Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-fwgfc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-10T18:08:51.892Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Contractarianism and Moral Standing Inegalitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2016

ANDREW I. COHEN
ANDREW I. COHEN*
Affiliation:
Georgia State University
*
*<aicohen@gsu.edu>
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, David Gauthier) sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call ‘decent treatment.’ Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than do others. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.

Le contractarianisme est plus inclusif que les critiques, incluant David Gauthier, le suggèrent parfois. Le contractarianisme permet de justifier que les personnes humaines aient un statut moral égal (à certains égards), et de reconnaître à plusieurs animaux non humains un statut moral suffisant pour que ce que nous appelons communément un «traitement décent» leur soit dû. En outre, le contractarianisme peut admettre que certaines entités aient un statut moral supérieur à d’autres. Cela n’autorise pas nécessairement l’oppression que les égalitaristes libéraux craignent à juste titre. Cela montre plutôt que le contractarianisme peut rendre compte du statut moral de façon nuancée.

Keywords

David Gauthiercontractarianismmoral standingmoral statuspolitical philosophy
Type
Special Topic: Gauthier’s Contractarian Project
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 639 - 658
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Badhwar, Neera Kapur 1993 “The Circumstances of Justice: Pluralism, Community, and Friendship.” Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (3): 250–276.Google Scholar
Becker, Lawrence C. 2005 “Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability.” Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 116 (1): 9–39.Google Scholar
Buchanan, Allen 2009 “Moral Status and Human Enhancement.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4): 346–381.Google Scholar
Carruthers, Peter 1992 The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, Andrew I. 2014 “Famine Relief and Human Virtue.” In Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, second edition. Edited by Cohen, Andrew I. and Heath Wellman, Christopher, 431–446. Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
Cohen, Andrew I. 2009 “Contractarianism and Interspecies Welfare Conflicts.” Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 227–257.Google Scholar
Cohen, Andrew I. 2007 “Contractarianism, Other-regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2): 188–201.Google Scholar
Cohen, Andrew I. 2002 “Warmongers, Martyrs, and Madmen versus the Hobbesian Laws of Nature.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4): 561–586.Google Scholar
DeGrazia, David 2002 Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeGrazia, David 1996 Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Frey, R.G. 2005 “Animals and their Medical Use.” In Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, second edition. Edited by Cohen, Andrew I. and Heath Wellman, Christopher, 91–103. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
Gaus, Gerald 2012 The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Reprint edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David 1987 Morals by Agreement. Fifth printing edition. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goodpaster, Kenneth E. 1978 “On Being Morally Considerable.” The Journal of Philosophy 75 (6): 308–325.Google Scholar
Harman, Elizabeth 2003 “The Potentiality Problem.” Philosophical Studies 114 (1/2): 173–198.Google Scholar
Hooker, Brad 2003 Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hunt, Lester H. 1999 “Flourishing Egoism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1): 72–95.Google Scholar
Kamm, F.M. 2008 Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel 1996 The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Gregor, Mary J.. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel 1963 “Duties toward Animals and Spirits.” In Lectures on Ethics, translated by Infield, Louis, 239–251. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Kavka, Gregory S. 1985 “The Reconciliation Project.” In Morality, Reason, and Truth, edited by Copp, David and Zimmerman, David, 279–319. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld.Google Scholar
Kittay, Eva Feder 1999 Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Korsgaard, Christine 2004 “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and our Duties to Animals.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (25/26): 77–110.Google Scholar
McMahan, Jeff 2003 The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 2011 “The Idea of Moral Standing.” In The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, edited by Beauchamp, Tom L. and Frey, R.G., 255–275. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 2007 “The Trouble with Justice.” In Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Bloomfield, Paul, 15–30. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 1998 “Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing.” In Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, edited by Coleman, Jules L., Morris, Christopher W., and Kavka, Gregory S., 186–207. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 1996 “A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification.” In Moral Knowledge, edited by Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Timmons, Mark, 215–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morris, Christopher W. 1991 “Moral Standing and Rational-Choice Contractarianism.” In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by Vallentyne, Peter, 76–96. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Murray, Malcolm 1998 “Unconsidered Preferences.” South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (4): 346–353.Google Scholar
Narveson, Jan 1999 Moral Matters. Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha 2007 Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha 2004 “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 24: 413–507.Google Scholar
O’Neill, Onora 1996 Toward Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Singer, Peter 2009 Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.Google Scholar
Singer, Peter 2007 “All Animals are Equal.” In Ethics in Practice, edited by LaFollette, Hugh, 171–180. Third edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Singer, Peter 1972 “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3): 229–243.Google Scholar
Taylor, Paul 1986 Respect for Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Vallentyne, Peter 1991 “Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern.” In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by Vallentyne, Peter, 71–75. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wenar, Leif 2007 “Responsibility and Severe Poverty.” In Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?, edited by Pogge, Thomas, 255–274. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wolf, Susan 1982 “Moral Saints.” Journal of Philosophy 79 (8): 419–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar