¹ Windsor, Philip, German Reunification (London: Elek Books, 1969), 23.Google Scholar

² These are all very sensitive political issues. In some instances the state of research permits one to draw conclusions; but in most cases we can only define the problem areas and the issues at stake. This article intends to assess the various scenarios; a more detailed and chronological analysis, extending to circumstances and specifics of situations and going into the domestic, intra-allied/transnational and international activities and debates, will be presented in my concluding chapter to the Actes de Congrès of the Bochum Conference (see Introduction).

³ President Dwight Eisenhower, 21 Nov. 1955, 267th meeting of the National Security Council, Foreign Relations of the United States (thereafter FRUS), 1955–7, iv. 349, 351; cf. Memorandum by the Office of European Regional Affairs, 6 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 355.

⁴ The view that the Soviet Union had to respond to the challenge which ‘European integration’ put to the Ostblock, and that the US – as a quasi-European power – was an integral part of any European Security System was also held by the SPD (eg, Willy Brandt); European integration was thought to induce and stimulate transformation in the ‘East’.

⁵ Adenauer put this argument to Scelba, Italy's Prime Minister; record of conversation, 26 March 1954, Political Archives of the Auswärtiges Amt (thereafter AA-PA) iii. 232–00. ‘Der Herr Bundeskanzler erwidert, daß ein geeintes Europa viel weniger als Sprungbrett fur die Amerikaner…dienen werde als das heutige Europa, und daß die Russen dies genau wüßten…’.

⁶ Adenauer to Scelba, record of conversation, 26 March 1954.

⁷ Bonn asked the Western allies to extend the task of working groups on arms control and limitation to the study of European Security, Disarmament and German unification. This group was established in Feb. 1957; it prepared briefings for the Bermuda Conference in March 1957 between Eisenhower and Macmillan (who was supposed to represent Paris and Bonn, too); Grewe, Wilhelm G., Rückblenden 1951–76. Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen deutscher Außenpolitik von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien, 1979), 291 ff.Google Scholar However, the 29 July 1957 Declaration on German Reunification satisfied only one part of Adenauer's purposes; the statement that a beginning could be made towards disarmament without prior or parallel negotiations on German unity reaffirmed the division of Germany, as it comprised the GDR as an affected area and hence as a signatory to the prospective agreement.

⁸ Dulles, J. F. to, Eisenhower, , 6 Sept. 1953Google Scholar, FRUS, 1952–1954, ii. 457ff.Google Scholar

⁹ Blackwill, R., Introduction, in Blackwill, R. and Larrabee, S., eds, Conventional Arms Control and East–West Security (thereafter Blackwill and Larrabee, Arms Control) (1989), xxx.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This refers to the Geneva summit 1955, the Messina initiative and the Kremlin's invitation to Adenauer in June 1955; to the SALT talks, the Hague Summit and the launch of German Ostpolitik in 1969; the INF–START talks, the Delors initiatives and ‘second German Ostpolitik’ in 1985/7.

¹¹ Deighton, A., The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War (thereafter Deighton, Peace) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

¹² Frank Roberts, Minute, 22 May 1953, CA 1071/137, FO 371 – 103 762.

¹³ Dulles in a conversation with Gruber, 26 March 1955, quoted 4by Bischof, Günter, ‘The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953–1955’ (thereafter Bischof, ‘Powers’), Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vol. 42 (1992), 386.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Deighton, Peace, 123, cf. 58/59. The quote comprises the gist of the so-called Magnettheorie, shared by Adenauer and by Kurt Schumacher since 1947.

¹⁵ Heuser, B., ‘Keystone in the Division of Europe: Germany in the Cold War’ (thereafter Heuser, ‘Keystone’), Contemporary European History, Vol. 1, no.3 (1992), 325 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Brief for the UK delegation to the London Conferences, 26 April 1950, Re-establishment of German Armed Forces, DBPO, 2nd ser., ii. 140. ‘Until Germany is far more involved with the West than she is at present we have no firm assurance that Germany will not throw in her lot with Russia. Until the Federal Republic is firmly in the Western camp it would be dangerous to allow it to rearm…’.

¹⁷ Dulles, late January 1956, FRUS, 1955–1957, iv. 399–400.Google Scholar The weakness of France, the growing military potential of the Soviet Union, the aversion against over-expanding American resources as a consequence of confronting the Soviet Union ‘single-handed’ around the globe, etc., were standard arguments in favour of ‘upgrading’ Germany to an equal partner, but in integrated European structures.

¹⁸ Meeting of US and UK delegations, 28 June 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, v. 998 ff.Google Scholar; cf. Office of German Affairs to Dulles, 27 May 1954, FRUS, vii. 570 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Costigliola, Frank, ‘The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin’ in: Paterson, T., ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961–1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 36–8 (thereafter Paterson, Quest).Google Scholar Although this remark refers to the Kennedy era, it is present from the creation of NATO and the foundation of the FRG.

²⁰ Rupieper, H. J., ‘Die Berliner Auβenministerkonferenz von 1954 und die Frage der deutschen Einheit’ (thereafter Rupieper, ‘Auβenministerkonferenz), Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (1986/1983), 433.Google Scholar

²¹ Schwartz, T. A., ‘The Skeleton Key – American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1944–54’, Central European History, Vol. 19 (1986), 369–85.Google Scholar For the same reason, first Strauss (as Minister of Defence since 1956) and then Adenauer pressed for extending NATO integration, with a view to solving the German and NATO's nuclear dilemma (see below).

²² Adenauer to Heuss President, 9 Jan. 1958, cf. Schwarz, H. P., Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967 (thereafter Schwarz, Adenauer), (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), 385.Google Scholar

²³ President R. M. Nixon's First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 18 Feb. 1970.

²⁴ See the contributions of Guillen, Pierre, Pikart, Eberhard, Greiner, Christian and Wiggershaus, Norbert in: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948–1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz (Boppard, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁵ Weber, S., ‘Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO’ (thereafter Weber, ‘Shaping’), International Organization, Vol. 46, no. 3 (1992), 633–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Ireland, T., Creating the Entangling Alliance (London: Aldwych, 1981)Google Scholar; Williams, P., The Senate and US troops in Europe (London, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaplan, L. L., The United States and NATO (Lexington: The University Press, Kentucky, 1984)Google Scholar; Forschungsamt Militärgeschichtliches, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, 2 vols, 1982–1990Google Scholar; Riste, O., ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985).Google Scholar The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the US to be responsible for the strategic bombing particularly as a deterrent and to limit the scope of US involvement in the defence of Europe; after the ratification of the McClellan Amendment 1951, the US Administration could make no further deployments (beyond the four divisions) without the consent of Congress. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy (thereafter JCS) Vols IV, V (Washington DC, 1986).

