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On Precision of Expression

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Adam Schaff
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Extract

Both in the case of colloquial language and in the case of specialized scientific language we always have to face the essential issue : what must we do in order not to be misled by an incorrect use of language? When we refer in general to being misled by some use of language we have two cases in mind: primo, when the language in question wrongly performs its communicative function so that the speaker is unable to convey his ideas to the listener, and, secundo, when the language by means of which we think imposes on us, through its structure and forms fixed by tradition (in the case of natural languages), incorrect ideas about reality (cf. the issues of hypostases). The causes of such and similar difficulties are varied. These difficulties, among other things, suggest the idea that language is not only an instrument, but also an object of research, an idea which induced twentieth century philosophers to engage in the study of language in its ontological, gnosiological, and methodological aspects. The method of semantic analysis, understood as a method of analysis of meanings of words, is directed precisely against these shortcomings of language. That method is meant to prevent semantic and logical errors that encumber the process of thinking with difficulties and hamper communication both with others and with oneself. Among other causes, these errors are due to the ambiguity and vagueness of words.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 9 , Issue 35 , September 1961 , pp. 34 - 59
Copyright
Copyright © 1961 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

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