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Annas: The Just Soul, the Community, and the Circularity Objection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2014

HUSAIN SARKAR
HUSAIN SARKAR*
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
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Abstract

Annas’ virtue ethics faces the Circularity Objection. She claims that a just soul is disposed to doing just acts. If a just soul is defined neither in terms of right acts nor rules, then the Circularity Objection is circumvented. Drawing upon Korsgaard’s recent work, it is shown that Annas’ argument faces anew the Circularity Objection. Then, I examine Annas’ fresh attempts to avert the Circularity Objection by appealing to the community of the virtuous. I argue that this move does not save her theory from either relativism or the Circularity Objection.

L’éthique de la vertu d’Annas est confrontée à l’objection de la circularité. Annas affirme qu’une âme juste est disposée à poser des actes justes. On contourne l’objection de la circularité si l’on ne définit l’âme juste ni en termes d’actes bons, ni en termes de règles. En m’appuyant sur les récents travaux de Korsgaard, je démontre que l’argument d’Annas se heurte de nouveau à l’objection de la circularité. Ensuite, j’examine de quelle façon Annas tente une fois de plus d’éviter l’objection de la circularité en faisant appel à la communauté des vertueux. Je soutiens que cette démarche ne préserve sa théorie ni du relativisme, ni de l’objection de la circularité.

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Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 159 - 184
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2014 

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