²⁷ This was reaffirmed in 1953 in the process of formulating the ‘long haul’ strategy; see NSC 160/1, Aug. 1953 and NSC 162/2; Duffield, J. S., The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture, PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1989 (UMI Dissertation services, Ann Arbor, 1991), 152 ff.Google Scholar; Wampler, R. A., Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Britain and the Foundations of NATO strategy, 1948–1957 (thereafter Wampler, Legacy), PhD thesis, Harvard University 1991Google Scholar; Thoß, Bruno and Volkmann, Hans-Erich, ed., Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung. Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesre-publik im Mächtesystem der Jahre 1953–1956 (thereafter Thoß and Volkmann, Zwischen) (Boppard, 1988).Google Scholar

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²⁹ The Paris treaties of 1954/5 stipulated that the FRG be obliged to remain committed to European integration; the restoration of sovereignty did not create or extend Germany's scope for action towards neutrality; Herbst, L., Option für den Westen. Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag (dtv 1260) (Munich, 1989), 104Google Scholar; Link, W., ‘Deutsche Ostpolitik und Zuständigkeit der Alliierten’, in Birke, A. M., Heydemann, G., eds, Britain and East Germany since 1918 (Munich, 1992), 107–20;Google ScholarFriedrich, W. U., ‘“Wir sind ein Volk”. Die Deutschen und die deutsche Einheit, 1945–1990’, German Studies Review, Special Issue: German Identity (1992), 137 ff.Google Scholar

³⁰ Erler, Fritz, ‘Umrüstung’, Auβenpolitik, Vol. 8, no. 1 (1957), 12–20.Google Scholar

³¹ Lloyd, S., Churchill, , 22 June 1953Google Scholar; this is a frequently quoted statement. See Dockrill, Saki, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950–1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 128–9.Google Scholar

³² See introduction to this issue, p. xx.

³³ Dulles memo, 16 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, iv. 28–9Google Scholar; Dulles, J. F. to, Dulles, Allen, 25 July 1955, qouted by Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Restoration and Reunification: Eisenhower's German Policy’ (thereafter Burley, ‘Restoration’), in Melanson, R. A. and Mayers, D. eds, Reevaluating Eisenhower. American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 220–40.Google Scholar On Adenauer's reasoning why the Soviet Union had to hold on to the GDR see Klaus Gotto, ‘Die Sicherheits- und Deutschland-frage in Adenauers Politik, 1954/5’ (Thereafter Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’), in Thoß and Volkmann, Zwischen, 148 ff.

³⁴ ‘US Policy toward Europe post-EDC’, 10 Sept. 1954, FRUS, v, 1170–7.Google Scholar

³⁵ Shuckburgh, FO Memo, early Aug. 1961, FO 371–160 480.

³⁶ Huth, Sabine, British-German Relations 1955–1961 (thereafter Huth, Relations), PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 1993), 198 ff.Google Scholar

³⁷ Gladwyn, Lord, British Ambassador to France, Feb. 1959; I owe this information to Huth, Relations, 197 ff.Google Scholar

³⁸ Dulles, J. F., 10 May 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, iv, 13 ffGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ See below on the Van Zeeland, Blankenhorn-Heusinger, and Eden plans.

⁴⁰ Dulles, , 10 May 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, iv, 13 ff.Google Scholar

⁴¹ H. Schmidt told the SPD party congress in Dortmund in 1966 that the Western neighbours were more afraid about changing the status quo than they were willing to support German unification. That the FRG leadership was thinking on similar lines was noticed by Western observers from the early 1950s; R. Steininger and J. Foschepoth based their interpretation that Adenauer preferred Western orientation (and ‘freedom’) to reunification (‘unity’) on documents which report Adenauer's motivations as expressed in conversations with, for instance, British diplomats and officials. Steininger, R., ‘Das Scheitern der EVG und der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik zur NATO’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 17 (1985), 3–18Google Scholar; Foschepoth, Josef, ‘Churchill, Adenauer und die Neutralisierung Deutschlands’, Deutschland-Archiv, Vol. 17 (1984), 1286–1301Google Scholar; Foschepoth, , ‘Adenauer, die Deutschen und die deutsche Frage’, in Timmermann, H., ed., Deutschland und Europa nach dem 2. Weltkrieg (Saarbrücken, 1990), 221–36.Google Scholar

⁴² Conventional wisdom correctly states that Britain and France benefitted from the division of Germany in certain respects. Their status - as nuclear powers; as permanent members of the UN Security Council; as two of the four powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole – was markedly different from Bonn's room for action. London and Paris could and did remind Bonn of these ‘facts’ by torpedoing the NATO/MLF projects, by aiming at Western, particularly four-power, summits and by exerting control on the formal relationships between Bonn and West Berlin.

⁴³ Schwarz, , Adenauer, ii, 270 ff.Google Scholar; Scherz, Adrian W., Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons. Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung (thereafter Scherz, Deutschland politik) (Köln, 1992), 43 ff., 120 ff.Google Scholar These fears were partly justified; however, the advocates of ‘neutralising’ Berlin or imposing singular restrictions on a semi-demilitarised zone, including not only the GDR, which Bonn itself proposed, but also West Germany's territory (to the Weser, sometimes even to the Rhine), in the end did not prevail, either among Washington's and London's counsels or in the four (Western) power and NATO consultation and working groups.

⁴⁴ Costigliola, ‘Pursuit’, 46–7; Huth, Relations, 230 ff.

⁴⁵ Costigliola, ‘Pursuit’, 46–7.

⁴⁶ Costigliola, Frank, France and the United States. The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 128.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ P. de Zulueta to the Prime Minister, 21 Oct. 1959; Macmillan presented a similar argument in Cabinet, C.C. (60) 41, PREM II – 2987.

⁴⁸ Dulles, J. F. in conference with President Eisenhower, Hoover and Goodpaster,15 Dec. 1956,Google ScholarFRUS, 1955–1957, iv. 164–5.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Schwarz, , Adenauer, ii. 270 ff.Google Scholar; Kelleher, C. McA, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (thereafter Kelleher, Germany) (New York, 1975).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The FRG was prevented from using ‘artificial’ barriers (fortifications, etc) to compensate for ‘gaps’ in its defence posture; to take refuge in border fortification would have invited the accusation that Bonn paid lip-service to its pronouncements on unification; such measures would have converted the inner-German border into a ‘wall’ against East Germany. Whether military thinking on such lines made sense is another question; the political-psychological situation ruled out reliance on such devices anyway.

⁵¹ The US suffered in 1957/8 not only from the Sputnik shock and the debate on the ‘missile gap’, but also from a recession; the call on Washington to take the lead and stop the erosion of the Atlantic community met a different atmosphere in the US: Washington insisted that the partners in Europe and Asia should take burdens from America's shoulders.

