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Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Value
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Extract
This paper deals with the problem of value in the psychoanalytic theory of human nature and culture. In particular, it is concerned with this problem in the theory as it was expounded by Freud. First, I shall show how the problem of value is an integral part of the therapeutic situation which Freud encountered. In regard to Freud's own assessment of the problem, I shall point out some difficulties of a cognitive and a moral nature for which his theory must, but cannot, account. In the second part of the paper I shall show how the problem of value is an indispensable component of Freud's overall theory of man and culture, what may be called his “general theory.” This part will be concerned with its peculiar normative and scientific status. I shall try to show how descriptive and prescriptive ethics are (1) confused in Freud's theory and (2) that it is a confusion that cannot be avoided if the theory is to serve the purpose that Freud seemed to believe it must serve, namely, as a science not only of what man is but also of what man ought not to be.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © 1967 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)
References
1 Heinrich Meng and Ernst L. Freud (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister, (New York, 1964) pp. 101-102. See also Maurice Natenberg, Freudian Psycho-antics: Fact and Fraud in Psychoanalysis, (Chicago, 1953) p. 95. Natenberg cites evidence to show that Freud was indiffer ent to suicide on the part of his patients. However, the latter is based upon hearsay evidence and should not be credited without further and more reliable documentation. At best Natenberg's account is consistent with Freud's keener interest in theory and research as opposed to therapy.
2 Psychoanalysis and Faith, p. 16.
3 Freud, "Postscript to a Discussion of Lay Analysis," trans. James Strachey, Collected Papers, London, 1953, vol. V, pp. 210-211. Hereinafter Collected Papers will be cited as C.P.
4 Freud, C.P., V, p. 211. For a significant contrast to this view, see Freud, "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" (Part III), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, XVI, ed. James Strachey (London, 1953), p. 386: "I also learnt then to stand obstinately by my suspicions till I had overcome the patient's disingenuousness and compelled them to con firm my views." Hereinafter The Standard Edition will be cited as S.E.
5 Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York, 1960), p. 69, Italics in text.
6 Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," trans. Joan Rivière, C.P., V, pp. 316-357.
7 Freud, "The Question of Lay Analysis," S.E., XX, p. 190, Italics added.
8 Freud, "Resistances to Psychoanalysis," trans. James Strachey, C.P., V., p. 171.
9 Freud is a determinist but it is not clear whether his deterministic view is compatible with freedom and moral responsibility. This seems to be the case in the practice of his therapy since patients presumably are enabled to alter their character and their behavior as a result of analytic treatment. In his theory of human nature and culture, however, Freud seems to hold the view that even the behavior of the so-called "normal" person is hopelessly determined. This seeming inconsistency cannot be fully discussed here. For some incisive com ments on this problem in Freud's theory, see A. C. MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (London, 1958), pp. 89-95.
10 Freud, " Civilization," S.E., XXI, pp. 141-144.
11 Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York, Doubleday Anchor Edition, 1959), p. 358.
12 Julian Wohl, "Introduction to a Critique of the Reality Concept," Psycho analysis and the Psychoanalytic Review, XLIX (Fall 1962), p. 111.
13 Freud, "An Autobiographical Study," S.E., XX, p. 72.
14 Freud, S.E., XX, p. 59.
15 Freud, "Preface to J. J. Putnam's Addresses on Psychoanalysis," S.E., XVIII, p. 270.
16 Robert Waedler, Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis (New York, 1960), pp. 90-93.
17 J. A. C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, (London, Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 125-130.
18 Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy, (New York, 1962), passim. Also of importance here is the work of Thomas S. Szasz, especially The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York, 1965). Szasz argues that psychoanalysis is essentially ethical and that this is the correct interpretation of Freud's theory.
19 This does not mean that Rieff is correct about the final effect of orthodox analytic therapy upon the person.
20 On these views of Freud see New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalvsis (New York, 1933), in particular, Chapter VII, "A Philosophy of Life;" "The Future of an Illusion" and "Civilization and Its Discontents," S.E., XX; and "Resistances to Psychoanalysis" and "Why War?", C.P., V.
21 Freud, "Civilization", S.E., XXI, p. 84; also, though written much earlier, "Some Character-types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work: (I) The Exception," S.E., XIX, pp. 311-315.
22 The failure to consider fully this aspect of Freud's reflections on culture and its relation to the individual results in a misunderstanding of the ambivalent (in the Freudian sense of "ambivalence") nature of Freud's moral theory.
23 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 88.
24 Harper, Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy: 36 Systems (Englewood Cliffs, 1959) pp. 148-149.
25 Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 49: "… the ego ideal answer in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man."
26 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 253.
27 Freud, "Why War?," trans. James Strachey, C.P., V, p. 284.
28 Freud, "Civilization," S.E., XXI, p. 145. See also "Why War?," C.P., V, p. 287: "But one thing we can say: whatever fosters the growth of culture works at the same time against war." Italics in text.