Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T13:47:10.123Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Stasi and the East German Revolution of 1989

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2010

Richard Popplewell
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Though the GDR's Ministry for State Security (Stasi) had enormous powers in 1989, it failed adequately to predict or to suppress the Revolution. It encouraged the Communist Party's opposition to reform by providing a distorted picture of society. The Stasi was restricted in its reporting by the ideological blinkers which it shared with the Party. Even during the Revolution, the Stasi believed that popular discontent could be remedied by a vigorous presentation of Party policies. In order to understand fully the events of 1989, it is necessary to view them also through the eyes of the Stasi.

En dépit de l'énorme pouvoir dont il disposait, le ministère d'Etat pour la sécurité de la République démocratique d'Allemagne (Stasi) fut incapable de prévoir ou de prévenir la révolution. Il encouragea, au sein du parti communiste, l'opposition aux réformes en présentant une image tronquée de la société. La vision de la Stasi était restreinte par les oeillères idéologiques qu'elle paratageait avec le parti communiste. Même durant la révolution, la Stasi pensait que le mécontentement populaire pourrait être désamorcé par une présentation vigoureuse de la politique du parti. Bien comprendre les évènements de 1989 passe par leur examen à travers les yeux de la Stasi.

Obwohl das Ministerium 1989 über enorme Kräfte verfúgte, war es ihm nicht gelungen die Revolution weder vorherzusagen noch zu unterdrücken. Es versuchte die Opposition innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei zu Reformmassnahmen zu bewegen durch die Präsentation eines verzerrtes Gesellschaftsbildes. Die Staasi-berichte waren nicht imstande ein realistisches Bild der Situation zu verbreiten aufgrund der Tatsache, dass das Ministerium genau dieselbe ideologische Scheuklappen trug als die Partei. Sogar während der Revolution glaubte es, dass die Volksunzufriedenheit durch eine energische Präsentation der Parteipolitik zu beheben war. Um die Ereignisse des Jahres 1989 voll und ganz zu verstehen muss man sie auch mit Stasiaugen ansehen.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , March 1992 , pp. 37 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Pravda, 5 Nov. 1989.

2 ‘Die Informationsstrecke war eine Einbahnstraße’, statement of ‘Klaus, 40 years of age’, Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe’ in Wilkening, Christina, Staat im Staate, Auskunfte ebemaliger Stasi-Mitarbeiter (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1990)Google Scholar. Thereafter Staat im Staate.

3 The immediate cause was a feeling on the part of the Roundtable that the government was not providing them with sufficient information about the state security service. East Berlin ADN International Service, 16 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-on, 17 Jan. 1990.

4 East Berlin ADN International Service, 26 Feb. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–039, 27 Feb. 1990.

5 East Berlin ADN International Service, 23 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–078, 23 April 1990.

6 They did not, however, retain complete control of the archives for long. On 2 Feb. the East German Cabinet appointed a State Committee which directed the work of dissolving the Stasi. Relations between the two committees were bad. The State Committee was mainly composed of former SED members. Six hundred former Stasi assisted the Berlin Citizens’ Committee in processing the Normannenstraße archive. However, the Citizens’ Committee's relations with them were relatively cordial. Their hostility was directed far more against the Party, whom they accused of betraying them, than against members of the former opposition. Conversation between Richard Popplewell and Heinz Meier, Leiter des Aufbaustabes, Bürgerkomitee zur Kontrolle der Auflösung des MfS, 28 May 1990. Thereafter Conversations, 28 May 1990.

7 Mitter, Armin and Wolle, Stefan, eds, Ich liebe euch doch alle. Befehle und Lageberichte des MfS Januar-November 1989 (Berlin: Basis Druck Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1990)Google Scholar. Thereafter ILEDA.

8 Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Introduction to ILEDA.

9 Bonn initially insisted that the Stasi documents be taken to the West German federal archives in Koblenz. But immediately before signing the unification treaty between the two Germanies on 31 Aug., it agreed that the documents should remain in the territory of the former GDR. Warning protests against possible West German interference started just before reunification. The strength of the citizens’ movement's determination to retain control of the documents took West German politicians by surprise.

