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EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND EPISTEMIC REASONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2018

Marc-Kevin Daoust
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Abstract

It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one's higher-order attitudes do not align with one's first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. This result doesn't square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons. This provides a partial solution to the above puzzle.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 282 - 302
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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