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WHAT IS TRANSMISSION*?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

John Greco
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Abstract

Almost everyone agrees that knowledge can be transmitted via testimony, but only some think that transmission is a special phenomenon, and one that has been largely neglected in epistemology. Let's call this “special transmission,” or transmission*. This paper offers a positive proposal for characterizing transmission*, and then considers a radical theoretical option: that an adequate account of transmission* cannot be given in traditional epistemological categories. In that case, traditional epistemological theories are best conceived as explaining knowledge generation rather than knowledge transmission*.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 481 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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