10 Public archives of Stasi material are ready for immediate opening in Dresden and Leipzig.

11 Conversation between Richard Popplewell and members of the Dresden Citizens’ Committee, Nov. 1990.

12 The only general history of the Stasi in the period 1950–88 is Fricke, Karl Wilhelm, Die Staatsskherheit DDR (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989). ch. 1, ‘Das MfS - unabdingbares Herrschaftsinstrument der SED’Google Scholar. Thereafter Die Staatsskherheit DDR.

13 One former Stasi officer has recently stated about his experiences in the 1980s: ‘Many people talk today about Stalinism. I don't know what this is, although I have tried hard to understand that happened. I find the term “administrative-bureaucratic system” more correct.’ ‘Die Informationsstrecke war eine Einbahnstraße’ in Staat im Staate.

14 ‘Ich war ein Teil, der zu funktionieren hatte’, statement of ‘Hans, 50 years of age’, Hauptabteilung XX, ibid.

15 Die Staatssicherheit DDR. ch. 1.

16 The situation in East German universities is well described in ‘Karies, Bach und Läufer’, Der Spiegel, June 1990, which provides details about the Stasi's attempts to secure informers in student groups.

I would also refer for comparison to my own experiences at the University of Olomouc in Czechoslovakia in the Summer of 1989. The Czechs generally held that one in five fellow-students were working for the Stasi's Czechoslovak equivalent, the Statni Bezpecnost (StB). Whether this figure was correct is unimportant’, the limitations such fear imposed on all freedom of discussion were the same as if one in five students really were informers.

17 Schell, Manfred und Kalinka, Werner, Stasi und kein Ende (Frankfurt, Berlin and Vienna: Ullstein Verlag, 1991), ch. 8, ‘Zum ÄuBersten bereit - SED und Stasi kämpfen gegen die Wende’. Thereafter, Stasi und kein Ende.Google Scholar

18 Mielke, Erich, Sozialismus und Frieden - Sinn unseres Kampfes, Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze (East Berlin: 1987), 421.Google Scholar

19 Mielke was elected as Candidate Member in 1971 and full member in 1976. Die Staatssicherheit DDR, ch. 9, ‘Die Chefs des MfS’.

20 Interim report on the dissolution of the former Office of National Security by Manfred Sauer, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin A D N International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-99O-OI2, 18 Jan. 1990.’

21 Interim report on the state of the disbandment of the Office of National Security, presented by Manfred Sauer, Deputy Head of the G D R Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, East Berlin A D N International Service, 15 Jan., in FBIS-EEU-990–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

22 Neues Deutschland, 9–10 June 1990, 6.

23 For example, ‘Schild und Schwert der Partei’. Pt I, Der Spiegel, 6/1990, 50. Thereafter ‘Schild und Schwert der partei’.

24 A ‘former high-ranking’ Stasi officer stated on West German television in April 1990: ‘Listening to Egon Krenz today, and referring to large sections of your press, I note that the term, state within the state, is used, and that the SED ranked after the State Security Ministry. That not only distorts the historic facts, it will also make it very difficult to find the historic truth regarding individual facts. The State Security Ministry was the shield and sword of the party - totally. The control of this ministry was total … The basic orientations of the State Security Ministry's activities came from his office, from him personally, because he was the security secretary.’ Mainz, ZDF Television Network, 11 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–071, 12 April 1990.

25 Interim report on the state of the disbandment of the Office of National Security, presented by Manfred Sauer, Deputy Head of the GDR Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, East Berlin AND International Service, 15 Jan., in FBIS-EEU-90–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

26 East Berlin ADN International Service, 8 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU-9O-O48, 12 March 1990.

27 East Berlin ADN International Service, 18 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–013, 19 Jan. 1990.

28 Mitter and Wolle, Introduction to ILEDA.

29 Statement of Manfred Sauer to the Roundtable, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin A D N International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

30 Interim report on the dissolution of the former Office of National Security by Manfred Sauer, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin A D N International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–012, 18 Jan. 1990.

