be seen as a result of the controversies within the Truman and Eisenhower administrations over nuclear sabre rattling in the Far East (1950, 1954, 1958); Adenauer and Strauss urged a ‘no-use’ policy on the occasion of contingency planning during the Berlin crisis. The complex issue why the United States and NATO did not end the ‘nuclearisation’ of NATO's strategy and forces postures before 1990 must be studied over and again. Drawing on hitherto unaccessible material, Beatrice Heuser's study points the way: NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Macmillan, 1998); Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar, raise important questions.

⁴⁵ Revelations of former high US officials – McNamara, Kissinger – in their memoirs as to their doubts over the nuclear risk that the US was running on behalf of Europe reaffirmed the trends in European thinking that the time had come to adjust NATO strategy to the decline of the nuclear deterrent as a stronghold of NATO; Freedman, Lawrence, ‘NATO without the Threat’ in idem, ed., Military Power in Europe. (Macmillan, 1990) 20 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Garrett, James M., Central Europe's Fragile Deterrent Structure (Exeter: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) 15 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ President Eisenhower and Dulles, although they had been responsible for the development of the ‘long haul/new look’ strategy, instructed the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to plan to employ nuclear weapons in minor affairs, reminding them that there were ‘certain’ places where the US would not be able to use these weapons because if they did, it would look as though the US were initiating global war; NSC, 265th meeting, 7 October 1953 discussing NSC 162.

⁴⁷ On this see Bozo's article in this issue.

⁴⁸ Schmidt, Gustav, ‘Kanada, die Bundesrepublik und “Europäische Sicherheit”’, in Müller, Guido, Deutschland und der Westen (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), 313–32.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Steinhoff, Johannes and Pommerin, Reiner, Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepublik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ära Adenauer-Kennedy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 37, 64 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Tuschhoff, Christian, Machtgewinn auf leisen Sohlen. Deutschland, Kemwaffen und die NATO. (Baden-Baden: Nomos)Google Scholar, forthcoming; idem, ‘Machtverschiebungen und zukünftige Bruchstellen im Bündnis’, in Gunther Hellmann, ed., Alliierte Präsenz und deutsche Einheit: die politischen Folgen militärischer Macht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 365–401; idem, ‘Multilaterale Verteidigungskooperation in der NATO und amerikanisch-deutscher Machttransfer’, in Gustav Schmidt, ed., Ost-West-Beziehungen: Konfrontation und Détente 1945–1989, II (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1993), 253–71; Gablik, Axel F., Strategische Planungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–67: Politische Kontrolle oder militärische Notwendigkeit? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996)Google Scholar; Haftendorn, , Kemwaffen, 183 ff.Google Scholar; Bluth, , Britain, 115 ff.Google Scholar; Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel.

⁵¹ Schmidt, Gustav, ‘Die politischen and sicherheitspolitischen Dimensionen der britischen Europapolitik, 1955–68', in Schmidt, , ed., Grossbritannien und Europa – Grossbritannien in Europa. (Bochum: Veröffentlichungen des Arbeitskreises Deutsche England-Forschung 10, 1989), 169–314.Google Scholar

⁵² This was the essential element of Germany's status as a semi-sovereign state.

⁵³ This was the background to the ‘Harmel exercise’; on this see Frédéric Bozo's article in this issue, and Bozo's, Frédéric, Deux Stratégies pour I'Europe: De Gaulle, Les Etats-Unis and I'Alliance Atlantique 1958–1969 (Paris, Plon, 1995)Google Scholar; Vaisse, Maurice, Mélandri, Pierre and Bozo, Frédéric, eds., La France et l'OTAN 1949–1996 (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996)Google Scholar; Haftendorn, Kemwaffen, ch. 5.

⁵⁴ Osterheld, Horst, Aussenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963–1966. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1992), 137–43.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ ibid. 58.

