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Cognitive Peerhood, Epistemic Disdain, and Affective Polarisation: The Perils of Disagreeing Deeply

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2023

Victoria Lavorerio Open the ORCID record for Victoria Lavorerio [Opens in a new window]
Victoria Lavorerio*
Affiliation:
Universidad de la República, Uruguay
*
Email: victoria.lavorerio@fic.edu.uy
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Abstract

Is it possible to disagree with someone without considering them cognitively flawed? The answer seems to be a resounding yes: disagreeing with someone doesn't entail thinking less of them. You can disagree with someone and not think that they are unreasonable. Deep disagreements, however, may challenge this assumption. A disagreement is deep when it involves many interrelated issues, including the proper way to resolve the disagreement, resulting in its persistence. The parties to a deep disagreement can hold neutral or even positive judgements of each other's epistemic character, as parties’ judging each other's epistemic character negatively (i.e., epistemic disdain) is not a defining feature of deep disagreements. When analysing real-life cases, however, we find that epistemic disdain is typical of deep disagreements. In this article, I analyse why this is the case. Given that epistemic disdain undermines cognitive peerhood, the prospects of deep disagreements between epistemic peers seem bleak. Finally, it is discussed how the phenomenon of epistemic disdain, as it relates to deep disagreements, may increase affective polarisation.

Keywords

Deep disagreementscognitive peerhoodepistemic disdainaffective polarisationcrossed disagreements
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 798 - 812
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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