31 Statement of Manfred Sauer to the Roundtable, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin A D N International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

32 Interim report on the dissolution of the former Office of National Security by Manfred Sauer, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin ADN International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–012, 18 Jan. 1990.

33 Ibid.

34 Junge Welt interview with Markus Wolf, relayed on East Berlin ADN International Service, 17 June 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–117, 18 June 1990.

For an organisational table of the MfS, see the appendix to Stasi im Stasi.

35 The channel of communication by which oppositionists found themselves on the central computers of the MfS ran as follows: Local AKG (Auswertungs und Kontrollgruppe); Data base of the ZPDB (Zentrale Personendatenbank). AKG puts names of enemy subversives in the files of Hauptabteilung XX. ILEDA, document 4: Friedensseminar Greifswald (MfS-Befehl 24/89, 10.3.1989).

36 Miller and Wolle, Introduction to ILEDA.

37 Statement of Werner Fischer, government representative for the dissolution of the MfS, cited on Hamburg DPA, 4 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–066, 5 April 1990.

38 All officers of the HVA were required to work in the domestic branches of the Stasi at some stage of their career. The purpose of this was to remind them that they were East Germans first, and members of the socialist bloc second. Adams, Jefferson, ‘Crisis and Resurgence: East German State Security’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 2, no. 4, (1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39 Conversation 28 May 1990.

40 Interim report on the dissolution of the former Office of National Security by Manfred Sauer, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin ADN International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–012, 18 Jan. 1990.

41 See the plaintive letters in Burgerkomitee zur Auflösung des MfS/AfNS, eds, Stasi Intern: Macht ünd Banalitat (Forum Verlag Leipzig, 1990)Google Scholar. Hereafter, Stasi Intern.

42 For example the file of a woman from the Dresden Citizens' Committee who was engaged to a West German. ‘Jeder Tag ein Alptraum’, Der Spiegel 17/1990.

43 Staat im Staate. Riecker, A. et al. , eds, Stasi Intim. Gespräche mit ehemaligen MfS-Mitarbeiter. (Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 1990).Google Scholar

44 East Berlin ADN International Service, 12 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

45 Interim report on the dissolution of the former Office of National Security by Manfred Sauer, 15 Jan. 1990, East Berlin ADN International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–012. 18 Jan. 1990.

46 A former member of ZAIG recalls: ‘The bulk of reports were distributed to the former Collegium of the MfS and to the Minister [Mielke]. it is important to note here that this information really came from the grassroots. By this I mean the broadest sections of the population. I would like to stress this. Then the reports were compiled by the relevant district [Kreis] sections and given to the provincial ‘Bezirk] administration. Here it was condensed again, and this created the problem that we were no longer receiving the original information.’ ‘Die Informationsstrecke war eine Einbahnstraße’, in Staat im Staate.

47 This situation was not new to 1989. One Stasi officer claimed that ‘For years shortages among the population were reported!’ Ibid.

48 East Berlin ADN International Service, 9 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–048, 12 March 1990.

49 ‘Schild und Schwert der partei (I)’, Der Spiegel, 6/1990.

50 East Berlin ADN International Service, 26 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–021, 31 Jan. 1990. Günther Schabowski, a former member of the Politburo, claimed that even Honecker often complained that ‘Mielke was not clever enough’ and even ‘clumsy’. East Berlin ADN International Service, 23 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–016, 24 Jan. 1990.

51 ‘Schild und Schwert der Partei (III), Der Spiegel, 8/1990. Outside this central complex, the Stasi carried out their control of the post in rooms belonging to the post office, but to which postal workers had no access. Statement of Manfred Sauer to the Roundtable, 15 Jan. 1990. East Berlin AND International Service, 15 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–010, 16 Jan. 1990.

Of an average of 90,000 posted every day in Erfurt, 3,000 had been opened. East Berlin ADN International Service, 18 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–013, 19 jan. 1990.