⁵⁶ McCloy, J. to President Johnson, 9 Feb.1967, cf. Schmidt, Gustav (with Doran, Charles F.), ed., Amerikas Option für Deutschland und Japan. Die Position und Rolle Deutschlands und Japans in regionalen und intemationalen Strukturen. Die 1950er und 1990er Jahre im Vergleich (Bochum, 1996), 9 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Hampton, Wilsonian Impulse, 73 ff.

⁵⁸ The Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence between the two systems was predicated upon the premise that the ‘West’, especially the United States and West Germany, must not interfere whenever the Kremlin resolved to quash reforms for the sake of enforcing the orthodox views of communist rulers in eastern and central Europe. Gorbachev's dismissal of the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’ met the West's precondition for ‘disengagement’ in all directions. Once the Kremlin resolved to disengage from Moscow's central position of defining and executing the ‘right way to socialism’, it allowed for ‘liberalisation’ in Eastern Europe and for the ‘demilitarisation’ of European politics.

⁵⁹ Each article in this issue is based on a comparison of situations both at an early stage and at the final stage of a ‘structural pattern’, and focuses on the relationship between intra-West tensions and ‘conflict and cooperation’ between Western powers and ‘Russia’.

⁶⁰ McCloy, John to Gilpatric, 8 January 1965, cf. Schertz, Deutschlandpolitik, 323–4.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The FRG ‘gained’ sovereignty later (after ratification of the Paris Accords of October 1954 and the Declarations of May 1955) than the GDR (26 March 1954). The ‘Peace’ settlement between the three Western allies and the FRG embraced constraints on German sovereignty: no West German government had the right to negotiate a settlement of its own with the USSR on matters affecting Germany as a whole (‘unification’, the eastern border) and Berlin; the integration of German armed forces into NATO structures were conceived with a view to making it impossible for the German military to operate autonomously; whereas Britain and France regarded their ‘independent nuclear deterrent force’ as a step towards ensuring their territory as a sanctuarium, Germany's non-nuclear status made Bonn dependent on NATO' – in fact: US and British – willingness to ‘nuclearise’ the security guarantee of Article V and to protect Germany against nuclear blackmail. In total, Germany depended upon the effectiveness of ‘multilateralism’, but had no guarantee that the USA, Britain and France supported and practised ‘multilateralism’ within the Westcentric systems.

⁶² Britain and the USA emphasised on the one hand the responsibility of the ‘strategic’ powers in the ‘missile age’ – i.e. the need for the US and the United Kingdom to discuss with the USSR the terms of arms control and non-proliferation regimes (even to the extent of forestalling a ‘European option’) – whilst on the other hand stressing that the global contest was shifting from military confrontation towards competition for the allegiance of Third-World countries. With regard to the latter, Germany was expected to pay a large part of the West's bill on aid and development; under the first rubric, Germany was expected, as were Italy or Canada, to agree to the basic tenets of the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation treaties, which demarcated the range of compromises between the USA and the USSR, with Britain as a third party to the negotiations.

⁶³ Studies by Ridgway and Gruenther had indicated that an atomic defence of Western Europe would still require a ‘shield’ of ground forces strong enough to force the enemy to concentrate its own troops in an attempt to break through NATO lines, thereby providing targets against which it would be worth using nuclear weapons (Watson, Robert J., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953–1954, vol. 5 of History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC, 1986), 304 ff.Google Scholar; Greiner, Christian, ‘Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU and die NATO 1954 bis 1957’ in Forschungsamt, Militärgeschichtliches, ed., Anfange westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, vol. 3: Die NATO-Option (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 608).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ von Gersdorff, Gero, Adenauers Aussenpolitik gegenüber den Siegermächten 1954. (Munich: Old-enbourg, 1994), 26, 65 ff., 110 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that Gruenther was sure that NATO even without a German contribution had sufficient force to hold any attack by the Soviets; but there is all the different in the world between asserting that available forces would make an attack extremely costly for an attacker and the requirements for stopping an invasion force as far east as possible.

