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First-Class and Coach-Class Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2023

Spencer Paulson Open the ORCID record for Spencer Paulson [Opens in a new window]
Spencer Paulson*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
*
Email: spencerpaulson2023@u.northwestern.edu
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Abstract

I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.

Keywords

Knowledgegraded knowledgedefeasible reasoningknowledge from falsehoodGettier problemfake barns
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 736 - 756
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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