52 ‘Doppelte Abschußquote’, Der Spiegel, 32/1990.

53 Diestel said that the reception of terrorists from the Federal Republic had evidently been an ‘individual hobby’ of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke, who saw their own youth reflected in the terrorists. Hamburg DPA, 19 June 1990, in FBIS-EEU-9O-12O, 21 June 1990.

54 ‘Eine perverse Kombination’, Der Spiegel, 25/1990. The idiosyncracies of the SED leadership are not, of course, the sole reason why the GDR supported terrorism. The following supplemental factors are also convincing explanations.

(1) Some contacts between terrorists and the Stasi were inevitable, since the RAF obtained and training in Arab countries, particularly Syria, Iraq and Southern Yemen, whose secret services were built up either by the Stasi or the KGB. But East Germany's active support for West German and Arab terrorists may be explained by the following motives.

(2) The East German Party leadership's eagerness to subvert the Federal Republic was revealed by captured Stasi documents, which gave details of plans to support partisan actions in the event of a possible crisis inside West Germany. Since the mid-1970s, 176 West German communists had been trained to this end in a secret camp near Frankfurt am Oder. The East German leadership saw the RAF as an asset to be kept in reserve, until the time was ripe to destabilise West Germans in earnest.

(3) Support for the RAF suited the Stasi's international role. The Palestinian terrorist organizations were particularly important to the Stasi in the general scheme of East-West relations. Thus, the Red Army Faction gained in importance, in the Stasi's eyes, from its close connection with the PLO.

(4) The East German leadership regarded Arab countries such as Libya, Syria and Iraq as allies in the ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle. They had helped Honecker bring the GDR out of diplomatic isolation in the 1970s.

(5) They wanted to shield East Germany from terrorist attacks.

55 Mitter and Wolle, Introduction to ILEDA.

56 ‘Die Informationsstrecke war eine Einbahnstraße’ in Staat im Staate.

57 Some Stasi officers claimed, that in the final years, Krenz was responsible for the direction of the Stasi's work, including its orders and its orientation. However, it is still hard to assess the extent of Krenz's role. The Stasi hated Krenz for the way they felt he betrayed them in 1989, and had an obvious axe to grind against him. See, for example, ‘Wir waren und wurden diszipliniert’, statement of ‘Franz, 54 years of age’, former Lieutenant-Colonel in the Zentrale Auswertungs-und Informationsgruppe’, ibid.

58 Mitter and Wolle, Introduction to ILEDA.

59 ILEDA, document nos 1: Luxemburg-Liebknecht-Demonstration in Leipzig (MfS-Information 25/89, 16.1.1989); and 2: Luxemburg-Liebknecht-Demonstration in Leipzig (Fernschreiben der SED-Bezirksleitung Nr.17, 167.1.1989).

60 ‘Ich war ein Teil, der zu funktionieren hatte’, in Staat in Staate.

61 ILEDA, document no. 10: Oppositionelle Zusammenschlüsse (MfS-Information 150/89. 1.6.1989).

62 ZAIG noted that this ‘group includes the Pastors EPPELMANN, TSCHICHE and WONNEBERGER, as well as Gerd and Ulrike POPPE, Bargel BOHLEY, and Werner FISCHER; the persons RÜDDENKLAU, SCHULT, Dr KLEIN and LEITZ’, ILEDA, 10.

63 Ibid., document no. 10.

64 Ibid., document no. 4.

65 ZAIG could not use the word ‘emigrate’ because these people wanted to go to the Federal Republic, which they did not regard as a legitimate state.

66 ILEDA, document no. 15: Ausreise in die BRD und Westberlin (MfS Analyse, Juli 1989).

67 Ibid., document no. 6: Kommunalwahlen 7, Mai 1989 (MfS-Hinweise, 26.4.1989).

68 Ibid., document no. 10.

69 Ibid., document 4.

70 Ibid., document no. 5: Aktion von Antragstellern auf ständige Ausreise in Leipzig (MfS-Information, 122/89, 14.3.1989). Ibid., document no. 7: Kommunalwahlen 7. Mai 1989 (MfS-Information, 229/89, 8.5.1989).

