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Grasping a Proposition and Cancellation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2023

Faraz Ghalbi
Faraz Ghalbi*
Affiliation:
University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran Department of Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran
*
Email: farazghalbi@ipm.ir
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Abstract

Recently, Indrek Reiland proposed a new version of the act-type theory of propositions (ATT) in which predication is still committal. However, the Frege-Geach problem can be addressed without resorting to Peter Hanks's cancellation manoeuvre. In this article, I argue that if we take predication as a committal act, we will then have to tackle another problem: non-committal representational acts. I argue that Reiland still needs a notion of cancellation to deal with the latter problem. On this account, he cannot avoid the major flaw he attributes to Hanks's version.

Résumé

Résumé

Récemment, Indrek Reiland a proposé une nouvelle version de la théorie des propositions comme type d'actes (ATT) dans laquelle la prédication demeure un acte d'engagement. Cependant, le problème Frege-Geach peut être abordé sans recourir à la manœuvre d'annulation de Peter Hanks. Dans cet article, je soutiens que si nous considérons la prédication comme un acte d'engagement, nous devrons alors nous attaquer à un autre problème : celui des actes représentationnels qui n'ont pas de dimension d'engagement. Je soutiens que Reiland a encore besoin d'une notion d'annulation pour traiter ce dernier problème. De ce fait, il ne peut éviter le défaut majeur qu'il attribue à la version de Hanks.

Keywords

act-type theorypropositionpredicationgraspingcancellation
Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , April 2024 , pp. 185 - 199
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association/Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie

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