⁵² The conflicting national strategies among the major European powers and the ‘divisive’ nature of nuclear diplomacy in an asymmetrical Alliance provided potential pressure points for the Soviet Union to affect the cohesion of the US–West European security partnership. See Laird, R., ‘Soviet Perspectives on the Western Alliance: The British Case’ (thereafter Laird, ‘Perspectives’), in Freedman, L., ed., Military Power in Europe (thereafter Freedman, Power) (London, 1990), 81.Google Scholar The Soviet Union could also hope for a revival of isolationism in the US as a result of frustrations about Western Europe's lack of gratitude. Without nuclear weapons the American influence in the counsels of NATO/WEU and the capitals of Western European nations would become marginal – and the Soviet Union could turn the screw on the members of NATO, who wanted nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, but not as operational ‘tools’.

⁵³ Record of conversation Dulles–Molotov, 6 Feb. 1954; cf. Rupieper, ‘Auβenministerkonferenz’, 446.

⁵⁴ Duffield, Evolution, 152 ff.; Wampler, Robert A., ‘NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons, 1950–1957’ (thereafter Wampler, ‘NATO’), Nuclear History Program Occasional Papers, No. 6 (1990)Google Scholar; idem, The Die is Cast: The U.S. and NATO Nuclear Planning, 1951–54 (thereafter Wampler, Die is Cast)(unpubl. MS). The British raised the question of proper use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the defence of the realm and of Western Europe in 1952; cf. Gustav Schmidt, Introduction and two articles in Groβbritannien und Europa – Groβbritannien in Europa (thereafter Schmidt, Groβbritannien, Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung, Vol. 10 (Bochum: Universitätverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1989); idem, ‘Die sicherheitspolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Dimensionen der britischamerikanischen Beziehungen 1955–1967’ (thereafter Schmidt, ‘Dimensionen’), Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, Vol. 2 (1991), 107–142.

⁵⁵ Dulles to Eisenhower, 6 Sept. 1953, FRUS, ii. 457 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ The US ‘neutrality’ scheme aimed at the withdrawal of the Red Army from the ‘satellites’, creating a belt of buffer states from Finland to Yugoslavia. This counter-project envisaged the roll-back of the Iron Curtain through relaxation of the Soviet's rule over its ‘satellites’ in return for Western consent to German neutrality.

⁵⁷ Eisenhower presented his ideas to the public in a peace speech on 18 May 1955; his concept envisaged a belt of neutralised states in Central Eastern Europe. He countered Russian plans which attempted to extend the settlement of the Austrian question on the basis of neutrality to include Germany; in the end, the Soviet Union agreed to armed Austrian neutrality. This was satisfactory to the US and the UK with regard to Austria but not as a model for an armed united Germany. Thoß, Bruno, ‘Modell Oesterreich? Der oesterreichische Staatsvertrag und die deutsche Frage 1954/55’, in Thoß, and Volkmann, , Zwischen, 93–136.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Van Zeeland presented his concept to Eisenhower in Washington in Sept. 1953 and then to Bonn, Paris and London. Its main elements were: (1) the offer of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Soviet Union and a European collective security arrangement; (2) the demilitarisation of the GDR and the establishment of a buffer zone (only Polish forces would be deployed between the Oder-Neiße and the Vistula; Red Army forces would be returned east of the Vistula); (3) British and American forces would be stationed behind the Rhine; (4) EDC forces would be deployed between the Rhine and the intra-German demarcation line; and (5) the united Germany would have to recognise the Oder-Neiße border. The intention of the plan was to rescue the EDC; concessions to Moscow should make the EDC acceptable to the eastern superpower. See PA-AA, Abtlg. III Ref. L I a, 232–00 III 27111/53. Cf. Rupieper, H. J., ‘Wiedervereinigung und europäische Sicherheit: Deutsch-amerikanische Überlegungen für eine entmilitarisierte Zone in Europa 1953’ (thereafter Rupieper, ‘Wiedervereinigung’), Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen’, Vol. 38 (1986), 91–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁹ The German concept in 1953 provided for a demilitarised zone on both sides of the Oder-Neiße boundary; the eastern side encompassed Poland (to the Vistula) and (former) East Germany; in West Germany, EDC troops would be garrisoned; NATO troops would be deployed in Western Europe; the area between the Oder-Neiße rivers and the Vistula would be reserved for Eastern European-Warsaw Treaty Organisation forces; the Red Army would have to move back behind the Vistula. Whereas American plans considered the withdrawal of US forces across the Atlantic under certain conditions, the West German plans did not clearly spell out the fate of the US forces in Europe. On the German concepts – of Sept. 1953 and June 1955 – see Haftendorn, H., Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Auβenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1982 (thereafter Haftendorn, Sicherheit) (Baden-Baden, 1983), 81 ff.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Eden discussed his views with Adenauer on 19 June 1955, PREM II – 859; Eden answered the question how to bring about unification of Germany without the neutralisation of Germany through advancing a package deal: ‘Our own modest idea has been a demilitarised zone formed of part of the Eastern zone and possibly- if militarily feasible – a small part of the Western zone. It was essential that any such plan should be kept on a basis which did not imperil our NATO plans. …’

⁶¹ Dulles–Molotov meetings on the occasion of the Berlin Foreign Ministers’ Conference, 6 Feb. 1954 and at the Geneva Summit 1955.

⁶² On the many obstacles which led to the demise of the EDC-project, see Dockrill, S., Britain and the Rearmament of Germany, 1950–1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Rupieper, H. J., Der besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955 (Opladen, 1991)Google Scholar; Jansen, Hans-Heinrich, Groβbritannien, das Scheitern der EVG und der NATO- Beitritt der Bundesrepublik (Bochum, 1992) ADEF, Vol. 22Google Scholar; Mélandri, PierreLes Etats-Unisface à l'Unification de l'Europe, 1945–54 (Paris, 1980)Google Scholar; Köllner, L., Maier, K. A. et al. , Die EVG-Phase. Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Vol. 2 (Munich, 1990)Google Scholar; Volkmann, H. E. and Schwengler, W., eds., Die EVG. Stand und Probleme der Forschung (Boppard, 1985)Google Scholar; Maier, Klaus A., ‘Die Auseinandersetzungen um die EVG als europäisches Unterbündnis der NATO, 1950–1954’ (thereafter Maier, ‘Auseinandersetzungen’), in Herbst, Ludolf, Bührer, W. and Sowade, H., eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EWG (Munich, 1990), 447 ff.Google Scholar

⁶³ Report, 16 Sept. 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, v. 522 ffGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ See n. 54. Melissen, , The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership. Britain, the U.S. and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952–59 (thereafter Melissen, Struggle) (Groningen, 1993)Google Scholar; Klaus Maier, Amerikanische Nuklearstrategie unter Truman und Eisenhower (thereafter Maier, Nuklearstrategie) (unpubl. ms, 1991).

⁶⁵ Blankenhorn asked the US on his visit to Washington to advance these arguments in their talks and consultations with the other allies and with the Soviet Union. See Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’, 141 ff.

⁶⁶ Adenauer, July 1953. Report of the Diplomatic Representation of the FRG to Paris, 29 July 1953, AA-PA, 221–201 Tgb. 2730/53.

