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On the Nature of Testimony

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Andrew Cullison
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Abstract

This paper examines several recent positions on the nature of testimony and argues that all are unsatisfactory. The first section argues against narrow, broad, and moderate views. The second section argues against Jennifer Lackey's recent analysis of testimony. Her position is supposed to avoid the problems of the prior accounts, but still suffers from two problems. After discussing those problems, this paper offers and defends an alternative analysis of testimony.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 114 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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