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On the Virtue of Epistemic Justice and the Vice of Epistemic Injustice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 September 2022

Alkis Kotsonis Open the ORCID record for Alkis Kotsonis [Opens in a new window]
Alkis Kotsonis*
Affiliation:
School of Education, University of Glasgow, 11 Eldon Street, St Andrews Building, Glasgow G3 6NH, UK
*
Email: alkiskotsonis@hotmail.com
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Abstract

In this paper, I develop an account of epistemic justice as a character-based intellectual virtue that a truth-desiring agent would want to possess. The agent who possesses this virtue is just towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a regard for agents as knowers. Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice has a unique position among virtues: epistemic justice is presupposed by every other intellectual virtue, while remaining a standalone virtue itself. Correspondingly, I also offer an account of the vice of epistemic injustice as an epistemically dis-valuable trait of character. The agent who possesses this trait is unjust towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a disregard for agents as knowers. Most importantly, I highlight that the vice of epistemic injustice is entailed by every other epistemic vice, though it remains a distinct vice.

Keywords

Epistemic justice and injusticeintellectual virtue and vicevirtue and vice epistemology
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 598 - 610
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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