⁶⁷ The tactical interest of Adenauer is obvious. First the EDC would be established; the follow-up solution might help to assuage French and perhaps even Russian opposition to ‘plain’ EDC, in particular WEU/NATO solutions. On the Heusinger-Blankenhorn plans of June 1955 see Schwarz, Adenauer, ii. 180 ff.; Haftendorn, Sicherheit, 81 ff.

⁶⁸ SACEUR's estimate of the situation and force requirements for 1956, 23 Dec. 1953, COS (53) 609, DEFE 5 – 50. Cf. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 5, Watson, JCS, chs 4, 13, 14; cf. Duffield, Evolution; Wampler, Legacy; Melissen, Struggle; Maier, Nuklearstrategie.

⁶⁹ Dulles admitted this in his conversations with Eden and Bidault at the Bermuda Conference in Dec. 1953; cf. FRUS, v. 1788 ff.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ SACEUR Gruenther in July 1954, quoted in Duffield, Evolution, 194 ff.; R. A. Wampler, From Lisbon to MC 48. The U.S., Great Britain and the New Look in NATO, 1952–54 (unpublished MS, 1987); Maier, Nuklearstrategie.

⁷¹ The controversial positions – between Eisenhower, Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff – on the scope of ‘nuclearising’ America's and NATO's strategy and forces postures were articulated on occasion of the process of reviewing the U.S. Basic National Security Policy planning in 1953. For instance, the US had to resolve whether nuclear weapons be considered to be available for use as any other weapon; this involved the problem of the authority to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. The other issue was to seek the consent of the allies to the use of such weapons systems from their territories.

⁷² Dulles memo, late Jan. 1956, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 399 ff.; cf. nn. 53 ff.

⁷³ Grewe in a conversation with the Canadian Ambassador, Ritchie; Ritchie to DEA, Ottawa, 26 July 1956, Ritchie's report on discussions with Grewe and Hoyer-Miller, 19/20 July 1956, DEA file 50030-AG–1–40.

⁷⁴ See my articles listed in n. 54 for the following. Britain – in 1953 and in 1955/6 – justified its claim for a change in strategy and defence forces structure by referring to the Soviet Union's promise/announcements of substantial unilateral troop reductions; why should NATO keep strong conventional forces in view of Moscow's dramatic cuts (by 640,000 men in 1955 and an additional 1,200,000 men, effective from May 1957)? Also, nuclear weapons were seen as the real protection of the world against war; the only protection is the deterrent of a counter-attack. Conventional forces then were needed for specific tasks, such as semi-police operations in places like Kenya or Malaya and to prevent minor front aggression across the German frontiers. Macmillan to Butler, 10 Aug. 1955, FO 800–668.

⁷⁵ Duffield, Evolution, 256.

⁷⁶ Weber, ‘Shaping’, and articles listed in n. 54.

⁷⁷ SACEUR Gruenther explained to the NAC in July 1954 that – in consequence of the Dec. 1953 NAC resolution – SACEUR would ‘need to have the authority to use atomic weapons so that there would be no delay whatsoever…in countering a surprise attack’. The basic principle was that NATO should concentrate on maintaining combat-ready forces with an integrated nuclear capability. This analysis and the following is based on the studies of Duffield, Wampler, Maier, Melissen, and the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. v, and my articles listed in note 54.

⁷⁸ The US took its time to decide on its final position on the question of adapting the ‘new look’ to NATO's nuclearised strategy; the decisions were taken in Nov. 1954 with a view to the Dec. 1954 NAC meeting.

⁷⁹ F. J. Strauss, even before he became Defence Minister in Oct. 1956, became the spokesman of such German claims; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 Sept. 1956; Strauss, F. J., Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), 310, 328.Google Scholar At first he asked for equivalent ‘modern’ (= dual capabilities of atomic weapons systems) equipment in order to avoid discrimination between German units and their Allied companions; then he turned towards demanding equality of equipment with the adversary (ie, Russian forces east of the demarcation line), cf. Steinhoff, Johannes and Pommerin, Rainer, Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepublik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ära Adenauer–Kennedy (thereafter Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel), (Baden-Baden, 1992), 30 ff.Google Scholar; Strauss’ views on the FRG's military role, Report US Embassy to Dept. of State, 27 May 1959, Vol. 3561, file 762 A.5/5 – 2559.

⁸⁰ Foreign Secretary S. Lloyd, 2 Dec. 1958, statement in the House of Commons; cf. PREM 11–2929.

⁸¹ Bonn NAC meeting, 2–4 May 1957, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 168 ff.

⁸² Dulles, 4 May 1957, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 168 ff.

⁸³ Jansen, Großbritannien, 180–1.

⁸⁴ McNamara in a conversation with Watkinson, Watkinson report to Macmillan, 15 Dec. 1961, PREM 11 – 3247.

⁸⁵ 19 Dec. 1961, C.C. 75(61), ministerial meeting, NAC, CAB. 128–35.

⁸⁶ Record of conversation Adenauer–Macmillan, 15 Dec. 1957, NA (57) Del 5, PREM 11 – 1839.

⁸⁷ Adenauer, 16 Dec. 1957, NAC meeting, PREM 11 – 2347; Adenauer, , Erinnerungen, 1955–59 (Frankfurt: Fischer-Taschenbuch, 1967), 344Google Scholar; Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’, 147 ff.

⁸⁸ Bowie, R. to Dulles, 19 Oct. 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, ii. 1228.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Bowie's statement was in reply to Dulles's suggestion to plan for mutual withdrawals of US and Soviet Union forces, 8 Sept. 1953; cf. Gaddis, J. L., ‘The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians’ (thereafter Gaddis, ‘Dulles’), in Immermann, R. H., ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (thereafter Immermann, Dulles), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 69.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ When considering the rescue operation – finding an alternative to EDC – the British Cabinet objected to meeting French demands for sharing atomic and thermonuclear secrets with the European partners; C (54) 276, 27 Aug. 1954, PREM 11 – 618. The UK insisted that the strategic deterrent was to remain the domain of the US and the UK. The French eventually preferred German rearmament within NATO to EDC because France could then implement its plan to develop an independent force de dissuasion; Jacques Bariéty made this point at the Tutzing Conference of 13–17 May 1991; Soutou, G H., ‘La politique nucléaire de Pierre Mendés-France,’ Relations internationales, Vol. 59 (1989), 317–330.Google Scholar

⁹¹ This question was acute. Eisenhower's ‘atom for peace’ speech attempted to direct interest towards the ‘civil’ use of atomic energy and test the chances for nuclear disarmament. The US attempted to ‘link’ its support to the relaunching of European integration. Cf. Wampler, ‘NATO’; idem, Die; Melissen, Struggle; Schmidt, ‘Dimensionen’.

⁹² Dulles at NSC meetings, 24 Nov. and 29 Dec. 1954, FRUS, 1952–4, ii. 789 ff. and 1,585 ff.

