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A STATISTICAL APPROACH TO EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2012
Abstract
We briefly review Condorcet's and Young's epistemic interpretations of preference aggregation rules as maximum likelihood estimators. We then develop a general framework for interpreting epistemic social choice rules as maximum likelihood estimators, maximum a posteriori estimators, or expected utility maximizers. We illustrate this framework with several examples. Finally, we critique this program.
- Type
- Disagreement and Opinion Aggregation
- Information
- Episteme , Volume 9 , Special Issue 2: Formal Social Epistemology, in memory of Horacio Arló-Costa , June 2012 , pp. 115 - 137
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012
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