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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2009
ABSTRACT: In a seminal article on the origin of philosophical idealism in the western philosophical tradition, Myles Burnyeat argued that idealism could not have come about prior to Descartes. According to Burnyeat, Descartes introduced a radical version of external world scepticism which made it possible for subsequent philosophers (Berkeley, e.g.) to argue that reality is composed exclusively of immaterial minds and their contents (ideas). I argue that (1) the success of Burnyeat’s argument depends upon the meaning of the term ‘idealism’ and (2) that one of Burnyeat’s definitions of the term does not rule out the possibility of Pre-Cartesian idealism.
RÉSUMÉ : Dans un article fondateur sur l’origine de l’idéalisme philosophique dans la tradition philosophique occidentale, Myles Burnyeat a soutenu que l’idéalisme ne pourrait pas être arrivé avant Descartes. Selon Burnyeat, Descartes a présenté une version radicale du solipsisme qui l’a rendu envisageable pour les philosophes ultérieurs (Berkeley, par exemple) afin de soutenir que la réalité est composée exclusivement des esprits immatériels et de leurs contenus (les idées). Je soutiens 1) que le succès de l’argument de Burnyeat dépend ce que l’on entend par «idéalisme» et 2) qu’une des définitions donnée par Burnyeat de ce terme n’exclut pas la possibilité d’un idéalisme pré-cartésien.
1 Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed” (hereafter IGP), in Idealism: Past and Present. ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50.
2 Ibid., 47.
3 George Berkeley, “Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water,” vol. 5 of The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A.A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1953), §311, 143.
4 IGP, 43-4.
5 Ibid., 50.
6 Thaeatetus, §151-183, contains a description and critique of the theory.
7 IGP, 21.
8 Ibid., 21-2.
9 Berkeley, § 310-12.
10 IGP, 29.
11 Ibid., 50.
12 Ibid., 44.
13 Ibid., 38-42.
14 Ibid., 50.
15 Ibid., 19.
16 Ibid., 34.
17 Ibid., 19.
18 Ibid., 23.
19 For a critique of Burnyeat’s view that Berkeleyan idealism is strictly a modern development, see the following works by Dermot Moran: “Spiritualis Incrassatio: Eriugena’s Intellectualist Immaterialism: Is it an Idealism?” in Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition, ed. Stephen Gersh and Dermot Moran. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 123-150; “Idealism in Medieval Philosophy: The Case of Johannes Scottus Eriugena,” in Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8, (1999): 53-82; “Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon: an Examination of Eriugena’s Understanding of the Physical World,” in At the Heart of the Real, ed. F. O’Rourke (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), 67-96; The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
20 IGP, 43.
21 Gail Fine, “Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern,” in Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Jon Miller and Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 192-231.
22 IGP, 23.
23 Plotinus, The Enneads (hereafter E), trans. Stephen Mackenna (London: Penguin, 1991). References are to the treatise , section, and chapter followed by pagination in the above edition.
24 E, 5. 2. 1, 361-2.
25 E, 4. 5. 2, 390.
26 E, 3. 7. 11, 227.
27 E, 2. 4. 6-10, 96-100.
28 E, 4. 3. 9, p361-3.
29 This interpretation of Plotinus is distinct from the view held by some scholars that Plotinus denied the existence of matter. See Terence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 194-5.
30 IGP, 30-1. John Bussanich makes a similar case in “Realism and Idealism in Plotinus,” Hermathena 157, 21-42.
31 J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). The case for Rist’s reading is made in chapter 4.
32 E.g. E, 5. 1. 7, 355.
33 IGP, 31.
34 Ibid., 33.
35 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 287-94.
36 Ibid., 290-1.
37 Gregory, In Hexaemeron, in vol. 45 of Patrologia Graeca, col. 69B-C, ed. J. P. Migne. trans. Sorabji, op. cite n. 33, 290.
38 Gregory, De Anima et Resurrectione, in Migne, op. cite n. 35, vol. 46. trans. Sorabji, op. cite. n. 35, 290-1.
39 Gregory, De Hominis Opificio, trans. Sorabji, op. cite N. 35, 291.
40 Ibid., 291-2.
41 E, 2. 4. 11, 100-1.
42 IGP, 50.
43 Ibid., 19.
44 Bernard Williams, “The Legacy of Greek Philosophy,” in The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal, ed. M. I. Finley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 204.
45 References are to the standard section numbers of Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge Part I, (hereafter PHK), in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vol. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948-1957); PHK, §§2-3.
46 PHK, §138.
47 PHK, §1.
48 PHK, §3.
