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Epistemic Dependence and Oppression: A Telling Relationship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2020

Ezgi Sertler Open the ORCID record for Ezgi Sertler [Opens in a new window]
Ezgi Sertler*
Affiliation:
Butler University, Indianapolis, IN, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: esertler@butler.edu
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Abstract

Epistemic dependence refers to our social mechanisms of reliance in practices of knowledge production. Epistemic oppression concerns persistent and unwarranted exclusions from those practices. This article examines the relationship between these two frameworks and demonstrates that attending to their relationship is a fruitful practice for applied epistemology. Paying attention to relations of epistemic dependence and how exclusive they are can help us track epistemically oppressive practices. In order to show this, I introduce a taxonomy of epistemic dependence (interpersonal – communal – structural). I argue that this particular taxonomy is useful for tracking epistemically oppressive practices in institutional contexts. This is because, first, the forms of epistemic dependence in this taxonomy yield, what I call, diagnostic questions. These are questions that help us track how relations of epistemic dependence could become exclusive and that thus help reveal epistemic oppression in institutional contexts. Second, the forms of epistemic dependence in the taxonomy are interrelated. Paying attention not just to each of three forms of epistemic dependence but also to the way in which they are interrelated is useful for illuminating epistemically oppressive practices. I conclude by demonstrating how the diagnostic questions can be used in analyses of concrete institutional practices in asylum law and higher education.

Keywords

Epistemic dependenceepistemic oppressioninterpersonal epistemic dependencecommunal epistemic dependencestructural epistemic dependencesocial epistemologyfeminist epistemologyapplied epistemology
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 394 - 408
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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