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The Theory of Mass Society

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2024

Extract

A specter is haunting sociologists. It is the specter of “mass society.” This phantasm is not of the sociologist's own making. The conception of mass society, that had its origin in the Roman historians’ idea of the tumultuous populace and its greatest literary expression in Coriolanus, is largely a product of the nineteenth century. In this epoch, it is a product of the reaction against the French Revolutions which ran from 1789, through 1830 and 1848, to 1871. Jakob Burckhardt and Friedrich Nietzsche, fearful of the inflammability of the mob in the presence of a heated demagogue—that demagogue was Louis Napoléon—came to envisage modern society, particularly modern democratic society, as tending toward an inert and formless mass, lying in brutish torpor most of the time and occasionally aroused to plebiscitary acclamation by a “great simplifier.” Tocqueville's critique of the absolutist ancien régime, centered on a vision of a society which has lost its framework of feudal liberty through the destruction of the autonomous corporations and estates on which it rested, is a cornerstone of that construction. The no-man's land between the absolute prince and the mass of the population became a field open to passion and manipulation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1962 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

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References

1 In a society touched by moral equalitarianism, the possibility of a populistic inequalitarianism in which some become "more equal than others" is by no means remote. In American society, and possibly in Australia, which have gone farther in this direction than any other countries, and where populism is not merely a doctrine of the intellectuals but a belief and practice of the populace and its politicians, there is always some danger that a strong gust of populistic sentiment can disrupt the civil order. Such was the situation during the years from 1947 to 1954, when the late Senator McCarthy stirred and was carried by the whirlpool of an extreme populism. But it never spread into the entire society; and, in the end, it broke on the rocks of Republican respectability. It remains a latent possi bility, inherent in the ethos of mass society.