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Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2016

RYAN LONG
RYAN LONG*
Affiliation:
Philadelphia University
*
*<longr@philau.edu>
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Abstract

Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ political liberalism as well.

Selon l’égalitarisme de la fortune, la justice distributive est à comprendre en termes de notre capacité d’être responsables de nos choix. Tant les partisans que les opposants d’un tel égalitarisme présupposent qu’il doit être fondé sur une conception compréhensive de la responsabilité. Je réponds aux opposants en développant une conception politique de la responsabilité qui demeure agnostique devant la métaphysique du libre choix. Pour ce faire, je propose une relecture de la distinction rawlsienne entre le politique et le compréhensif. Une conséquence surprenante est que de nombreuses objections à l’égalitarisme de la fortune s’avèrent être des objections au libéralisme de Rawls.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 107 - 130
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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