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The Evolution of Science: Reformation and Counter-Reformation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Stefan Amsterdamski
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Extract

The remarks which follow deal with the ideas which I developed in more detail in my book: between Experience and Metaphysics. They are inspired principally by the vigorous polemic aroused by the publication several years ago of a work which caused a great uproar in epistemological circles; I am speaking of The Structure of Scientific Revolution by T.S. Kuhn. One could thus consider this essay, as well as my book, as an element to be added to that polemic's dossier. It goes without saying that I am indebted to a great number of those who before me have given their points of view on the question, whether I agree with their opinions or not.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 23 , Issue 89 , March 1975 , pp. 21 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

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References

* Text of a lecture given in Boston at the Colloquium for Philosophy in October 1973.

1 Stefan Amsterdamski: Miedzy doswiadczeniem a metafizyka, Warszawa 1973.

2 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962, 2nd ed. 1970.

3 Cf. The Structure…, p. 121.

4 Cf. I. Lakatos, " Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in: Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, p. 91-197; "History and its Rational Reconstructions," in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, t. VIII 1972, p. 91-136.

5 The Structure…, p. 57-58.

6 Cf. the papers of J.W.N. Watkins, S. E. Toulmin, L. P. Williams, P. K. Feyerabend in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970.

7 Cf. T. S. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, p. 7-10.

8 Cf. The Structure…, p. 35-40.

9 Ibid., p. 35.

10 Cf. Kuhn's characteristic of normal science with the characteristic of the difference between basic and applied research given by R. Oppenheimer to the Senate Commission of Atomic Energy: H. Hall, "Scientists and Politicians," in: Barber and Hirsch (eds.), Sociology of Science, Glencoe, 1962.

11 The Structure…, p. 37.

12 Cf. Krzysztof Pomian: "Dzialanie i sumienie," Studia Filozoficzne 1967, 3.

13 L. Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason, New York, 1968, p. 202.

14 According to Popper, a theory is subject to falsification if, and only if, it can be placed in conflict with experience; a theory which does not fulfill this condition is not scientific.

15 The protective belt of hypothesis: term used by Lakatos to name the body of hypotheses introduced by the scientist to eliminate the contradictions between the results of experiences and the "hard core"; these hypotheses change as one passes from one theory to another within the outline of the same program.

16 Modus tollens: a reasoning in the following manner: if a statement p implies a statement q and its contrary non-q, then non-p. In other words, any statement which implies two contradictory statements must be rejected.

17 Hard core: name given by Lakatos to the body of hypotheses which form a program of research and which are maintained during the entire period of its realization.

18 Let us notice, however, that J. Agassi is right when he says that this conception is a deviation from the fundamental ideas of falsificationism. (Cf. J. Agassi, "Science in Flux," in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, t. III 1967, p. 293-324. I believe that no matter how right is Lakatos' conception, naming it falsificationism is nothing but façon de parler. If the term falsificationism has a definite meaning in the philosophy of science, it denotes a thesis that science evolves by means of successive falsifications of theories exposed to the most severe verdicts of experiments, as well as the methodo logical postulate of asking what are the facts which could contradict the accepted theory. Lakatos refutes this thesis as well as the methodological postulate.

19 Cf. I. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, p. 125.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 116.

22 I believe that the opinion according to which several research programs are always in operation is as wrong as the monoparadigmatic conception of evolution of knowledge.

23 Cf. Ibid., pp. 126-127.

24 K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 52; cf. ibid. and 9, 10, 11.

25 I. Lakatos, Falsification…, p. 138.

26 I. Lakatos, "History and its Rational Reconstruction," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, t. VIII, p. 105-109.

27 Ibid.

28 W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in: "From Logical Point of View ", 1961, p. 42-43.

29 Ibidem.

30 Cf. R. Suszko, "Formal Logic and the Development of Knowledge," in: Problems of the Philosophy of Science, t. III, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 210-222.

31 Cf. Helena Eilstein: "Hipotezy ontologiczne i orientacje ontologiczne," in: Teoria i doswiadczenie, Warsaw, 1966, p. 223-242.

32 Cf. A. Koyre "De l'influence des conceptions philosophiques sur l'evolution des theories scientifiques," in: Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique, Paris, 1961, p. 246.