⁹³ On the discussions in Washington and between the US and German, British and NATO representatives see Rupieper, ‘Außenministerkonferenz’, 188 ff., 194 ff.; Duffield, Evolution, 212 ff. On the related debate about authorisation fo the use of atomic weapons between the US and NATO member-states see Watson, JCS, 299 ff.; Duffield, Evolution, 191 ff.; K. Maier, Nuklearstrategie.

⁹⁴ Dulles opposed such views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the NSC meeting of 24 June 1954, FRUS, 1952–4, ii. 694 ff.; see also the debate on NSC 5422/1 in Aug. 1954.

⁹⁵ Gaddis, ‘Dulles’, 52; Wampler, Die, 46 ff.; idem, NATO, 11 ff.

⁹⁶ Adenauer thought both of US backing and European integration as ‘guarantees’ to attain unification; Erinnerungen, iii. 252; Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’, 148 ff.

⁹⁷ R. A. D. Ford, A Re-examination of the Balance of Power, 18 Oct. 1957, NA Canada, RG 25, Box 298, file 50128–40, part 5.

⁹⁸ It was thought that if the Soviet Union had to realise that its interventions could not prevent the ‘West’ from passing integration schemes (the EDC project or a replacement for it), then an era of détente might be launched. Churchill advanced ideas in this direction; US Embassy, London, to Dept. of State, 4 Nov. 1954, NA Wash., file 641.61/11 – 454.

⁹⁹ Attlee, 8 Feb, 1951, CAB. 128–19, C.C. (51) 12.

¹⁰⁰ Britain, Canada and the US – as a result of domestic pressures on governments to meet the increasing costs of air defence and the coming of the missile age as well as other conflicting social and political priorities – had to consider the reduction of their forces in Germany. The effect of cutting commitments ‘overseas’ on the balance of payments was another motivation. The British and US governments wanted a Western summit before the 1959 NAC meeting in order to discuss balance of payments problems and costs of US in particular for UK troops in Europe and the resulting agenda for the East–West summit with Khrushchev; UK Emb., Washington, to FO, London, 20 Oct. 1959, PREM 11–2990.

¹⁰¹ The question of negotiating with the Soviet Union – about disarmament, unification and European security – was an issue between the CDU/CSU and the SPD and FDP. There were divergent views between Adenauer and Brentano, within the Auswärtiges Amt, and sometimes between Adenauer and his ‘entourage’. Their conflicting priorities were linked to different views about French, American and British as well as Russian attitudes.

¹⁰² Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador, Bonn, in a discussion with von Brentano, 10 Aug. 1956, Can. Emb., Bonn, to DEA, Ottawa, Tel. 241, DEA file 50030-AG–1–40.

¹⁰³ Eisenhower statement, 15 June 1956; NAC, June 1956 meeting; conversation between Adenauer and Dulles, 13 June 1956.

¹⁰⁴ Joffe, J., ‘The View from Bonn’ (thereafter Joffe, ‘View’), in: Gordon, Lincoln, ed., Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe (Washington DC, 1987), 138.Google Scholar Cf. E. Frey, Division and Détente. The Germanys and their Alliances (1987).

¹⁰⁵ Record of conversation between S. Lloyd and Pinay, Lloyd to Jebb, 21 Jan. 1958, WF 1051/5, FO 371 – 137 267; cf. Dulles memo for the President, 18 June 1955. See Rupieper, ‘Außenminister-konferenez’, 446: ‘The Western powers generally feel that it is not possible to have the unification of Germany except within the context of some general plan for regulating European security and assuring the Soviets that East Germany will not be made an advance military position of the West.’ This proposition was repeated in the Herter Plan of 1959; the negotiations leading to the end of the Cold War in 1990 – especially the Kohl/Gorbachev meetings in Feb. 1990 and July 1990, for which Baker's visits to Moscow set the stage – encompassed the (temporary) exemption of former GDR territory from united Germany's membership of NATO. Cf. E. Conze, Von Genfnach Ottawa. Zum Zusammenhang von deutscher Einheit, europäischer Sicherheit und internationaler Abrüstung am Ende der 50er Jahre und heute, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, No. 265, May 1990.

¹⁰⁶ S. Lloyd–Pinay, record of conversation, 21 Jan. 1958, WF 1051/5, FO 371 – 137 267.

¹⁰⁷ J. F. Dulles, 18 Dec. 1956.

¹⁰⁸ Auswärtiges Amt, Briefing for Adenauer, Feb. 1957, in view of Adenauer's meetings with Dulles and the NAC meeting in Bonn in April/May 1957, PA-AA 200 – 80.SL/0 – 94.29; I owe this information to Thorsten Cabalo.

¹⁰⁹ F. Strauss put such views first into print in an article to the Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz, Feb. 1957. For the thoughts and postures of Strauss and his ‘military’, see Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel, 44 ff., 55 ff., 72.

¹¹⁰ Bonwetsch, B., ‘Deutschlandpolitische Alternativen der Sowjetunion, 1949–1955’, Deutsche Studien, Vol. 24 (1986), 320–40.Google Scholar In this masterly analysis Bonwetsch shows the alternation between the concepts of: (1) four-power/Kontrollratslösung and (2) integrating the GDR into the Socialist camp in conjunction with domestic struggles for power in the Soviet Union and with reactions to developments on the side of the Western powers. His thesis claims that the Kremlin thought preventing the military integration of West Germany into the ‘Western orbit’ would serve the security interests of the Soviet Union better than maintaining an undisputed ruling over the GDR and its incorporation into the Ostblock. ibid., 335.

¹¹¹ Stalin's successors might have been asked to exchange a relaxation of control over Eastern Europe for a Western reduction of the defence contribution which they expected from Germany, mainly as a relief of their burdens. The German contribution did not in fact enlarge the basic forces requirements of NATO (about 30 divisions since 1953/4), but was required to compensate for the ‘absence’ of substantial French contributions (due to the Vietnam war and then to developments in Tunisia and Algeria).

¹¹² This is to be viewed against the background that the American–German link was the second ‘basic law’ of the FRG, the Grundgesetz being the other (first) basic law.

¹¹³ Canada's Foreign Minister, L. Pearson, on his return from a visit to Moscow, reported that the Kremlin believed a peaceful interlude would serve its purposes, ‘but no sign Soviet leaders willing to pay real price for lower tension.…Clear they will now unify Germany only on their own terms. Under these conditions NATO must make situation crystal clear to public opinion and show continued support for Germany for unity. West must seek further to expose Soviet attitude, push ahead with German rearmament in NATO and European integration, and refuse recognize East German regime’; 17 Dec. 1955, NAC meeting, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 37.

¹¹⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, Feb. 1957, Briefing for Adenauer's meetings with Dulles in April/May 1957. It was thought that NATO need not suffer dissolution if US forces were stationed in Spain and Britain and the Soviet forces returned to Soviet territory; on the contrary, the safeguarding of Berlin could then still be assured and NATO's situation might be improved due to extended warning time. Eastern Europe would become NATO's ‘shield’. If the superpowers were disengaged it seemed less likely that the Soviet Union would intervene to quell reform movements in the East.

