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Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2009

David B. Hershenov
David B. Hershenov*
Affiliation:
University at Buffalo
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve the problems posed by the two kinds of conjoined twins, the constitution theorist must accept that constitution is not always a one-to-one relationship.

RESUME: La théorie constitutionnelle de l’identité personnelle de Lynne Baker soulève certains problèmes qui deviennent évidents lorsque l’on considère des expériences de pensée sur des transplantations de cerveaux et deux genres de cas rares de jumeaux conjoints — du premier cas paraît s’ensuivre qu’il y a deux personnes pour un seul organisme alors que du deuxième découle qu’une seule personne existe dans deux organismes. Afin d’expliquer les problèmes qui surviennent avec les transplantations de cerveaux, le théoricien de la constitution doit admettre un niveau de constitution intermédiaire entre l’organisme et la personne. Pour résoudre les problèmes que posent les cas de jumeaux conjoints, le théoricien de la constitution doit accepter que la relation de constitution ne se réalise pas toujours entre deux termes.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 291 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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