71 Ibid., document no. 10.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., document no. 23: Motive fur Ausreiseantrage und Republikflucht (MfS-Hinweise, 9.9.1989).

75 Ibid., document no. 18: Kommunalwahlen 7. Mai 1989 (MfS-Hinweise, 7.7.1989).

76 Ibid., document no. 4.

77 Ibid., document no. 10.

78 For a comparison with the role of ideology in the Soviet Union, see Hosking, Geoffrey, The Awakening of the Soviet Union (London: Heinemann, 1990), ch. 1.Google Scholar

79 ILEDA, document no. 8: Bevölkerungsreaktion auf sowjetische Medienpolitik (MfS-Hinweise, 10.5.1989).

80 Popplewell, Richard, ‘Themes in the Speeches of KGB Leaders from Andropov to Kryuchkov’, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 6, no. 3 (1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

81 ILEDA, document no. 6.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., document no. 7.

84 East Berlin ADN International Service, 17 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–014, 22 Jan. 1990.

85 Berliner Zeitung, 14 Feb. 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–040, 28 Feb. 1990. ILEDA, document no. 7. Ibid., document no. 9: Kommunalwahlen 7, Mai 1989 (MfS-Befehl 38/89, 19.5.1989).

86 Ibid., document nos. 13: Ereignisse in China (MfS-Befehl 45/89, 10.6.1989); and 14: Ereignisse in China (MfS-Information 321/89, 30.6.1989).

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., document no. 23.

89 Ibid., document no. 20: Oppositionsveranstaltung in Leipzig und Dresden (MfS-Information 337/89, 10.7.1989).

90 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

91 ILEDA, document no. 21, Dienstsprechung des Ministers fur Staatssicherheit (Tonbandabschrift, 31.8.1989, Auszug).

92 ZAIG recommended that: ‘Under the leadership of the Central Committee, a working group should be formed from the security organs, corresponding state organs and academic institutions to study reports, tasks, arguments, as well as other bases for offensive measures,’ Ibid., document no. 26: Oppositionelle Zusammenschlusse (MfS-Information 416/89, 19.9.1989).

93 Ibid., document no. 35: Bevölkerungsreaktion auf Einschränkung des Reiseverkehrs (MfS-Information 438/89). 4.10.1989).

94 Ibid., document no. 21.

95 Ibid., document no. 26.

96 For details of the formation of New Forum and Democratic Awakening, see Ibid., documents nos 29: Neues Forum (MfS-Information 429/89, 27.9.1989); 30: Demokratischer Aufbruch (MfS-Information 432/89, 29.9.1989), 31: Demokratischer Aufbruch (MfS-Information 433/89, 2.10.1989); 32: Neues Forum (MfS-Information 434/89, 2.10.1989); and 41: Oppositionelle Zusammenschlüsse (MfS-Information 451/89, 9.10.1989).

97 Ibid., document no. 27: Haltung der katholischen Kirche (MfS-Information 426/89, 25.9.1989).

98 Ibid., document no. 40: Innenpolitische Lage (MfS-Hinweise, 8.10.1989).

99 Mielke concluded that ‘good forces, who were capable of something’ could show that such people were talking nonsense, and that people were not being given correct information. Ibid., document no. 21.

100 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

101 Ibid.

102 ILEDA, document no. 40.

103 ZAIG lamented that: ‘Above all, progressive groups were completely unable to comprehend the lack of offensive political discussions with hostile, opposition groups and with the anti-socialist pamphlets produced and disseminated by such groups’. Ibid.