¹¹⁵ Moscow sent and/or published notes to the Western governments on 24 July 1954, 4 Aug. 1954, 15 Jan. 1955. The propaganda effort was always obvious: the Soviet notes were an attempt to prevent (further) integration of West Germany into the Western communities.

¹¹⁶ The Soviet position became more evident in the abortive Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the four powers in Berlin, Feb. 1954; cf. Rupieper, ‘Außenministerkonferenz’, 440 ff.

¹¹⁷ Dulles in conversation with Brentano, 21 Nov. 1957, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 198 ff.

¹¹⁸ The most obvious instances are the 1955 Geneva summit, the Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev in mid-Sept. 1959 and the Rusk–Gromyko talks in the aftermath of the Berlin crisis (Sept. 1961–April 1962).

¹¹⁹ On the Soviet's Westpolitik see the brilliant chapters by Hoensch in D. Geyer, ed., Handbuch Sowjetunion; and by Laird, ‘Perspectives’.

¹²⁰ Adenauer was furious that Mollet or Eden and later Macmillan/S. Lloyd neglected Germany's concerns and treated Bonn as a third-ranking power. Cf. Schwarz, Adenauer, ii. 240.

¹²¹ Intelligence report No. 31/55, 3 Aug. 1955, BW 2/2734. To the delight of the GDR, the Soviet Union started a campaign that Socialist achievements should not only be maintained in the GDR, if it ever came to unification, but that these must be transferred to West Germany.

¹²² Adenauer, , 5 Feb. 1955, ‘Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen’. Buchstab, G., ed., Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1953–1957 (Düsseldorf, 1990).Google Scholar Adenauer reacted to rumours that the French Government was intrigued by Moscow's offers; the Soviet Union also began to play the Austrian card.

¹²³ Dulles report to Dept. of State, 10 May 1955, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 13.

¹²⁴ Adenauer speech, 22 April 1955, in Goslar.

¹²⁵ Blankenhorn's visit to London, 28 April 1955. The proposals comprised elements of a plan which was developed in 1953 in reaction to American, British and French plans for an approach to the Soviet Union. See Schwarz, Adenauer, ii. 180 ff. On the Heusinger–Blankenhorn plan of 1955, cf. Haftendorn, Sicherheit, 81 ff.; Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’, 147 ff.; Rupieper, ‘Wiedervereinigungs’, 189 ff., 197 ff.

¹²⁶ Adenauer, 2 May 1955, Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands. Adenauer wanted to exploit the cracks in the Soviet economy; he admitted to comprehensive disarmament and general détente as the necessary context for making progress in solving the German question.

¹²⁷ Bischof, ‘Powers’, 368–93.

¹²⁸ ‘… This was why some people in West Germany were thinking about the possibility of an approach to the Russians to use economic means to drive a political bargain. It was quite clear that a bilateral deal between Bonn and Pankow would not be possible.’ Blumenfeld in conversation with Macmillan and Brentano, 5 July 1962, PREM 11 – 3799. London had been curious as to why the FRG granted the GDR ‘credits’ without strings attached, but at the same time advocated ‘denial’ strategies towards the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe in order to increase the pressure on the Communist rulers, speculating that these pressures were conducive to getting negotiations on the right track.

¹²⁹ Dulles at a news conference, 14 May 1957. Dulles elaborated his views in an article for Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (Oct. 1957), 25–43; cf. Kelleher, Germany, 44–59; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, iii. 306, regarded the Dulles–Stassen plans as steps leading towards neutralisation.

¹³⁰ Macmillan protested – on 2 May 1957 – against the so-called Stassen plan, which was revealed to the Soviets before London was officially informed. Freeman, J. P. G., Britain's Nuclear Arms Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–1968 (thereafter Freeman, Policy) (London, 1986), 86;CrossRefGoogle Scholar cf. Defence Committee (56) 3rd meeting, 17 Feb. 1956, CAB. 131–17.

¹³¹ Heuser, ‘Keystone’, 331; cf. Duffield, Evolution; Wampler, Die is cast; Maier, Nuklearstrategie.

¹³² CP (50) 80, ‘Policy towards Germany’, 26 April 1950, CAB. 129–39; Schwarz, Adenauer, ii. 180 ff., 241.

¹³³ Schmidt, G., ‘Vom Anglo-Amerikanischen Duopol zum Trilateralismus: Groβbritannien-USA-Bundesrepublik, 1955–67’, Amerika-Studien Vol. 39 (1994), 73–109.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ The British position in Oct./Nov. 1958 was not only influenced by the Berlin crisis, but also by the breakdown of the FTA project and the ‘split’ of OEEC-Europa into competing economic groupings (‘The Six and Sevens’ problem).

¹³⁵ Adenauer presented the gist of the Globke plan to Dulles when Dulles was in Bonn in Feb. 1959. The plan was conceived in reaction to Dulles’ public statement on 13 Jan. 1959 that there were other avenues to reunification than starting with ‘free elections’. Schwarz, H. P., Geschichte der Bundes-republik, Vol. III: Die Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel 1957–1963 (1983), 86 ff.Google Scholar; Schwarz, Adenauer, ii. 478 ff.; Klaus Gotto, Adenauers Deutschland- und Ostpolitik 1954–63, Adenauer-Studien, vol. III, Mainz 1974, 49–55; Gotto, K., ed., Der Staatssekretär Adenauers. Persönlichkeit und politisches Wirken Hans Globkes (Stuttgart, 1980).Google Scholar At about the same time the SPD finalised its Deutschland Plan.

¹³⁶ F. J. Strauss admitted that ‘unification’ was not conceivable for years to come. Becker, Josef, ‘Deutsche Wege zur nationalen Einheit’, in Becker, J., ed., Wiedervereinigung in Mitteleuropa (Munich, 1992), 153;Google ScholarSchuster, R., Deutschlands staatliche Existenz im Widerstreit politischer und rechtlicher Gesicht-spunkte, 1945–1963 (Munich, 1963), 276.Google Scholar Improving the ‘lot’ of East Germans was also the primary concern of the Globke plan.

¹³⁷ See my articles listed in nn. 54 and 132; cf. Scherz, ‘Deutschland politik’, and my review article in Contemporary European History (forthcoming).

¹³⁸ US Embassy, Bonn, to State Dept., 2 Dec. 1957, NAC, Box 3561, file 762 A.5/12–257.

¹³⁹ Gaitskell, House of Commons, 19 Dec. 1956; Brentano report on discussions with Gaitskell, 30 April 1957; on 10 April 1957 – Bulletin, Deutsch-Englische Gespräche – Gaitskell raised the question what the FRG would do, once the Bundeswehr was in place, in case of another ‘17 June 1953’ or ‘Hungary 1956’; the Red Army might not restrict its actions to quelling East German protest, but carry the struggle further west; what would NATO then do?

