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A Problem about Identity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2010
Extract
1. The problem: Here are three plausible but incompatible propositions:
(1) The answer to Locke's question (23):
Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night … I ask … whether the day and the night man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato ?
is yes.
(2) I am a human being. More generally, human persons are human beings.
(3) Identity is not relative.
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- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 1974 , pp. 455 - 474
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- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1974
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