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Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Kent W. Staley
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Abstract

Some prominent accounts of scientific evidence treat evidence as an unrelativized concept. But whether belief in a hypothesis is justified seems relative to the epistemic situation of the believer. The issue becomes yet more complicated in the context of group epistemic agents, for then one confronts the problem of relativizing to an epistemic situation that may include conflicting beliefs. As a step toward resolution of these difficulties, an ideal of justification is here proposed that incorporates both an unrelativized evidence requirement and the requirement of the security of the evidence on which a conclusion from data is based. The latter requirement incorporates the consideration of epistemic modal statements.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , October 2010 , pp. 232 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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