¹⁴⁰ G. F. Kennan presented his assessment of the situation after ‘Suez’ and ‘Hungary’ on 15 Jan. 1957 to the Senate Committee on Disarmament, and then in the famous Reith Lectures on the BBC. Cf. H. P. Schwarz, Epochenwechsel, 45–6, 78.

¹⁴¹ Zulueta's ‘proposals’ to Macmillan concerning his talks with Eisenhower and de Gaulle at the summit of Western powers in Paris, 14 Dec. 1959. PREM 11 – 2987. Although Zulueta did not advise reforming or reducing NATO, he urged the reduction of British and American land and air forces in Germany. Arguing that the importance of such forces was decreasing, he asked whether the US and UK, as stalwarts of NATO, could not in exchange for the pull-back obtain some price from the Russians; they could also gain political advantages in Eastern Europe.

¹⁴² Dennis Healey, ‘A neutral belt in Europe’, 27 Oct. 1957.

¹⁴³ Adenauer's changing views depended on his fears that (1) NATO might be disrupted, and (2) that the situation in the Ostblock could worsen (what might Khrushchev then be up to?).

¹⁴⁴ SACEUR Norstad – commenting on similar proposals in Bulganin's letter of 7 Feb. 1957 – objected; it was the enemy who imposed the frontlines on NATO; NATO should not and could not allow any thinning out or weakening at any spot along the border; an adversary might be tempted to exploit weak local spots; NATO would then be confronted with the unwarranted and impossible choice between all-out war or non-fulfilment of treaty obligations. Norstad drew attention to the deployment of SS-4 and SS-5 in East European theatres (Dec. 1956). Bonn supported his demand for counter-measures, Britain resisted the upgrading of NATO and the entanglement into integrated structures. Cf. Freeman, Policy, 158 ff.

¹⁴⁵ Schwarz, Epochenwechsel, 86 and 88–91.

¹⁴⁶ NSC 160/1, 17 Aug. 1953, FRUS, 1952–4, vii. 510–20; cf. Draper, US Delegation to NATO, 26 Jan. 1953, FRUS, v. 709.

¹⁴⁷ Grabbe, Hans-Jürgen, ‘Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and West German–American relations’, in Immermann, Dulles, 124–5.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ When Brentano and the AA – in early 1959 – presented a scheme for a Central European limited inspection zone, Adenauer became angry with his Foreign Minister. Schwarz, Adenauer, 385.

¹⁴⁹ Paper on German neutrality, Jan. 1959, WG 1073/74 G, FO 371 – 145 819. This was one of a series of discussion papers for determining Britain's position in forthcoming talks with the US and the Soviet Union on Germany and European security. The views did not go undisputed: ‘U.K. experts feel any disengagement in Central Europe would weaken western deterrent and encourage Soviet probing actions …’. Report of the US Embassy, Paris, to Dept. of State, Tel. 3811, 15 Feb. 1958, NA Wash., 641.51/2 – 1558. But Macmillan and S. Lloyd proceeded on the assumption that Britain should concentrate on nuclear power summits on the one hand and on using the Soviet interest in reducing conventional armed forces for disarmament negotiations on the other.

¹⁵⁰ There are differences between these concepts, of course, but the political ‘rationale’ is similar.

¹⁵¹ S. Lloyd to Macmillan, 13 March 1958, PREM 11 – 2347.

¹⁵² Brentano, 13 Dec. 1956, FRUS, iv. 146.

¹⁵³ Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, report, 2 Aug. 1959, file 50030-AG–1–40.

¹⁵⁴ Dulles had asserted – 21 Dec. 1953 – that Western Europe was the one region in the world where the doctrine of massive retaliation was not intended to apply. See Duffield, Evolution, 180 ff. The ability to provide a forward defence constituted the strongest deterrent against military aggression in that region. Dulles was also aware that, if German troops were required for certain types of risk, anything like the trip-wire doctrine would undermine the rationale for German (conventional) rearmament.

¹⁵⁵ Edwina Moreton, ‘Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact: The Politics of “New Thinking”’, (thereafter Moreton, ‘Gorbachev’), in Freedman, Power, 59 ff.

¹⁵⁶ Auswärtiges Amt. Briefing for Adenauer, Feb. 1957, PA-AA, 200–80 S.L/O – 94.29.

¹⁵⁷ Weber, ‘Shaping’; Melissen, Struggle; Schmidt, note 54 above. ‘The U.S. sought to prove herself a reliable ally for NATO Europe, while preventing Europe from gaining too much independence or too great a voice in nuclear policy in Europe’. Freeman, Policy, 158.

¹⁵⁸ On the inter-Allied and intra-German consultations 1959/61 about various scenarios cf. Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel, 66 ff., 72, 81 ff.; Scherz, Deutschland politik, 110 ff., 130 ff.

¹⁵⁹ Note of the Federal Government in reply to the Soviet disarmament proposal of 17 Nov. 1956. The Soviet Union proposed not only the reduction of armed forces but also the dismantling of bases (Stützpunkte) within a two-year period.

¹⁶⁰ The controversy between Ambassador Pfleiderer and Grewe in Oct. 1956 is the outstanding case; Brentano spoke in similar terms during his visit to London. Schwarz, , Epochenwechsel, 31, 45 ff.,78.Google Scholar Adenauer is said to have made the point on 30 Aug. 1953 in a discussion with Ollenhauer. See Küsters, Hanns-Jürgen, ‘Konrad Adenauer und Willy Brandt in der Berlin-Krise 1958–1963’, VZG, Vol. 40 (1992), 507.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ Grewe to AA, 24 March 1959, in Rückblenden, 390/1; cf. Huth, Relations, 191 ff.

¹⁶² S. Lloyd proposed this to Dulles, 13 March 1958, Lloyd (from Manila) to PM, Tel 122, PREM 11–2347.

¹⁶³ Soviet disarmament proposal, 17 Nov. 1956.

¹⁶⁴ Alexander I. Zinchuk (Foreign Office Official) in a conversation with US Ambassador Thompson; US Embassy Moscow to Dept. of State, 13 Jan. 1958, Tel. 359. NA Wash., file 661.00/ 1–1358.

¹⁶⁵ Schwarz, , Adenauer, ii. 379 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ Adenauer, , Erinnerungen, iii. 367.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Peter Bender, Neue Ostpolitik. Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag (thereafter Bender, Neue Ostpolitik), (dtv 1280), (1986), 47 ff.

¹⁶⁸ Ulbricht pressed in the 1956 crisis to ‘solve’ the Berlin problem, ie, eliminate the ‘capitalist world's’ outpost located on GDR territory. During the Berlin crisis in July/August 1961 he wanted to push the Soviet Union to hand over control over the access roads to Berlin to GDR authorities.

¹⁶⁹ J. F. Dulles to Allen Dulles, 25 July 1955, cf. Burley, ‘Restoration’, 227. Cf. US Embassy Moscow to Dept. of State, 8 Aug. 1959, Tel. 500: The primary factor which prevented Khrushchev giving German unification serious consideration was ‘his inability to consider abandonment of a Communist regime and fear of chain reaction if such retreat ever took place’.

