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Haase, Michaela
2008.
Trends in Business and Economic Ethics.
p.
229.
Article contents
Why ‘Law and Economics’ Is Not the Frankenstein Monster
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2008
Extract
In a published debate between Law and Economics avatar Judge Richard Posner and Professor Robin Malloy entitled ‘Is Law and Economics Moral?’, Malloy argued that the dominant methodology of Law and Economics (Posner's Chicago-style wealth maximization) is immoral. Malloy likened it to the Frankenstein Monster – an unholy, undead abomination that can go berserk despite its ostensibly benign provenience. Malloy claimed that wealth maximization applied to social discourse ‘reduces people to an human existence to imaginary variables for calculation’.
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