104 Ibid., document no. 46: Humboldt-Universität (MfS-Information 458/89, (16.10.1989).

105 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

106 ILEDA, document no. 17: ‘Soforteinsatzgruppe operative Beobachtung’ (MfS-Befehl 50/89, 5.7.1989).

107 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

108 ‘Kennwort Rosenstock’, Der Spiegel, 30/1990. Hamburg DPA, 1 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90- 063, 2 April 1990. Berlin ADN International Service, 2 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–064, 3 April 1990.

109 Die Welt, 29 Jan. 1990, 5.

110 Mainz ZDF Television Network, 11 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–071, 12 April 1990.

111 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

112 ILEDA, document no. 39: Maßnahmen gegen Ausweitung der Demonstracionswelle (Fernschreiben o.Nr., 8.10.1989).

113 Mainz ZDF Television Network, 11 April 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90–073, 12 April 1990. According to Egon Krenz's account of events, Krenz never wanted to use force.

114 ILEDA, document no. 48: Montagsdemonstration in Leipzig (Fernschreiben 76/89, 16.10.89).

115 An order received by the Leipzig Stasi on 16 Oct. read ‘appeals will be made (on our side) –then if there is to be violence, no one can say he did not know about it’. DB-L-BV. 16.10.90. A general statement of intent is contained in FS Minister VVS 84/89 - ‘Maßnahmen Sicherheit der Objekte’, in Stasi Intern - Macht und Banalität.

116 DB-L-BV, aus dem Dienstbuch des Leiters der Bezirksverwaltung, Ibid.

117 Stasi und kein Ende, ch. 8.

118 Mitter and Wolk, Introduction to ILEDA.

119 ‘Wir waren und wurden diszipliniert’, in Staat im Staate.

120 ILEDA, document no. 45: Haltung der Kampfgruppen (MfS-Information 457/89, 15.10.89).

121 Ibid., document no. 49: Referat des Ministers fur Staatssicherheit (Protokollauszug, 21.10.1989).

122 Letter from Hauptmann ‘H.O.’, Abteilung II, Bezirksverwaltung fur Staatssicherheit, to Generalleutnant Hummitzsch, Leiter der Bezirksverwaltung, Leipzig, 10.11.1989, in Stasi Intern.

123 Hummitzsch's arguments were based on the following lines. The attacks on the Stasi made them aware that their reputation, and the people's trust in them, was not what they had assumed. Thus they were taking the initiative, making greater use of publicity. The Stasi's publicity was particularly aimed to be effective among the working class. The Stasi was given many duties which had nothing to do with the basic tasks of a socialist security service. The reasons for this should be presented honestly. Partly this was a result of party policies. Entwurf. Leipzig, 15.11.1989. Analyse des Interviews des Leiters der BV mit dem Sender Leipzig am 14.11.1989, Ibid.

124 Berlin Headquarters sent out the following message to the provinces: ‘We have noted Comrade Erich Mielke's appearance before the Volkskammer yesterday evening with deep consternation. In agreement with the opinion of many comrades, the Secretariat of the District Management has distanced itself from these explanations of Comrade Mielke before the highest organ of the people.’ Communication from H. Felber, 1. Sekretär, Sekretariat der Kreisleitung, MfS Belin, to 1. Sekretär der Parteiorganisation der SED, alle Bezirksverwaltungen, und Parteiorganisation der Hochschule des MfS, Ibid.

125 For one member of the Stasi, however, the revolution of 1989 did not spell the end. After his disastrous appearance before the Volkskammer, Erich Mielke was consigned to a prison hospital. He enraged his guards by acting as if he were still head of the MfS. In particular, he constantly demanded that they provide his cell with a telephone. Unable to bear this behaviour any longer, the prison authorities complied with his orders, and Mielke set to work giving long instructions to his subordinates. The lines were disconnected. ‘Schild und Schwert der Partei’. The Berlin Citizens' Committee assured me of the veracity of this Spiegel article.

‘“Was ist Gesetzlichkeit?”’ SPIEGEL–Interview mit Peter Erfurth, dem bisherigen Stasi-Chef von Greifswald, Der Spiegel, 7/1990, 138.

126 ‘Wir waren und wurden diszipliniert’, in Staat im Staate.