¹⁷⁰ On the Globke plan, which was in part a reaction on Dulles's pronouncement, see Schwarz, Epochenwechsel, 86 ff.; idem, Adenauer, ii. 487 ff.; Gotto, ‘Adenauers Politik’, 44 ff.

¹⁷¹ Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 165–9.

¹⁷² On the Franco-Italian-West German military projects 1956/8 see the contributions of Vaisse, Maurice and Soutou, G. H., Relations Internationales, Vol. 59 (1989)Google Scholar, and those of Conze, E., Nuti, L. and Barbier, Colette, Revenue d'Histoire Diplomatique, No. 1–2 (1990), 81–156.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ On the MLF project see my review, ‘“… but what to do about the Germans?” Nuclear Diplomacy and the Role of NATO as an Instrument of Peaceful Change’, in Contemporary European History Vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1994), 123–38.

¹⁷⁴ Weber, ‘Shaping’; Schmidt, note 133 above.

¹⁷⁵ The MRBM (Thor, Jupiter missiles) were considered a stopgap; ICBMs would not be available before 1963; long-range bombers and MRBMs were to guarantee the retaliatory capabilities of the US, Britain and NATO in the interval period 1957–63.

¹⁷⁶ The Eastern European governments did not even learn – before 1983, it seems – when the Soviet Union started to deploy nuclear weapons and how many. See E. Moreton, ‘Gorbachev’, in Freedman, 61 f.

¹⁷⁷ Jan Cuthbertson, ‘The Political Objectives of Conventional Arms Control’, in Blackwill and Larrabee, Arms Control, 99.

¹⁷⁸ General Bradley, the American Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put this in rather blunt terms: ‘… We don't have enough atomic weapons to plaster all of Europe. Twelve German divisions would put a completely different picture on the situation. It would force [the Soviet Union] to a considerable build-up before they could attack. German participation would make it certain that we are given warning …’. Quoted in Jansen, Groβbritannien, 39–40.

¹⁷⁹ Canadian Embassy, Washington, to DEA, Ottawa, Tel WA 1092, report on NATO Annual Review and D. Sandys meeting at the State Dept, 17 June 1954, NAC, file no. 50030-AG-I-40.

¹⁸⁰ Churchill in 1953; Eden in 1955; Macmillan (as Foreign Secretary) in 1956; Butterworth (US Embassy, London) to Dept of State, 4 Nov. 1954, Possibility of UK moves towards discussion with USSR for relaxation of tensions, NA Wash., 641.61/11 – 454.

¹⁸¹ Kaiser, K., ‘The Federal Republic of Germany: the case of a reluctant latecomer’, in Flynn, G., ed., The West and the Soviet Union: Politics and Policy (1990)Google Scholar; Haftendorn, H., Security and Détente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy (1985)Google Scholar; Nerlich, U., ‘Continuity and Change: The Political Context of Western European Defense’, in Holst, J. J. and Nerlich, U., eds., Beyond Nuclear Deterrence. New Aims – New Arms (New York, 1978), 9–40.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Joffe's excellent article, ‘View’. Cf. William, T. R. Fox and Warner, R. Schilling, eds., European Security and the Atlantic System (New York/London, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁸³ Dulles–Brentano, record of conversation, 21 Nov. 1957, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 198 ff.

¹⁸⁴ J. F. Dulles to Macmillan, 10 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 362 ff. Similar fears induced the Kennedy Government to relaunch the MLF project. See Schmidt, ‘Nuclear Diplomacy’; Scherz, Deutschlandpolitik, 157 ff.

¹⁸⁵ Dulles report on NAC meeting, a Dept. of State, 17 Dec. 1955, FRUS, 1955–7, iv. 369–71; cf. Dulles to Macmillan, 15 Dec. 1955: ‘… to do something to capture the imagination of the Germans and European integration offers a means to this end’.

¹⁸⁶ This notion was to mark that NATO was not simply a multinational alliance but a multilateral security partnership. Adenauer–Macmillan, record of conversation, 15 Dec. 1957, N.A. (57) Del. 5, PREM 11 – 1839.

¹⁸⁷ Schwabe, K., ‘Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Einigung Europas 1945–1952’, in Franz, O., ed., Europas Mitte (Göttingen, 1987), 166–82;Google ScholarSchwabe, K., ed., Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/1 (Baden-Baden, 1988)Google Scholar; Ebersold, B., Machtverfall und Machtbewuβtsein. Britische Friedens- und Konflikt-strategie 1918–1956 (Munich, 1992), 358 ff.;Rupieper, Verbündete; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt Freiburg, eds., Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik (thereafter MGFA), Vol. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ Schwartz, ‘Key’, 382 ff.; MGFA, Vol. 1.

¹⁸⁹ Eden, memo to Cabinet, 19 Dec. 1952, Dockrill, Britain, 109.

¹⁹⁰ Diplomatic representation of the FRG in Paris, report to Bonn, 31 July 1953, ‘Neue Argumente der Gegner der EVG in Frankreich’, 221–201 Tgb. 2742/53, PA-AA 11 1747/53. The report refers to Fontaine's article in Le Monde, ‘La Paix – est-elle contagieuse?’. This article advocated the demise of the EDC project and an armed ‘half’-neutrality of a reunited Germany.

¹⁹¹ Lord Home, 27 June 1961, FO 371 – 160 478.

¹⁹² Rusk–Gromyko, meeting in Geneva, April 1962; Shuckburgh, memo, 13 April 1962, PREM 11 – 3783; cf. Scherz, Deutschlandpolitik, 140 ff., 147 ff., on the development since July/Aug. 1961.

¹⁹³ Kennedy to W. W. Rostow, early Aug. 1961, quoted by Bender, Neue Ostpolitik, 63; cf. Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel, 85.

¹⁹⁴ S. Lloyd to Kuznetsov, Report on the visit of the prime minister and the foreign secretary to the Soviet Union, 21 Feb – 3 March 1959, CAB. 133–293.

¹⁹⁵ Grewe to AA, 24 March 1959, Rückblenden, 390/1; cf. Huth, Relations, 190 ff.

¹⁹⁶ FO memo, C.C. 53 (57), CAB. 129– 86; cf. PREM 11 – 2347.

¹⁹⁷ Dulles in conversation with Couve de Murville in Paris, 5 July 1958, NA Wash. 611.51/7–558.

¹⁹⁸ L. B. Johnson, Address to National Conference of Editorial Writers, 7 Oct. 1966. The author of the ‘bridgebuilding’ speech was Z. Brzezinski.

¹⁹⁹ K. Carstens memo, 14 Oct. 1966, quoted by Hildebrand, K., Von Erhard zur Groβen Koalition, 1963–1969; Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (Stuttgart-Wiesbaden, 1984), iv. 199.Google Scholar