⁶⁵ Leopoldo Nuti's article in this issue broaches this issue.

⁶⁶ Freedman, ‘NATO’, 5.

⁶⁷ On the shift in Moscow's nuclear strategy see Beatrice Heuser's article in this issue; cf. footnote 1.

⁶⁸ The extended conflict first about the INF treaty (1986/7) and then the modernisation of ‘Lance’ (1989/90), culminated in coining watchwords such as ‘the shorter the missile-range, the deader the Germans’. ‘Flexible response and the heavy reliance upon tactical and Euro-strategic nuclear weapons ensured that any limited war in Europe would be a total war for the Germans’, Kirchner, Emile J. and Sperling, James, ‘From Instability to Stability’ in Kirchner, and Sperling, eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: After 40 Years (London, Macmillan, 1992), 11.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ On the trends towards adapting NATO strategy to the decline of the nuclear deterrent as a stronghold of NATO, cf. Freedman, ‘NATO’, 20 ff.; Durch, Blechman and O'Prey, , NATO's Stake, 77.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Garrett, Fragile, ch. 7. Less than adequate provisions on many critical counts; doubts as to the sustainability of conventional forces, due to the effects of ‘structural disarmament’, on the one hand and divergent US, British, French, and German foreign policy and defence postures on the other made it extremely difficult for NATO to have a more balanced view as to what was and what was not dispensable in its military structure.

⁷² The CFE negotiations, starting in March 1989, and the run-up to the NATO summit (to celebrate NATO's fortieth anniversary!) revealed tensions concerning ‘modernisation’ of atomic weapons systems, disputes about what were NATO's military requirements and how to distribute the likely results of arms reduction agreements among the different zones.

⁷³ Schröder, Hans-Henning, Sowjetische Rüstungs- und Sicherheitspolitik zwischen ‘Stagnation’ und ‘Perestrojka’: Eine Untersuchung der Wechselbeziehungen von auswärtiger Politik und innerem Wandel in der UdSSR (1979–1991), Habilitationsschrift, (Bochum, 1994); Kanet and Kolodziej, Cold War, 16 ff.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ The ‘big prize’ in this was Kohl's offer to reduce the size of the combined former East and West German forces to less than two-thirds of the previous nominal strength of the Bundeswehr.

⁷⁵ Kanet, Roger E., ‘Superpower Cooperation in Eastern Europe’, in Kanet and Kolodziej, Cold War, 110 ff.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ This refers to the combination of German-Russian agreements, KSE I and the Paris Charter of 21 November 1990. One element was the (temporary) semi-demilitarised status of former GDR territory. Although the united Germany stayed in NATO, no NATO forces would be deployed in the new Länder, and during the same period the USSR would withdraw its forces from East Germany. Another element was the renewal of the non-nuclear power status of the FRG.

⁷⁷ Britain, Canada, and the USA, which were thinking of arms reduction talks as a means to alleviate the fate of the East Europeans, asserted that the USSR might be more forthcoming if the West formally recognised the territorial status quo; this meant recognition of existing borders, in particular the Oder-Neisse line and the ‘demarcation’ line between the two Germanies. The Berlin situation was a complicating factor – before, during and after the Berlin crisis of 1958–61.

⁷⁸ See above.

⁷⁹ This theme is brilliantly explored by Hanrieder, Wolfram F., ‘The FRG and NATO: Between Security Dependence and Security Partnership’, in Kirchner, Emil J. and Sperling, James, eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years After. (London, Macmillan, 1992), 194–220; cf. note 33.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Britain, France, and the FRG never believed in nor wanted to rely on conventional deterrence; therefore, they were loath to give in to US pressures for the ‘re-conventionalisation’ of NATO's strategy and Europe's defence posture; the shortcomings on this account could not but reinforce the nuclear dilemma.

⁸¹ The size of 500,000 men was attained in 1972.